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of these two phenomena, many prominent security experts in b~th
government and private industry have rung an alarm b~ll regardi~g
the potential for acts of cyber-terrorism. However,. there is .no precise
definition of cyber-terrorism under U.S. law or m prac~ice ai:ion.g
cyber-security academicians. The lac~ of a co~on startmg pomt lS
one of the reasons existing law fails to dlrectly address cyberterrorism.
. .
This Article furnishes a lexicon of cyber-related mahc10us
activities and argues for a common working definition of cyberterrorism. This definition can be both incorporated into current
counter-terror legislation and used by government agencies to com~at
cyber-terrorism. This paper arrives at ~hat definition by ana~yzmg
the various definitions proposed by security experts and those m use
by governmental organizations.
This Article builds on these
definitions to arrive at a new definition that is at once broad eno_ugh
to cover the potentially unique effects of a weapon of cyber-terronsm,
while narrow enough to exclude computer network attacks that are
relatively minor in nature. Second, analyzing several recent cyberattacks this Article finds that, while we have not yet faced a "cy~er
9/11," ~omputer network attacks for politic~l purp?ses a~e on the nse
and becoming increasingly complex. Thlrd, this .Artic~e ~nalyzes
current law related to both cyber-crimes and terronsm, fmdmg th~t
while these laws are applicable in many instances, they fall short. m
adequately focusing on the most important factor when address~ng
cyber-terrorism: prevention. This Article concludes
recommen~mg
that cyber-terrorism, as defined in this paper, be mc?rporated mto
some of our most frequently used laws to combat terronsm.

copyrighted music and video files on their website, Megaupload.com.3
The w:bsite was one of the most popular on the Internet with
approximately 150 million registered users, 50 million hits daily, and
endorsements from music superstars earning its founder Kim Dotcom
("Dotcom"), $42 million in 2011. 4
'
~n January 19, 2012, New Zealand police arrived at Dotcom's
mans10n to arrest him. 5 Dotcom retreated into a "safe room" where
he had stored weapons, including a sawed-off shotgun.6 The police
eventua~y cut their .way into the room and arrested him. 7 Following
Dot com s arrest, police arrested three other indicted co-conspirators in
Auckland, New Zealand at the United States' request. 8 Additionally
police executed more than twenty search warrants in the Unitetl
States a~d eight o;her countries and seized approximately fifty million
dollar~ m assets.
The action was "among the largest criminal
copyri.ght cases ever .brought by the United States and directly targets
the misuse of a public content storage and distribution site to commit
and facilitate intellectual property crime. "10
. In the imm~diate aftermath of the arrests, one segment of the
onlme community responded with what the International Herald
:ri?une called ,::;ugital Molotov c?ckt~ils," 1•1 and what CNET called
go mg nuclear.
In apparent dissatisfact10n with the Megaupload
arrests, the hacker group Anonymous launched cyber-attacks against
3.

Id. ("[F]or more than five years the conspiracy has operated websites
that unlawfully reproduce and distribute infringing copies of copyrighted
works ... on a massive scale.").

4.

See Nick Perry, Popular file-sharing website Megaupload shut down
USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
'
tech/~e~s/story /2012-01-19/megaupload-feds-shutdown/52678528/1
(explammg Megaupload's size and profits).

5.

~ee

?Y

INTRODUCTION

"If I had an hour to save the world I would spend 59 minutes defining the
problem and one minute finding solutions. m

On January 5, 2012, an Eastern District of Virginia gran~ j.ury
indicted seven individuals and two corporations, Megaupload Limited
and Vestor Limited, with "racketeering conspiracy, con~piring to
commit copyright infringement, conspiring to . c?mmit m~ney
laundering and two substantive counts of cnmrnal copyright
infringement. "2 The government based the indictme~ts on the alle~ed
conspirators' business of profiting from users illegally sharmg

1.

2.

Albert Einstein.
See Justice Department Charges Leaders of Megaupload with
Widespread Online Copyright Infringement, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
(Jan. 19 2012) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm074.html' [hereinafter DOJ MegauploadJ (identifying the seven
individuals' and two corporations' charges).

276

Kevin J. O'Brien et al., Flashy Promoter of File-Sharing Captured
Ne·w· Zealand Raid, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 2012, at 1
(explammg how Dotcom was arrested).

in

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

See DOJ Megaupload, supra note 2 ("Dotcom, Batato, Ortmann, and
van der Kolk ~~re arrested today in Auckland, New Zealand, by New
Zealand authonties, who executed provisional arrest warrants requested
by the United States.").

9.

Id. (explaining the additional searches and seizures resulting from the
Megaupload conspiracy).

10.

Id.

11.

0 'Brien et al., supra note 5.

12.

Molly Wood, Anonymous goes nuclear; everybody loses?, CNET (Jan.
19, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31322 3-57362437256 /anonymous-goes-nuclear-everybody-loses/.
-
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the websites of the White House, the U.S. Department of ~ustice
("DoJ"), the U.S. Copyright Office, and several entertamment
companies and trade groups. 13 Across the globe, similar ~etwork
attacks were up twenty-four percent immediately followmg the
arrests.14 These actions were crimes, but neither money nor othe~
traditional criminal motives motivated the perpetrators. Anonymous
cyber-attacks were likely politically motivated and geared towards
influencing both government and civilian opinion.
Should the
motivations of such an attack affect how it is classified under the law?
Was this a cyber-crime that the law should treat like an~ ot~er? Was
it an act of civil disobedience? Or, did its political motivat10ns make
it a unique form of terrorism?
.
.
Cyber-crime is now a part of everyday life, and m 2009, caused
15
Gi~e11: the
estimated losses of up to one trillion dollars globally.
potential criminal rewards, law enforcement is as unlikely to ehmmate
cyber-crimes as they are traditional crimes.
Lawmakers have
attempted to keep pace by enacting statutes such as the Co~puter
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), which has been contm:ially_
updated.16 Such statutes criminalize offenses that ar.e collilll~ted
through computers or other information systems loc~ted m the mted
States.17 However, the Internet's inher.ent anon:~11mty make~8 it eas!
for criminals to act in cyberspace without bemg caught.
This

Y

13.

14.

See id. (arguing that the FBI may have go.aded Anonymous into
attacking their website with the arrests followmg deb~tes about new
legislation on Internet piracy in an attempt to turn pubhc support away
from Anonymous and similar hacking groups).
Id. (identifying the effects of the Megaupload conspiracy).

See Elinor Mills, Study: Cybercrime cost firms $1 trillion globally,
CNET (Jan. 28, 2009, 9:01 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_310152246-83.html ("Data theft and breaches from cy.bercrime. may have
cost businesses as much as $1 trillion globally m lost mtellect~al
property and expenditures for repairing the damage last year, accordmg
to a new study from McAfee. "); see generally INTERNET CRIMES
COMPLAINT CTR, 2010 INTERNET CRIME REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.ic3.gov/media/ annualreport/2010_IC3Report. pdf
(reporting the internet crime complaints in 2010).
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (CFAA has been amended six times since it
16.
became law, specifically in 1988, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008).

15.

17.
18.

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Thomas Crampton, Nigeria to battle Internet scams that taint
its image, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.c~m/
2004/01/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-t16_0.html (reportmg on the
infamous Nigerian Internet fraud schemes); accord Somini Sengupta &
Jenna Wortham, U.S. Charges 1 in Online Ad Fraud Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at Bl (describing a rece:r:t Internet fr~ud scheme
that diverted marketing revenue to fraudulent sites by replacmg real ads
with fraudulent ones).
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anonymity, combined with society's increasing reliance on computers
a~d c~mputer networks, has also made a new type of cyber-crime
with d~~erent motivations possible: cyber-terrorism. There is growing
recogmt10n of the threa~ of. cyber-terrorism, and an ever-increasing
amount of proposed legislat10n and academic thought is being put
towards it.s prevention. 19 A well thought-out strategy, however, needs
to start with a common working definition of cyber-terrorism.
T~is Article proposes a common working definition of cyberterronsm that legislators and government agencies can work from to
ensure that ~he ~o~u~ions developed address the most pressing
problems. This defmit10n can be neither too broad nor too narrow or
els~ i.t . risk~ being irrelevant and/ or useless. However, this proposed
defimt1on is. broad enough to cover the potentially unique effects of
cyber-terronsm as a weapon, while sufficiently narrow to exclude
relatively minor computer network attacks.
This Article also shows how existing counter-terrorism statutes
such as statutes prohibiting material support to terrorism 20 th~
F.oreign Int~lligenc~ ~urveillance Act ("FISA"), 21 conspiracy to kill,
kidnap, maim, or mJure persons or damage property in a foreign
country, 22 and statutes addressing weapons of mass destruction
("WMD"), 23 could be amended to incorporate the proposed definition
By incorporating cyber-terrorism into these
of cyber-terrorism.
statutes, an already effect~ve counterterrorism legal regime would also
apply to the cyber-realm. The author does not suggest that these
changes, even if enacted wholesale, would eliminate cyber-terrorism as
a threat. However, a common definition of cyber-terrorism can be
used as a pie.ce in ~he ?uzzle towards the most important goal of
counter-terrorism legislat10n: prevention.
Section ~ examines the current state of cyber-threats and why
current law madequately deals with cyber-terrorism. Section II aims
at p:ovi~ing a definition of cyber-terrorism by including an
exammat10n of each element of the definition a lexicon of definitions
used within the definition, an examination ~f other types of cyberattacks, and a comparison with current definitions of cyber-terrorism
19.

See generally Susan W. Brenner, "At Light Speed": Attribution and
Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Brenner] (describing why
current laws do not ~dequately address the issue of attack attribution);
see also, generally Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are we Legally Ready?,
9 J. INTL Bus. & L. 1 (2010) (arguing for new international conventions
to govern cyber-terrorism).

20.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-B (2006); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).

21.

50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2006).

22.

18

23.

18 U.S.C. § 2332A.

u.s.ci. § 956

(2006).
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°

cyber-terrorism.
SECTION

I:

THE CURRENT SITUATION

"The very technologies that empower us to lead and c~,~:te also empower
those who would disrupt and destroy.

n:w~;~ h~v;

do':::"!

Attacks on information systemds a;;d
.
d · the last two deca es.
· ·
mcrease m
.
f
d that the Department of Defense
Accounting Office report oun
k . 1995.26
("DOD") faced 250,000 attempted attacks on its _networ shm
b'
the number had risen to 6 million,21 and m 2008 t ~ num er
.
m 2006 th 300 million.2s These numbers become staggerm~ ~hen
was more an
t to other cyber-attacks victims.
governmen
. .
f
1ooki n g beyond. the
.
le in the United States were victims o
Seventy~four . mill10n peopult"
. an estimated thirty-two billion
cyber-cnme_ m ~010, r2~s i~g m .
xamines the current threats
dollars in fmancial loss.
This Sect10n e h
t
proach will be
to information system~ and e~lores bhow t~ e kc~::e Dnited States.
inadequate in preventmg a maJor cy er-a ac
A. The Current Threat
President Barack Obama has labeled computer ~etw_orkk attafcks
·
d ational security ns s we ace
"one of the most serious economic an n

24.
25.

26.
27.

28.
29.

as a nation," 30 and stated, "America's economic prosperity in the 21st
century will depend on cybersecurity. "31 The gravity expressed in
these statements, although serious, is mild compared to the fears of
cyber-security experts.
The leading force among cyber-security
experts has been the former chief cyber-security adviser on the
National Security Council, Richard Clarke. 32 In his book Cyber War,
Clarke describes the potential for "a massive cyberattack on civilian
infrastructure that downs power grids for weeks, halts trains, grounds
aircraft, explodes pipelines, and sets fire to refineries. "33 Former
Director of National Intelligence and Director of the National Security
Agency Mike McConnell stated, "[t]he warnings are over. It could
happen tomorrow[.]" 34 McConnell described the potential for such an
attack as impacting the global economy on "an order of magnitude
surpassing" the 9/11 attacks. 35
Whether cyber-attacks have the potential to rise to the level just
described is certainly debatable. 36 However, cyber-attacks motivated
by reasons other tp.an money3 7 are becoming more and more
30.

Obama, supra note 24.

31.

Id.

32.

Profile: Richard Clarke, BBC (Mar. 22, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3559087.stm.

33.

Richard A. Clarke & Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat
to National Security and What to Do About It 260 (2010).

34.

Max Fisher, Fmr. Intelligence Director: New Cyberattack May Be
Worse
Than
9/11,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
30,
2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/frnr-intelligencedirector-new-cyberattack-may-be-worse-than-9-11/63849/.

35.

Id.

36.

See, e.g., Joshua Green, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, WASH. MONTHLY
(Nov. 2002), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/
2001/0211.green.html (arguing the threat of cyber-terrorism is overhyped and focusing too heavily on cyber-security will have a negative
effect on the information technology industry); see also Derek E.
Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 604, 621 (2011)
[hereinafter Bambauer] (arguing that scenes of "cyber-apocalypse" are
overblown, but cyber threats are real and that information, not systems
should be the focus of cyber-security); but see Richard Clarke, Threats
to U.S. National Security: Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards
Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 33, 36-38
(1999-2000) (arguing that large scale cyber-attacks are a distinct
possibility and that the best way to respond to cyber-threats is through
the development of public-private partnerships).

37.

See Lily Kuo, Cyber attacks grow increasingly 'reckless,' says top
official, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/07 /us-usa-cybersecurity-nsa-idUSBRE8861CY20120907
(noting that accusations of hacking for espionage and other motives).
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prevalent. The years 2006 to 2010 saw a 650% increase in cyberattacks on federal agencies. 38 The rise in politically-active hacking
groups, such as Anonymous, demonstrates that. the Inter:iet is
increasingly a platform for dissenters, both domestic and foreign, to
39
express their disagreement with the government.
Espionage on
40
. rapi.dly nsrng
. .
E ven " au-gappe
.
d" 41
information systems is
as we11 .
classified networks are not immune, as the DOD's classified network
42
was compromised in 2008 by an attack using flash drives.
Politically-motivated cyber-attacks are not limited to government
websites. 43 Hacking groups have increasingly attacked corporations
that have policies with which the groups disagree. Examples of such
corporate attacks include a "highly sophisticated" attack on Google in
2010 that originated from China, 44 and numerous coordinated attacks
38.

39.

40.

41.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-463T, CONTINUED
ATTENTION NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR NATION'S CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AND FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2011) (stating
that from 5,503 incidents reported in FY 2006 to 41,776 reported in FY
2010).
See, e.g., Kukil Bora, Anonymous Timeline 2011: The Rise of the
INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb.
23,
2012,
8:58
AM),
Hactivist
http:// w'-ww .ibtimes .com/ articles/ 303449/20120223 /anonymous-hackinghactivist-acta-protest-ddos-blackout .htm (charting the increasing rate of
hacking by Anonymous).
Ellen Nakashima, In a world of cybertheft, U.S. names China, Russia as
main culprits, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security /us-cyberespionage-report-names-china-and-russia-as-mainculprits / 20ll/11/02 / gI QAF 5fRiM_story .html
(repo:ting . on. an
intelligence report to Congress naming China and Russia as the pnmary
culprits of cyber-espionage).
"Air gapped" networks are those physically, electrically, and
electromagnetically isolated from other networks such as t~e Interne~.
See Oliver Rist, Hack Tales: Air-gap networking for the price of a pair
of
sneakers,
INFOWORLD
(May
29,
2006,
2:00
A:-'-1),
http://www.infoworld.com/d/networking/hack-tales-air-gap-networkmgprice-pair-sneakers-610 (describing how an "air gap" network works and
why certain companies choose to utilize them).

42.

William J. Lynn III, Essay, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's
Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2010),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynniii/defending-a-new-domain (describing defense initiatives put in place to
defend the United States from cyber threats).

43.

See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google, Citing Attack,
Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2010),
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13beijing.html.

44.

Id. (discussing Google's reaction to network attacks it says were aimed
at curbing free speech in China).
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against the music and motion picture industries due to the industry's
support of anti-copyright infringement legislation. 45 Other attacks
have had widespread effects on foreign states, such as the 2007 attack
on Estonia, allegedly conducted by Russian hacking groups "that
crippled dozens of government and corporate sites[,]" 46 and the 2009
cyber-attacks against South Korea, which targeted several leading
web pages. 47
Every day, new components of U.S. infrastructure are connected
to computer networks, which allows for more efficient operation, but
also opens these components to network attacks. 48 The development
of smart grid technology49 is such an example. By placing controls of
the power grid on interconnected information systems, power can be
efficiently controlled and distributed. 50 The security of these systems
should be made a national priority. 51 However, no amount of security
spending will completely eliminate vulnerabilities, and those
vulnerabilities will eventually be exploited. 52

45.

See, e.g., Attacks target recording industry websites, BBC NEWS (last
updated Sept. 20, 2010, 7:56 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-11371315.

46.

A look at Estonia's cyber attack in 2007, NBC NEWS (last updated July
,8, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246/
ns/technology_and_science-security /t /look-estonias-cyber-attack/ (the
cyber-attack on Estonia 2007, discussed in Part III(E) of this Article,
was a three week assault on Estonia's "e-government" following the
removal of a Russian memorial in Estonia's capital).

47.

South Korea hit by cyber attacks, BBC NEWS (last updated Mar. 4,
2011, 5:40 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12646052 (these
attacks were blamed by the South Korean Government on North Korea
but definitive links were never established). These attacks are described
infra Section III.

48.

Cf. Norman Announces New SCADA Security System to Protect
Industrial
Infrast~cture,
PR
NEWSWIRE
(Feb.
14,
2012),
http://www.prnewswlie.com/ news-releases/ norman-announces-newscada-security-systein-to-protect-industrial-infrastructure139278053 .html (announcing release of updated security measures for
pipeline SCADA systems, which is designed to counter cyber-attacks).

49.

See Matthew L. Wald, Making Electricity Distribution Smarter, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2009, 11:32 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009 /04/21/making-electricity-distribution-smarter /
(discussing
the
spread of smart grid technology that increases efficiency in electrical
power operations by monitoring and controlling electricity distribution).

50.

Id.

51.

See generally Clarke, supra note 36.

52.

See Bambauer, supra note 36 at 621 (arguing that cyber-security should
focus on protecting information rather than infrastructure).
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The dramatic rise in both attacks and vulnerabilities has led
governments to recognize the enormity of the ~ssue, res~ting in a
push for increasing mandated cyber-secunty .covermg both
government and private networks. At a 2011 hearmg, U.~. House .
Representative Dan Lungren, Chairman of the ~ubcomrmttee .on
Infrastructure Protection, Cybersecurity and Security Technologies,
stated that one of the top concerns for American lawmakers,
intelligence officials, and military leaders is the rapidly growing cyberthreat.53 He cited the belief that "a successful cyber attack on [the
Nation's] power grid or O communications networks could cripple [the]
The President has
economy and threaten national security. "54
established multiple task forces to evaluate and make
recommendations for the future of cyber-security. 55 British Foreign
Secretary William Hague convened a conference on cyber-at~acks after
receiving criticisms for failing to take cyber-threats to his country
seriously. 56 Secretary Hague stated a "global coordinated response" is
required to combat cyber-threats. 57 In 2005, the European Com~cil
adopted the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protect~on
to focus on strengthening information systems and enhancmg
. fr ast ruet ure. "58
preparedness for attacks on " en"t"ica1 m
If, as suggested by these experts, cyber-attacks that equat~ to
terrorism are possible, then there are multiple reasons to believe
terrorist groups will use information systems as weapons of terror.
The Internet and other information systems have attributes that

53.

Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing
Effectiveness Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Infrastructure Prat., Cybersecurity and Sec. Techs., 112th Cong._ 2
(2011) (opening statement of Rep. Dan Lungren at the markup hearmg
of H.R: 3674).

54.

Id.
See generally Bill Lane, Tech Topic 20: Gybes Security and
Communications, FED. COMMC'NS CoMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/
techtopics/techtopics20.html (cataloging executive branch task forces
focused on cyber-security).

55.

56.

57.
58.

GCHQ chief reports 'disturbing' cyber-attacks on UK, BBC NEWS (last
updated Oct. 31, 2011, 12:14 ET), http:/ /www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk15516959 (describing how following several attacks on U .K. Governm~nt
and technology firm computers, the U .K. convened a conference with
world leaders and cyber-security experts to discuss a coordinated global
response to cyber-attacks).
Id.
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EUROPA:
SUMMARIES
EU
LEGIS.
(last
updated
Aug.
17,
2010),
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security /fight
_against_terrorism/133260_en.htm.
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terrorists might appropriate to achieve their goals. 59 The Internet is
global, anonymous, and allows collaboration by people around the
worl~ on a single _project. 6° Cyber-terrorism may be the next logical
step m the evolut10n of terrorism. Given that possibility, preventive
laws should be implemented as soon as possible, not after the first
As Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the
major attack.
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, he stated his belief that "time is not on
our side," and that the Nation should "act to prevent a cyber 9/11
before it happens. "5 i Senator Lieberman went on to describe how he
saw the threat in greater detail, stating:
Every day rival nations, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates
and individual hackers probe the weaknesses in our most critical
computer networks, seeking to steal government and industrial
secrets or to plant cyber agents in the cyber systems that
control our most critical infrastructure and would enable an
enemy to seize control of a city's electric grid or water supply
system with the touch of a key from a world away. 62
What if cyber-terrorists were currently planning a major attack?
What laws could be used to combat this threat? Certainly there are
existing laws, such as the CFAA, under which an attack could be
prosecuted, 63 but these laws may be of little consequence in
attempting to prevent such an attack.
B.

The Inadequacy of the Current Approach

This Article does not suggest that a cyber-apocalypse is just.
around the corner; the author will leave that judgment to intelligence
and industrial security experts. If possible, however, the author
suggests it would be wise to develop a preventive approach. Recently,
the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
introduced a major piece of legislation, entitled the Cybersecurity Act
of 2012. 64 The bill seeks to regulate critical industry cyber-security
and promote information sharing between private parties and

59.

See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REP.
116, How MODERN TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET, 5-11 (2004) available
a~ http://www.usi~.org/files/resources/sr116.pdf
(identifying eight
different ways terrorists use the Internet to advance their cause).

60.

Id. at 3.

61.

Securing America's Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. o~ Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs,
112th Cong. (2012) (openmg statement of Sen. Lieberman, Chairman).

62.

Id.

63.

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). See discussion infra Part IV.

64.

Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
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Secretary William Hague convened a conference on cyber-attacks after
receiving criticisms for failing to take cyber-threats to his country
seriously. 56 Secretary Hague stated a "global coordinated response" i.s
required to combat cyber-threats. 57 In 2005, the European Cou~c1l
adopted the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protect~on
to focus on strengthening information systems and enhancmg
58
preparedness for attacks on "critical infrastructure. "
If, as suggested by these experts, cyber-attacks that equat~ to
terrorism are possible, then there are multiple reasons to believe
terrorist groups will use information systems as weapons of terror.
The Internet and other information systems have attributes that

53.

Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing
Effectiveness Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Infrastructure Prat., Cybersecurity and Sec. Techs., 112th Cong .. 2
(2011) (opening statement of Rep. Dan Lungren at the markup hearmg
of H.R: 3674).

54.

Id.
See generally Bill Lane, Tech Topic 20: Cyber Security and
Communications, FED. CoMMC'NS COMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/
techtopics/techtopics20.html (cataloging executive branch task forces
focused on cyber-security).

55.

56.

57.
58.

GCHQ chief reports 'disturbing' cyber-attacks on UK, BBC NEWS (last
updated Oct. 31, 2011, 12:14 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk15516959 (describing how following several attacks on U.K. Governm~nt
and technology firm computers, the U .K. convened a conference with
world leaders and cyber-security experts to discuss a coordinated global
response to cyber-attacks).
Id.
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EUROPA:
SUMMARIES
EU
LEGIS.
(last
updated
Aug.
17,
2010),
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries / justice_freedom_security /fight
_against_terrorism/133260_en.htm.
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terrorists might appropriate to achieve their goals. 59 The Internet is
global, anonymous, and allows collaboration by people around the
worl~ on a single .project. 6° Cyber-terrorism may be the next logical
step m the evolut10n of terrorism. Given that possibility, preventive
laws should be implemented as soon as possible, not after the first
major attack.
As Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, he stated his belief that "time is not on
our side," and that the Nation should "act to prevent a cyber 9/11
before it happens. "61 Senator Lieberman went on to describe how he
saw the threat in greater detail, stating:
Every day rival nations, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates
and individual hackers probe the weaknesses in our most critical
computer networks, seeking to steal government and industrial
secrets or to plant cyber agents in the cyber systems that
control our most critical infrastructure and would enable an
enemy to seize control of a city's electric grid or water supply
system with the touch of a key from a world away. 62
What if cyber-terrorists were currently planning a major attack?
What laws could be used to combat this threat? Certainly there are
existing laws, such as the CFAA, under which an attack could be
prosecuted, 63 but these laws may be of little consequence in
attempting to prevent such an attack.
B.

The Inadequacy of the Current Approach

This Article does not suggest that a cyber-apocalypse is just.
around the corner; the author will leave that judgment to intelligence
and industrial security experts. If possible, however, the author
suggests it would be wise to develop a preventive approach. Recently,
the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
introduced a major piece of legislation, entitled the Cybersecurity Act
of 2012. 64 The bill seeks to regulate critical industry cyber-security
and promote information sharing between private parties and

59.

See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REP.
116, How MODERN TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET, 5-11 (2004) available
a~ http://www.usi~.org/files/resources/sr116.pdf
(identifying eight
different ways terrorists use the Internet to advance their cause).

60.

Id. at 3.

61.

Securing America's Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. o:i Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs,
112th Cong. (2012) (opemng statement of Sen. Lieberman, Chairman).

62.

Id.

63.

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). See discussion infra Part IV.

64.

Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
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government agencies.65 On August 2, 2012, the Senate voted ~own
67
the bill.66 However, there have been talks of "resurrecting" the bill.
Elements essential to prevent cyber-attacks include regulato~y
oversight, information sharing, and significant financial investment m
cyber-security for the components of the U.S. infrastructure that :un
on information networks.
These components include power gnds,
68
pipelines, and systems containing economic data.
The ?over~m~nt
should develop legal tools to prevent acts of cyber-terronsm, slillllar
to those developed to combat terrorism.
This is not to say that the traditional law enforcement model h~s
no role to play in catching and prosecuting thos~ who comrmt
politically-motivated cyber-crimes. Not all who coi:nmit these types of
Mitchell Frost ~as
cyber-attacks have escaped punishment.
sentenced to thirty months in prison following a 2007 attack agam~t
conservative political websites belonging to Ann Coulter and Bill
O'Reilly.69 A college student who hacked Sarah Palin's email account
during the 2008 presidential campaign was sentenced to a year and a
day in a halfway house. 70 In a successful prosec~tion of an early
cyber-attack on physical infrastructure, an Australian man was s~nt
to jail for hacking into a waste-management system and dumpmg

65.
66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

Id.
Gerry Smith, Cyber Security Law Fails To Pass Senate Before MonthLong Break, THE HUFF. POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 1:15 PM, updated Aug. 3,
2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
..
2012/08/02/cyber-security-law_n_1733751.html (descnbmg how the
Bill fell eight votes shy of the sixty needed to pass).
Chris Finan, Five reasons why Congress should pass C~bersecurity Act
of 2012, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2012, 4:00 PM), htt?://theh1ll.com/
blogs /congress-blog/homeland-security/ 26 7945-five-r~a~ons-whycongress-should-pass-cybersecurity-act-of-2012 (descnbmg Senator Harty
Reid's intentions to reintroduce the Bill for another vote).

millions of liters of raw sewage into parks, rivers, and other
properties. 71
Perhaps the best example of the use of traditional law
enforcement methods was the capture of five Anonymous members in
2012. 72 Following his 2008 arrest, New York based hacker Hector
Monsegur assisted the FBI in tracking other Anonymous members in
exchange for sentencing leniency. 73 His cooperation led to the arrests
of five prominent Anonymous members, prompting one cyber-security
expert to state, "[t]his is the most important roll-up of hackers ever. "74
Traditional law enforcement work certainly has its place in
combating cyber-terrorism. However, the overwhelming majority of
cyber-related crimes evade detection and prosecution. There are a
number of reasons for this. First, many large corporations are
reluctant to report the astounding· number of attacks they receive
given shareholder concerns over cybersecurity and loss of intellectual
Additionally, cyber-crimes continue to receive lower
property. 75
priority than traditional crimes. 76 However, the primary reason is
71.

Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks, REGISTER (Oct.
31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/
hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (the perpetrator worked for the
company that installed the waste management controlling software and
had been recently rejected for employment by the local city council).

72.

Ellen Nakashima, Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, 5 members of Anonymous
hacking
group
charged,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
6,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/ 5-members-ofanonymous-hacking-group-charged/2012/03/06 / gIQAJ70FvR_
story.html?hpid=z4 (explaining the investigation into the hackers group
Anonymous).

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

See Ellen Nakashima & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC: Firms must report
cyberattacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2011, at AlO (describing new
Securities and Exchange Commission guidelines for reporting losses due
to computer network attacks to corporation shareholders); see also Gus
Coldebella, Cyber Security Act of 2012 requires a liability protection bug
fix, THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/ technology/ 212049-cyber-security-act-of-2012-requires-a-liabilityprotection-bug-fix (arguing that the information procedures in the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 do not go far enough and open corporations
to potential liability); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Information Sharing
and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2012, 6:43 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012 /02 /information-sharing-and-thecybersecurity-act-of-2012 / (discussing information sharing procedures in
the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2012 designed to overcome corporate
hesitancy to share information about CNA).

76.

See Ron Condon, Catching Cyber Criminals Yourself, COMPUTER CRIME
RESEARCH CTR (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.crime-research.org/

See William J. Lynn III, U.S. Deputy Sec. of Def., Defending a New
Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct.
2010), available at http://www.foreignaf!airs.com/~rticles/6655~/. . .
william-j-lynn-iii/ defending-a-new-domam (descnbmg defense m1tmt1ves
put in place to defend the U.S. from cyber threats).
Robert McMillan, Bill O'Reilly hacker gets 30 mont~s, CS? (Nov. 8,
201 o),
http://www.csoonline.com/ article/ 634363 /b1ll-o-re1lly-hackergets-30-months.
Bill Poovey Palin e-mail hacker sentenced to 1 year, 1 day, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 12, 2010, 7:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40152249/
ns/politics-more_politics/t/palin-e-mail-hacker-sentence~-year~d~y / .
(stating the defendant had hoped to find information m ~alms onlme
accounts that could derail her campaign, but found nothmg helpful to
that effect).
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govermnent agencies. 65 On August 2, 2012, the Senate voted ~own
67
the bill.66 However, there have been talks of "resurrecting" the bill.
Elements essential to prevent cyber-attacks include regulato~y
oversight, information sharing, and significant financial investment m
cyber-security for the components of the U.S. infrastructure that :un
on information networks.
These components include power gnds,
68
pipelines, and systems containing economic data.
The ~over~~nt
should develop legal tools to prevent acts of cyber-terronsm, sirmlar
to those developed to combat terrorism.
This is not to say that the traditional law enforcement model h~s
no role to play in catching and prosecuting thos~ who comrmt
politically-motivated cyber-crimes. Not all who coi:nmit these types of
cyber-attacks have escaped punishment..
Mitchell Frost :vas
sentenced to thirty months in prison followmg a 2007 attack agam~t
conservative political websites belonging to Ann Coulter and Bill
O'Reilly.69 A college student who hacked Sarah Palin's email account
during the 2008 presidential campaign was sentenced to a year and a
day in a halfway house. 70 In a successful prosec~tion of an early
cyber-attack on physical infrastructure, an Australian man was s~nt
to jail for hacking into a waste-management system and dumpmg

millions of liters of raw sewage into parks, rivers, and other
properties. 71
Perhaps the best example of the use of traditional law
enforcement methods was the capture of five Anonymous members in
2012. 72 Following his 2008 arrest, New York based hacker Hector
Monsegur assisted the FBI in tracking other Anonymous members in
exchange for sentencing leniency. 73 His cooperation led to the arrests
of five prominent Anonymous members, prompting one cyber-security
expert to state, "[t]his is the most important roll-up of hackers ever." 74
Traditional law enforcement work certainly has its place in
combating cyber-terrorism. However, the overwhelming majority of
cyber-related crimes evade detection and prosecution. There are a
number of reasons for this. First, many large corporations are
reluctant to report the astounding number of attacks they receive
given shareholder concerns over cybersecurity and loss of intellectual
property. 75
Additionally, cyber-crimes continue to receive lower
priority than traditional crimes. 76 However, the primary reason is
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71.

Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks, REGISTER (Oct.
31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/
hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (the perpetrator worked for the
company that installed the waste management controlling software and
had been recently rejected for employment by the local city council).

72.

Ellen Nakashima, Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, 5 members of Anonymous
hacking
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WASH.
POST
(Mar.
6,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security /5-members-ofanonymous-hacking-group-charged/2012/03/06/gIQAJ70FvR_
story.html?hpid=z4 (explaining the investigation into the hackers group
Anonymous).

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

See Ellen Nakashima & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC: Firms must report
cyberattacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2011, at AlO (describing new
Securities and Exchange Commission guidelines for reporting losses due
to computer network attacks to corporation shareholders); see also Gus
Coldebella, Cyber Security Act of 2012 requires a liability protection bug
fix, THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/ technology/ 212049-cyber-security-act-of-2012-requires-a-liabilityprotection-bug-fix (arguing that the information procedures in the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 do not go far enough and open corporations
to potential liability); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Information Sharing
and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2012, 6:43 PM),
http:/ /www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/information-sharing-and-thecybersecurity-act-of-2012/ (discussing information sharing procedures in
the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2012 designed to overcome corporate
hesitancy to share information about CNA).

76.

See Ron Condon, Catching Cyber Criminals Yourself, COMPUTER CRIME
RESEARCH CTR (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.crime-research.org/

See William J. Lynn III, U.S. Deputy Sec. of Def., Defending a New
Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct.
2010), available at http://www.foreignaf~airs.com/~rticles/6655~/. . .
william-j-lynn-iii/ defending-a-new-domam (descnbmg defense m1tiat1ves
put in place to defend the U.S. from cyber threats).
Robert McMillan, Bill O'Reilly hacker gets 30 mont~s, CS? (Nov. 8,
2010),
http://www.csoonline.com/ article/ 634363 /b1ll-o-re1lly-hackergets-30-months.
Bill Poovey Palin e-mail hacker sentenced to 1 year, 1 day, NBC NEWS
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that cyber-crimes are extraordinarily difficult to attribute to a
particular culprit. 77
Current cyber-crime laws, when applied to potential acts of cyberterrorism also suffer from another aspect of traditional criminal law:
78
relying o~ prosecution for deterrence and prevention.
Traditional
criminal law seeks to prevent future crimes primarily through
successful arrest and prosecution. 79 When responding to senatorial
nomination questions for the position of Commander of the U.S.
Cyber Command, (then) Lieutenant General Keith Alexand~r
explained, "The bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is
to work to catch perpetrators and take strong and public action when
we do. "80 However, when making the leap from traditional cybercrime to cyber-terrorism, the stakes become higher and prevention
becomes the most important factor.
Overall, the current focus on cyber-terrorism can be compared to
pre-9/llterrorism. The 9/11 Commission Report Executive Surnrnary
noted the FBI was "case-specific, decentralized, and geared towards
prosecution. "81 The report went on to note that "[s]ignificant F:SI
resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of maJor
82
The FBI was
terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions. "
very good at doing what it had always done: investigate crimes, make
arrests and then hand over the perpetrators to the U.S. Attorney's
'
.
.
Office for prosecution.
However, after-the-fact prosecution is
ineffective as a deterrent to terrorists. Other methods of prevention
are required to prevent terrorist acts, and future laws should reflect
this. But before a problem can be prevented, it must be defined.
SECTION

II:

DEFINING CYBER-TERRORISM

"As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we

news/24.04.2006/1962/ ("Law enforcement has much higher priorities,
and its resources for chasing computer crime are limited.").
77.
78.

See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 589.
E.g., Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth
Cong. 209, 219-220 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, USA
Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to question
regarding U.S. military strategy in cyberspace).

79.

E.g., id.

80.

Id.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISTS ATTACKS UPON THE UNlTED
STATES, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13.

81.

82.
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know there are some things we do not know. But there are also
unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know."83
The first and often most difficult step with any great problem is
prope:ly ~efinin~ it, and cyber-terrorism is no exception. Cyberterronsm is a logical sub-category of both terrorism and cyber-crime.84
These categories are very different; one is based on a relatively new
phenomena, cyber-crime, and the other encompasses a phenomena
that has taken on new historical significance, terrorism. 85
The definitions of these categories continue to be unsettled. 86 The
definition of cyber-crime generally involves some violation of a
criminal code through the use of computers or other information
systems, usually, but not necessarily, accomplished through the
Internet. 87 However, the U.S. Government offers multiple definitions
of _te_r~orism, 88 and internationally, there is even less clarity on a
defimt10n of terrorism. 89
. C?i:en the evolving definition of terrorism, it is no surprise that
defi~i~ions
of cyber-terrorism have been equally divergent.go
Addit10nally, the United States has yet to see a cyber-attack on the
level_ of a major terrorist attack. 91 Without a major event to spark
public debate, lawmakers have little incentive to define and address
the issue. Nevertheless, to develop a legal framework that helps to
~revent, deter, and defend against cyber-terrorism, the appropriate
first step must be to develop a practical working definition that

83.

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Def., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS
BRIEFING (Feb. 12, 2002).

84.

See BRU?E HOFFM_AN, ~NSIDE TERRORISM 2-3 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006)
(evaluatmg the h1stoncal development of terrorism and why it is so
difficult to define).

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).

88.

See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Definitions of Terrorism:
The P_r?blem of Too Many Gr~il~,- 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249-50 (2004)
(exammmg twenty-two of the defimt1ons for terrorism in federal lexicon
and arguing for a single definition).

89.

See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We
:egretta?ly are no closer now than eighteen years ago to an
mternat1onal consensus on the definition of terrorism or even its
proscription.").
'

90.

generally Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J.
& INFO. L. 397 (2003-2004) (exploring the
different defm1t10ns of cyber-terrorism that have been suggested).
See

~ARSHALL ~-. C?OMPUTER

91.

Id. (describing that the different definitions of cyber-terrorism are due
to "no reported instances of cyberterrorism").

Id.
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nomination questions for the position of Commander of the U.S.
Cyber Command, (then) Lieutenant General Keith Alexand~r
explained "The bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is
to work t~ catch perpetrators and take strong and public action when
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systems, usually, but not necessarily, accomplished through the
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Add1t10nally, the United States has yet to see a cyber-attack on the
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precisely defines what type of attacks should be considered cyberterrorism.
This Section begins by offering a cyber-terrorism definition that
Congress and various governmental agencies can use as a common
starting point.
As this Section will demonstrate, the current
definitions of cyber-terrorism are widely divergent in the scope of
actions that fall under their definition. This divergence makes it
difficult to develop common strategies and tactics to defeat cyberterrorism. This Article does not intend to suggest that all legislations
and agency mission statements use the exact same definition of cyberterrorism.
Nevertheless, these definitions should begin from a
common starting point that may be altered to serve a particular
legislative or administrative purpose.
This Section will also examine a lexicon of terms that are
generically used to describe different aspects of cyber-attacks. Using
these definitions, this Section then categorizes the various types ~f
cyber-attacks and explains how . they are dist_inguis~e~ fro1?- . t~1s
Article's definition of cyber-terronsm. Next, thrn Articles defm1t10n
of cyber-terrorism is analyzed in comparison to other definitions by
discussing how they differ and why they should yield in favor of this
Article's version.
A. Proposed Definition of Cyber-Terrorism
Following the 9 /11 attacks, terrorist organizations have faced a
full-court press by the United States and other nations who recognize
the threat posed to their national security. Terrorist organizations
such as Al-Qaeda have responded, in part, by using the Internet for
organizational and propaganda purposes, utilizing online publications
such as Inspire. 92 The last decade has also seen the rise in politically
93
motivated hacking groups, both in the United States and abroad.
These groups have become increasingly daring and sophisticated in
their attacks. 94 It is logical to assume that both these types of
organizations will eventually attempt to use the Internet and other
information systems as an instrument of terror. 95 Using the Internet

92.

Marc Ambinder, Al Qaeda's First English Language Magazine ls Here,
THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/
.
international/ archive/ 2010 / 06 / al-qaedas-first-english-languagemagazine-is-here / 59006 / (discussing "Inspire," Al Qaeda's English
language magazine).

93.

See Joshua E. Keating, Shots Fired, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/24/shots_fired (listing
instances of political hacking attacks).

94.

Id. (comparing the attacks from different sources).

95.

See, e.g., Clay Wilson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, COMPUTER
ATTACK AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES
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as a weapon of terror is inexpensive, anonymous, and global. 96 At the
same time, the United States is becoming more reliant on technology
to control critical infrastructure, both physical and informational.97
According to the DoD:
Hackers and foreign governments are increasingly able to launch
sophisticated intrusions into the networks and systems that
control critical civilian infrastructure. Given the integrated
nature of cyberspace, computer-induced failures of power grids
transportati0n networks, or financial systems could caus~
massive physical damage and economic disruption. DoD
operations-both at home and abroad-are dependent on this
critical infrastructure. 98
This quote hints at the existence of cyber-terrorism, but how
exactly to define it?
Experts base most definitions of cyber-terrorism on one of two
general models: effects-based criteria and intent-based criteria. 99
Many current definitions focus on one criterion to the exclusion or
minimization of the other, making the actions covered by the
definition too broad or too narrow. 100
This Article combines the effect- and intent-based approaches
and adds a requirement that the attacker be a non-state actor. Th~
proposed definition for cyber-terrorism is as follows:
Premeditated, politically motivated computer network attacks
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups, designed to cause fear or anxiety in a civilian populace
either by: a) inflicting, falsely appearing to inflict, or
FOR CONGRESS 5 (2005) (arguing that given the confluence of the United
States' overwhelming military superiority, and its reliance on
technology, future adversaries are likely to attempt acts of cyberterrorism) .
96.

Cf. id. at 2-5 (describing the characteristics of the various types of
cyber-attacks).

97.

Kevin Coleman, The Increased Threat of Attacks on SCADA Systems
~EF. TECH (Sept. 26, 2011), http://defensetech.org/2011/09/26/the~
~creased-threat-of-attacks-on-scada-systems/
(reporting
on
the
mcreased uses of SCADA control systems and the increasing numbers
vulnerabilities found in those systems).
·

98.

DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE 4 (2011).

99.

See WILSON, supra note 95, at 7 (describing the intent-based definition
as involving deliberate harm, and the effect-based definition as one that
intended to cause destruction and disruptions).

100. See, Perry, supra note 88, at 251 (describing how "definers disagree on
what should be included in the definition").
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precisely defines what type of attacks should be considered cyberterrorism.
This Section begins by offering a cyber-terrorism definition that
Congress and various governmental agencies can use as a cornrnon
starting point.
As this Section will demonstrate, the current
definitions of cyber-terrorism are widely divergent in the scope of
actions that fall under their definition. This divergence makes it
difficult to develop common strategies and tactics to defeat cyberterrorism. This Article does not intend to suggest that all legislations
and agency mission statements use the exact same definition of cyberterrorism.
Nevertheless, these definitions should begin from a
common starting point that may be altered to serve a particular
legislative or administrative purpose.
This Section will also examine a lexicon of terms that are
generically used to describe different aspects of cyber-attacks. Using
these definitions, this Section then categorizes the various types of
cyber-attacks and explains how they are distinguished from this
Article's definition of cyber-terrorism. Next, this Article's definition
of cyber-terrorism is analyzed in comparison to other definitions by
discussing how they differ and why they should yield in favor of this
Article's version.
A.

Proposed Definition of Cyber-Terrorism

Following the 9 /11 attacks, terrorist organizations have faced a
full-court press by the United States and other nations who recognize
the threat posed to their national security. Terrorist organizations
such as Al-Qaeda have responded, in part, by using the Internet for
organizational and propaganda purposes, utilizing online publications
such as Inspire.92 The last decade has also seen the rise in politically
93
motivated hacking groups, both in the United States and abroad.
These groups have become increasingly daring and sophisticated in
their attacks.94 It is logical to assume that both these types of
organizations will eventually attempt to use the Internet and other
95
Using the Internet
information systems as an instrument of terror.
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Marc Ambinder, Al Qaeda's First English Language Magazine Is Here,
THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2010/06/al-qaedas-first-english-languagemagazine-is-here/59006/ (discussing "Inspire," Al Qaeda's English
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threatening to inflict, widespread damage to critical physical or
informational
infrastructure,
national
security
related
information systems, or critical economic systems; or b) causing,
appearing to cause, or threatening to cause any type of severe
physical damage or human casualties.
The elements and requirements contained in this .definition, as
well as an explanation of the technical terms, will be discussed in the
Sections below.
This definition intentionally mirrors the definition of terrorism set
forth in 22 U.S.C. § 2656, which defines terrorism as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
101
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. "
However, in
adapting this definition to cyber-terrorism, it is_ necess~ry to replace
the element of "violence" with a more complicated hst of effects.
While this makes the definition more cumbersome, it necessarily
ensures both that the definition of cyber-terrorism is not overly broad
and addresses the unique ways in which cyber-attacks can affect a
society.
Should the legislature enact law that ~dentifies critical
infrastructure and economic systems, they should mcorporate those
definitions and evaluations into this definition wherever possible. The
remainder of this Section will review the different terms and elements
included in the above definition.

B.

General Lexicon of Terms

The above-proposed definition includes several terms of art.
These terms build upon legal definitions or as used by government
agencies.
1.
Information System
An information system is any machine, network, or electronic
device that cont~ins stored information or is capable of processing
data.102 This intentionally broad term covers hardware and software
103
systems and the networks in which those systems operate.
Hardware systems, which are primarily composed of computers, are
defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l), as:
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conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held
calculator, or other similar device. 104
Cyberspace encompasses any type of network that hardware
systems operate on and is defined by the DOD as the "global domain
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures, including the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers. " 105 The Internet is the network
most commonly associated with cyberspace, most easily accessed by
outside parties and is the predominant world-wide network today.
But, the object of a cyber-terrorist attack does not need to use the
Internet, or any other network.
Many critical infrastructure
components are intentionally not connected to the Internet as a
security precaution, yet they remain vulnerable to attack. 106 For
example, the Agent.btz attack used thumb drives to attack the U.S.
Government's classified networks. 107
2.

Computer Network Attack

Computer network attack ("CNA") is a term meaning any
unauthorized access, or exceeding of one's permitted access, to an
information system that results in damage, enables potential future
damage, or allows for future unauthorized access to information on
'
any information system. 108 CNA is another intentionally broad term,
drafted to cover the entire range of malicious activity that a
perpetrator may take against an information system. The DoD
defines CNA as "[a]ctions taken through the use of computer
networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks

104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l) (2006).
105. DEP'T OF DEF. Joint Publication 1-02, . DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS, 80 (updated Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf.

[A]n electronic, magnetic, optical, elec~rocherr_iical, o~ other_ high
speed data processing device performmg logical, anthm~~1c, or
storage functions, and includes any- data storage fac1~1ty or
communications facility directly related to or operatmg in

106. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, A cyberspy is halted, but not a debate,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at Al (describing security precautions that
were intended to prevent infection of Government classified computer
systems and how those measures were circumvented).

101. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2006). This definition was chosen because it is
commonly used definition in the U.S. Code.

107. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, The Return of the Worm That Ate the Pentagon,
WIRED (Dec. 9, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2011/12/worm-pentagon/ (describing a virus that affected DoD
computers that spread through the use of an infected thumb drive).

D~F. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary /data/1/9699.html.

102. See Definition of Information System, DEP'T OF

103. See id.
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108. § 1030(a) (providing for how a computer network attack may be
perpetrated).
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threatening to inflict, widespread damage to critical physical or
informational infrastructure,
national
security
related
information systems, or critical economic systems; or b) causing,
appearing to cause, or threatening to cause any type of severe
physical damage or human casualties.
The elements and requirements contained in this definition, as
well as an explanation of the technical terms, will be discussed in the
Sections below.
This definition intentionally mirrors the definition of terrorism set
forth in 22 U.S.C. § 2656, which defines terrorism as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. mm However, in
adapting this definition to cyber-terrorism, it is. necess~ry to replace
the element of "violence" with a more complicated hst of effects.
While this makes the definition more cumbersome, it necessarily
ensures both that the definition of cyber-terrorism is not overly broad
and addresses the unique ways in which cyber-attacks can affect a
society. Should the legislature enact law that ~dentifies critical
infrastructure and economic systems, they should mcorporate those
definitions and evaluations into this definition wherever possible. The
remainder of this Section will review the different terms and elements
included in the above definition.
B.

General Lexicon of Terms

The above-proposed definition includes several terms of art.
These terms build upon legal definitions or as used by government
agencies.
1.
Information System
An information system is any machine, network, or electro:iic
device that contains stored information or is capable of processmg
data.102 This intentionally broad term covers hardware and software
103
systems and the networks in which those systems operate.
Hardware systems, which are primarily composed of computers, are
defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l), as:
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conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held
calculator, or other similar device. 104
Cyberspace encompasses any type of network that hardware
systems operate on and is defined by the DOD as the "global domain
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures, including the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers. "105 The Internet is the network
most commonly associated with cyberspace, most easily accessed by
outside parties and is the predominant world-wide network today.
But, the object of a cyber-terrorist attack does not need to use the
Internet, or any other network.
Many critical infrastructure
components are intentionally not connected to the Internet as a
security precaution, yet they remain vulnerable to attack. 106 For
example, the Agent.btz attack used thumb drives to attack the U.S.
Government's classified networks. 107
2.

Computer Network Attack

Computer network attack ("CNA") is a term meaning any
unauthorized access, or exceeding of one's permitted access, to an
information system that results in damage, enables potential future
damage, or allows for future unauthorized access to information on
'
any information system. 108 CNA is another intentionally broad term,
drafted to cover the entire range of malicious activity that a
perpetrator may take against an information system. The DoD
defines CNA as "[a]ctions taken through the use of computer
networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks

104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l) (2006).
105. DEP'T OF DEF. Joint Publication 1-02, . DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS, 80 (updated Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf.

[A]n electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, o~ other. high
speed data processing device performing logical, anthm:~1c, or
storage functions, and includes any- data storage fac1~1ty or
communications facility directly related to or operatmg in

106. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, A cyberspy is halted, but not a debate,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at Al (describing security precautions that
were intended to prevent infection of Government classified computer
systems and how those measures were circumvented).

101. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2006). This definition was chosen because it is
commonly used definition in the U.S. Code.

107. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, The Return of the Worm That Ate the Pentagon,
WIRED (Dec. 9, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2011/12/worm-pentagon/ (describing a virus that affected DoD
computers that spread through the use of an infected thumb drive).

102. See Definition of Information System, DEP'T OF D~F. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary /data/1/9699.html.
103. See id.
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themselves. "109 The definition excludes using information systems to
collect intelligence, which the DoD defines as "Computer Network
Exploitation ("CNE")." 110 However, this Article will incorporate CNE
into CNA to maintain a broad definition that includes all types of
cyber-attack.
3.
Critical Infrastructure

an increased vulnerability to CNA m R
1 t~e U.S. Government,
through the Departm~nt of H.
1 ecdentSy,
.
ome an
ecunty h
t k
' as. a en .an
mcreased role in protection of critical . fr
systems. 117
m astructure mformat10n

The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 defines critical
infrastructure as, "systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health and safety, or any
112
combination of those matters. "111 Although an imprecise definition,
examples of critical infrastructure generally include the power grid,
telecommunication lines and towers, air traffic control, port controls,
and primary repositories of economic data. 113
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1996
version of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") recognized
the potential for CNA on critical infrastructure: "[a]s the [National
Information Infrastructure] and other network infrastructures
continue to grow, computers will increasingly be used for access to
critical services such as emergency response systems and air traffic
control, and will be critical to other systems which we cannot yet
anticipate. "114 As government and private companies seek to increase
efficient operation of critical infrastructure, the operation of the
components becomes increasingly dependent on computer and
network control. 115 The dependency on computer systems results in

109. Definition of Computer Network Attack, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/10082.html.
110. Definition of Computer Network Exploitation, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15,
2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/
18166.html.
111. 42 U.8.C. § 5195c(e) (2006); see generally JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: BACKGROUND,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2011) (defining critical infrastructure
and describing the effect of destruction or incapacity).
112. See generally HOMELAND SEC. PRES. DIRECTIVE 7: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION, PRIORITIZATION, AND PROTECTION
(2003) (noting that "[c]ritical infrastructure and key resources provide
the essential services that underpin American society").
113. Cf. id.

4.
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(June 18
2009)
htt ·//. 'JJO 1 on Cybersecurity, LEADERSHIP J
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p. Journa dhs gov/2009/06/£
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118. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 95 at 7 (
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119. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
120. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law p .
(holding that 18 U.S.C. §
B ro~ct, ~ 3 0 S.Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010)
2339
Terrorist Organizations was con t"t 't· atlenal Support to Designated
as applied to plaintiff'~ activitis I ~ 10nak_and not impermissibly vague
.
d
es m see mg to provid
.t
d es1gnate foreign terrorists organizations).
e ass1s ance to
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332B(c) (2006) C
.
on anyone who is convicted of t
. imposmg consecutive sentences
sentences).
erronsm, and forbidding concurrent

115. See James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber
War and Other Cyber Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. 1
(Dec. 2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/.

122. See, e.g., Alejandro M Sueldo Am .
Prncess,
INT'L
POLICY ' D e'("l,can Terrorists Abrnad and Due
htt ·//
·
·
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(Mar.
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2012)
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. '
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. .
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themselves. "109 The definition excludes using information systems to
collect intelligence, which the DoD defines as "Computer Network
Exploitation ("CNE")." 110 However, this Article will incorporate CNE
into CNA to maintain a broad definition that includes all types of
cyber-attack.
3.
Critical Infrastructure

an increased vulnerabili~y to CNA.11 6 Recently, the U.S. Government,
through the Department of Homeland Security, has taken an
increased role in protection of critical infrastructure information
systems. 117
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The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 defines critical
infrastructure as, "systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health and safety, or any
112
combination of those matters. "111 Although an imprecise definition,
examples of critical infrastructure generally include the power grid,
telecommunication lines and towers, air traffic control, port controls,
113
and primary repositories of economic data.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1996
version of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") recognized
the potential for CNA on critical infrastructure: "[a]s. the [National
Information Infrastructure] and other network mfrastructures
continue to grow, computers will increasingly be used for ~ccess ~o
critical services such as emergency response systems and aII traffic
control and will be critical to other systems which we cannot yet
anticip~te. "114 As government and private companies seek to increase
efficient operation of critical infrastructure, the operation of the
components becomes increasingly dependent on computer and
network control. 115 The dependency on computer systems results in
109. Definition of Computer Network Attack, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary /data/c/10082.html.
110. Definition of Computer Network Exploitation, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15,
2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/
18166.html.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006); see generally JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: BACKGROUND,
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2011) (defining critical infrastructure
and describing the effect of destruction or incapacity).
112. See generally HOMELAND SEC. PRES. DIRECTIVE 7: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION, PRIORITIZATION, AND PROTECTION
(2003) (noting that "[c]ritical infrastructure and key resources provide
the essential services that underpin American society").
113. Cf. id.
114.

s. REP. No.

104-357, at 11 (1996).

115. See James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber
War and Other Cyber Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. 1
(Dec. 2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/.
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4.

Terrorism

Generically, cyber-terrorism has been defined as the use of
computers and the Internet to engage in terrorist activity. 118 This
simple definition, however, begs the question: what is terrorism? In
the last half-century, terrorism has become a loaded term with
significant legal and moral overtones. Congress has enacted nontraditional legislation, such as criminalizing providing material
support to terrorism, 119 which the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional. 120 The crime of terrorism generally holds extended
sentences 121 and may have due process implications. 122 Therefore
incorporating the term "terrorism" into another crime should be don~
carefully as to not inadvertently include lesser acts that are not on
the same moral plane.
The U.S. Code contains numerous definitions of terrorism and
this Article will examine those mostly commonly used. In 22 U.S.C. §
021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf [hereinafter Lewis] (arguing that
against critical infrastructure by cyber-weapons is primarily a
busmess concern, and that the concern to national security is
overstated).
att~cks

116. See id. (describing the "new vulnerabilities" as "a massive electronic
Achilles' heel").
117. Janet Napolitano, A Focused Effort on Cybersecurity, LEADERSHIP J.
(June 18, 2009), http://journal.dhs.gov/2009/06/focused-effort-oncybersecurity.html (describing DHS efforts in the area of cyber-security).
118. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 95, at 7 (combining the intent- and effectbased terrorism aspects to establish a working definition of cyberterrorism).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
120. See ~older v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010)
(holdn~g that ~8 y.s.c. § 2339B, Material Support to Designated
Terrorist Orgamzat1ons, was constitutional and not impermissibly vague
as applied to plaintiff's activities in seeking to provide assistance to
designated foreign terrorists organizations).
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332B(c) (2006) (imposing consecutive sentences
on anyone who is convicted of terrorism, and forbidding concurrent
sentences).
122. See, e.g., Alejandro M. Sueldo, American Terrorists Abroad and Due
Process,
INT'L
POLICY
DIGEST
(Mar.
20,
2012),
http: !/www .internationalpolicydigest.org/2012 / 03 /20 / americanterronsts-abroad-and-due-process / (describing possible due process
issues when dealing with oversea terrorist suspects).
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large, not just the subject of the attack. 128 This intimidation, and the
resulting fear or anxiety, is at the heart of terrorism. 129 This
intimidation and fear create the "terror" and present an important
distinction when .examining which type of CNA has sufficiently
affected the population to be considered an act of cyber-terrorism.
The second element typically required is that the attack be
political in nature, such as seeking to influence a government through
violent actions. 130 The political element distinguishes terrorism from
other violent crimes with similar results, like murder .131 Terrorist
organizations typically have clear motivations and explicit end-goa.ls;
for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army desired to oust
the British government from Northern Ireland, 132 and, Al-Qaeda
advocates for the withdrawal of western nations from the Middle East
and the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. 133 The terrorist
creates "terror" through acts of large-scale violence, such as setting off
bombs, using chemical or biological weapons, or perpetrating other
violent attacks. 134 It is this fear and threat of further violence that is
intended to motivate a nation to change its policy toward the
intended aim of the terrorist organization. 135
The third element, which appears less frequently in terrorism
definitions, requires non-belligerents, those outside the scope of a
military conflict, to conduct the violence. 136 The law generally does
not consider as terro"rism violence aimed directly at military personnel
128. See, e.g., § 2331(1).
129. Cf. id. (listing intent to intimidate as a requisite behavior for terrorism).
130. See, e.g., id.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (2006) (including a requirement the
act intends (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C)
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping).

126

state actors.
d f. ·t·
ft orism
The first element which is common to all e im 10ns o err
'
re uires the presence' of some act, violent in nature or dangerous to
hq
life 121 The definitions do not provide an exact formula to
d~:;~ine ~hat level of violence qualifies, but t~e definitions ge~erally
specify that the act be violent enough to intimidate the populat10n at

132. See generally ED MOLONEY, A SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA 246 (2003).
133. See CHRJSTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32759, AL
QAEDA: STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY 3 (2007).
134. See generally STEVE BOWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31332,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE TERRORIST THREAT 1 (2002).

u.s.c. § 2656f(d) (2006).
18 u.s.c. § 2331(1) (2006).

123. 22
124.

131. Compare § 2331(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (defining murder
generally as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought).

125. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2011).
126. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, suprn note 84, at 34.
ALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM: FANATICISM AND
127.
SHe~
MASS DESTRUCTION 6 (1999) (evaluating over. a huntdre.d
. d'mg th e vi·olence requrremen is
definitions of terrorism an d fm
universal).

T li;ds :F
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135. See, e.g., Pippa Norris, Montague Kern & Marion Just, Framing
Terrorism, in FRAMING TERRORJSM: THE NEWS MEDIA, THE
GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 3, 8 (Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, &
Marion Just eds., 2003) (generally discussing news coverage of terrorism
and how it frames public discussion of terrorism).
136. See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31191, TERRORISM AND
THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORJSTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1 (2011).
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distinction when examining which type of CNA has sufficiently
affected the population to be considered an act of cyber-terrorism.
The second element typically required is that the attack be
political in nature, such as seeking to influence a government through
violent actions. 130 The political element distinguishes terrorism from
other violent crimes with similar results, like murder. 131 Terrorist
organizations typically have clear motivations and explicit end-goa.ls;
for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army desired to oust
the British government from Northern Ireland, 132 and, Al-Qaeda
advocates for the withdrawal of western nations from the Middle East
and the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. 133 The terrorist
creates "terror" through acts of large-scale violence, such as setting off
bombs, using chemical or biological weapons, or perpetrating other
violent attacks. 134 It is this fear and threat of further violence that is
intended to motivate a nation to change its policy toward the
intended aim of the terrorist organization. 135
The third element, which appears less frequently in terrorism
definitions, requires non-belligerents, those outside the scope of a
military conflict, to conduct the violence. 136 The law generally does
not consider as terrorism violence aimed directly at military personnel
128. See, e.g., § 2331(1).
129. Cf. id. (listing intent to intimidate as a requisite behavior for terrorism).
130. See, e.g., id.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (2006) (including a requirement the
act intends (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C)
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping).
131. Compare § 2331(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (defining murder
generally as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought).
132. See generally ED MOLONEY, A SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA 246 (2003).
133. See CHRJSTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32759, AL
QAEDA: STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY 3 (2007).
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by belligerents within the scope of a military co~~ict.
E:'~:an:ples of
attacks on the military outside the scope of a military conflict mclude
the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon138 and the 1996 ?ombing ~f. the
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia. 139 Acts agamst the military
occurring within the scope of a military conflict and conducted by
belligerents are typically considered acts of warfare under the l~w,
even if these acts mimic terrorist attacks. 140 Thus, the working
definitio~ must consider the category of armed ·attacks in
cyberspace, i41 which occur as part of the broa~er conflict. This
category of CNA will be discussed in the next Sect10n.
137

C.

Definitional Elements

This Section will examine the elements contained in the proposed
definition of cyber-terrorism and discuss the reasons for inclusion.
Like the traditional elements of terrorism discussed above, cyberterrorism should include an effects element, an element of intent, and
a requirement that the cyber-terrorist be a non-state actor.
1.

The Effects Element: Fear and Anxiety

The effects element of the cyber-terrorism definition should
require that the CNA cause fear or anxiety in a civil.ian pop1:1-lace
through widespread damage to critical physical or mformat10nal
infrastructure national security related information systems, and/ or
critical econo~c systems, or that the CNA attack result in severe
physical damage or human casualties. This resu~t can occur in one of
three ways: as. a causation of the effects, by causmg the appearance or
belief in these effects, or threatening to cause these effects. Some
definitions of cyber-terrorism focus solely or predominantly on the
effects of the act and minimize the intent of the actor. For example,
indicative of this approach is the informal, but commonly used,
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definition of cyber-terrorism as "hacking with a body count. n142 The
advantage of this definition is that the attacker's motivation need not
be determined. The CNA need only be evaluated based on tangible
outcomes, which provides a clear standard for determining when a
CNA rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. If the result of the CAN is
equivalent to the fear and anxiety caused by traditional terrorist
actions, then it will be labeled an act of cyber-terrorism.
. .Wh~n ~ocusing on the effects of a CNA, there is an advantage in
distmgmshmg cyber-terrorists who are a serious threat to national
security from online activists who conduct minor CNA without being
a serious threat. 143 An online activist may seek to influence popular
or government opinion by defacing a military or government
website, 144 but this does not make him a terrorist. Some commonly
used definitions of cyber-terrorism fail to make this distinction. For
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines cyberterrorism as "[t]he use of computing resources against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the .civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives. "145 This definition contains no indication of the
severity a CNA would have to reach before it is defined as cyberterrorism. Such a definition runs the risk of making the term cyberterrorism so broad that it becomes inappropriately over-inclusive of
misconduct that is not cyber-terrorism.
Along with a tendency to be overbroad, the other problem with
most effects elements is that they leave unanswered the question of
how to deal with effects that not traditionally associated with
terrorist attacks that can have equally devastating effects on society.
For example, by corrupting large amounts of economic data, a CNA
could inflict great economic damage on a nation without inflicting
~ivilian casualties. 146 Definitions of traditional terrorism historically
mcorporate an element of physical damage or civilian casualties as the
method of producing fear and anxiety in society. 147 However, to

137. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006) (defining terrorism. as
"premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated agamst
noncombatant' targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents").

142. Amara D. Angelica, The New Face of War, TECHWEEK (Nov. 2, 1998),
http:/ /www.transbay.net/~nessie/Pages/teds.html
(quoting
Barry
Collin).

138. On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked American. ~irlines
flight 77 and flew it into the west side of the Pen~agon, killing all
aboard as well as over 100 people in the Pentagon. History: September
11, 2001, PENTAGON, http://pentagon.osd.mil/septemberll.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2012).

143. Such groups are commonly referred to as "hacktivists" and are discussed
in greater detail infra Section II(E)(4).

139. On June 25, 1996, a group of mostly Saudi nationals with ties ~o Iran
and the Islamic Movement for Change exploded a car bomb outside the
Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Airman.
Rebecca Grant, Death in the Desert, AIR FORCE, June 2006, at 48.

144. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14,
2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07/64193.
145. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INFRASTRUCTURE
THREATS FROM CYBER-TERRORISTS 2 (Mar. 19, 1999), 1999 WL 137721
(O.C.C.).

140. See ELSEA, supra note 136.

146. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 8 (noting that some believe that "because
of U.S. dependency on computer technology, such attacks have the
potential to create economic damage on a large scale").

141. Brenner, supra note 19, at 401.

147. See supra Section II(C).
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the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon138 and the 1996 ?ombing ~f. the
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia. 139 Acts agamst the military
occurring within the scope of a military conflict and conducted by
belligerents are typically considered acts of warfare under the l~w,
even if these acts mimic terrorist attacks. 140 Thus, the working
definitio~ must consider the category of armed ·attacks i?cyberspace, 141 which occur as part of the broa~er conflict. This
category of CNA will be discussed in the next Sect10n.
C.

Definitional Elements

This Section will examine the elements contained in the proposed
definition of cyber-terrorism and discuss the reasons for inclusion.
Like the traditional elements of terrorism discussed above, cyberterrorism should include an effects element, an element of intent, and
a requirement that the cyber-terrorist be a non-state actor.
1.

The Effects Element: Fear and Anxiety

The effects element of the cyber-terrorism definition should
require that the CNA cause fear or anxiety in a civi~an pop~lace
through widespread damage to critical physical or mformat10nal
infrastructure national security related information systems, and/ or
critical econo~c systems, or that the CNA attack result in severe
physical damage or human casualties. This resu~t can occur in one of
three ways: as. a causation of the effects, by causmg the appearance or
belief in these effects, or threatening to cause these effects. Some
definitions of cyber-terrorism focus solely or predominantly on the
effects of the act and minimize the intent of the actor. For example,
indicative of this approach is the informal, but commonly used,
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definition of cyber-terrorism as "hacking with a body count."142 The
advantage of this definition is that the attacker's motivation need not
be determined. The CNA need only be evaluated based on tangible
outcomes, which provides a clear standard for determining when a
CNA rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. If the result of the CAN is
equivalent to the fear and anxiety caused by traditional terrorist
actions, then it will be labeled an act of cyber-terrorism.
. .Wh~n ~ocusing on the effects of a CNA, there is an advantage in
distmgmshing cyber-terrorists who are a serious threat to national
security from online activists who conduct minor CNA without being
a serious threat. 143 An online activist may seek to influence popular
or government opinion by defacing a military or government
website, 144 but this does not make him a terrorist. Some commonly
used definitions of cyber-terrorism fail to make this distinction. For
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines cyberterrorism as "[t]he use of computing resources against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the .civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives. "145 This definition contains no indication of the
severity a CNA would have to reach before it is defined as cyberterrorism. Such a definition runs the risk of making the term cyberterrorism so broad that it becomes inappropriately over-inclusive of
misconduct that is not cyber-terrorism.
Along with a tendency to be overbroad, the other problem with
most effects elements is that they leave unanswered the question of
how to deal with effects that not traditionally associated with
terrorist attacks that can have equally devastating effects on society.
For example, by corrupting large amounts of economic data a CNA
could inflict great economic damage on a nation without inflicting
~ivilian casualties. 146 Definitions of traditional terrorism historically
mcorporate an element of physical damage or civilian casualties as the
method of producing fear and anxiety in society. 147 However, to

137. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006) (defining terrorism. as
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noncombatant' targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents").
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flight 77 and flew it into the west side of the Pen~agon, killing all
aboard as well as over 100 people in the Pentagon. History: September
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Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Airman.
Rebecca Grant, Death in the Desert, AIR FORCE, June 2006, at 48.

144. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14,
2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07 /64193.
145. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INFRASTRUCTURE
THREATS FROM CYBER-TERRORISTS 2 (Mar. 19, 1999), 1999 WL 137721
(O.C.C.).

140. See ELSEA, supra note 136.
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of U.S. dependency on computer technology, such attacks have the
potential to create economic damage on a large scale").
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restrict cyber-terrorism to events where there are civilian casualti~s or
large-scale physical destruction ignores a large :a~~e of hig~ly
malicious CN A. Therefore, physical damage or civilian casualties
should· solely determine the effects element; it should also focus on the
psychological effect the CN A has on the target society.
Under this Article's definition, the effects element of cyberterrorism requires that a CNA lead to either of the follo~ng. Fir_st,
the CNA could lead to damage traditionally associated with
terrorism, which includes death, injury, water contamination, or
release of radiological material. 148 Alternatively, the CNA could cause
damage unique to a CN A with an equivalent psychological i1:1pact .on
society l such. as pipeline bursts l extended
power outages, disrupt10n
•
•
d
149
of air-traffic control systems, or maJor loss of econormc ata.
However the intended effects of CNA can often be hard to predict
and distinguish. 150 Therefore, it is necessary to have an element of
intent in a proper definition of cyber-terrorism.
2.

The Intent Element: Motivation

The intent element of the cyber-terrorism definition requires that
the CNA be premeditated and politically motivated. Similar to
effects-based definitions, there are definitions currently in use that
focus solely on the intent of the CN A. 151 An example of a typi~al
intent-based definition of cyber-terrorism is offered by Serge Krasavm,
Ph.D., of the Computer Crime Research Center; he defines cyberterrorism as the "use of information technology and means by
terrorist groups and agents. "152
•
This definition offers a drastically different approach because it
focuses on the actor ("terrorist groups and agents"), not the act ("use
148. See Dorothy E. Denning, Is Cyber Terror Next?, Soc. Ser. RES.
COUNCIL (Nov. 1, 2001), http:/ /essays.ssrc.org/septll/essays/ .
denning.htm ("To assess the potential threat of cyber terrorism, two
factors must be considered: first, whether there are targets that are
vulnerable to attack that could lead to severe harm, and second,
whether. there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry
them out.").
149. Id.
150. See Martin C. Libicki, Cyberwar as a Confidence Game, STRATEGIC
STUD. Q., 132-133 (Spring 2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/
2011/spring/libicki.pdf (noting that it is hard to predict the effects of a
cyber-attack).
151. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 6 (noting several intent-based definitions
of cyber-terrorism).
152. Serge Krasavin, Ph.D., What is Cyber-terrorism? COMPUTER: CRlME
RES. CTR., http://www.crime-research.org/library /Cyber-terronsm.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
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of information technology" is extremely broad and unhelpful).
Accordingly, as long as a terrorist is using the information system to
forward his or her means, the result of that use does not matter. For
example, the use of e-mail to communicate with other terrorists would
be an act of cyber-terrorism. However, the Internet's widespread use
likely means there is not a terrorist organization that does not use the
Internet and computers for any number of reasons. 153 Thus, the
category essentially becomes redundant when considering its
application to terrorism. This definition is an excellent description of
"terrorist use of the Internet," but is not helpful in distinguishing
cyber-terrorism from other types of CNA.
The advantage of an intent-based definition is that it covers the
full range of attacks both unique to CN A, such as damaging economic
data, and similar to traditional terrorism, such as releasing poison gas.
However, an attack for political motivations can run the entire
spectrum of CNA, from basic denial of service attacks and
government website defacement to potentially major attacks, such as
on Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition ("SCADA")
controlled utilities. Intent-based definitions, like overly broad effectsbased definitions, run the risk of making the category of cyberterrorism so broad it becomes meaningless. We do not classify the
graffiti artist who spray-paints "Out of Iraq" on a public wall as a
terrorist, partly because the term would lose its meaning. The same
should hold for acts of cyber-terrorism.
The most useful approach is to add an element of motivation that
requires the CNA be premeditated and politically-motivated, with the
effects element discussed above. The term cyber-terrorism should
recognize the purpose behind the attack: to undermine a government
or motivate it to change its policies. It should only encompass CNA
with specific effects: attacks that produce fear or anxiety in the
populace. This combination will prevent the definition from being too
narrow, allowing the inclusion of certain effects unique to CNA, while
also avoiding being too broad-excluding those acts that are of a
more trivial nature.
3.

The Non-State Actor Requirement

Although not every definition includes a requirement that
state actor commit the terrorist acts, most acts with similar
that are attributed directly to a state are considered acts of
aggression. 154 The reason is because governmental agencies

a noneffects
armed
would

153. See infra, Section II(E)(5), for a discussion of terrorist use of the
Internet.
154. Cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (providing that the United States is
prepared to assist other nations against instances of armed aggression
from other countries).
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restrict cyber-terrorism to events where there are civilian casualti~s or
large-scale physical destruction ignores a large ~a~?e of hig~y
malicious CNA. Therefore, physical damage or civilian casualties
should· solely determine the effects element; it should also focus on the
psychological effect the CNA has on the target society.
Under this Article's definition, the effects element of cyberterrorism requires that a CNA lead to either of the following. First,
the CN A could lead to damage traditionally associated with
terrorism, which includes death, injury, water contamination, or
release of radiological material.1 48 Alternatively, the CNA could cause
damage unique to a CNA with an equivalent psychological i~pact _on
society, such as pipeline bursts, exten~ed power outages, ~isrupti~~
of air-traffic control systems, or maJor loss of economic data.
However, the intended effects of CNA can often be hard to predict
and distinguish. 150 Therefore, it is necessary to have an element of
intent in a proper definition of cyber-terrorism.
2.

The Intent Element: Motivation

The intent element of the cyber-terrorism definition requires that
the CNA be premeditated and politically motivated. Similar to
effects-based definitions, there are definitions currently in use that
focus solely on the intent of the CN A. 151 An example of a typi~al
intent-based definition of cyber-terrorism is offered by Serge Krasavm,
Ph.D., of the Computer Crime Research Center; he defines cyberterrorism as the "use of information technology and means by
terrorist groups and agents. "152
.
This definition offers a drastically different approach because it
focuses on the actor ("terrorist groups and agents"), not the act ("use
148. See Dorothy E. Denning, Is Cyber Terror Next?, Soc. Ser. RES.
COUNCIL (Nov. 1, 2001), http://essays.ssrc.org/septll/essays/ .
denning.htm ("To assess the potential threat of cyber terrorism, two
factors must be considered: first, whether there are targets that are
vulnerable to attack that could lead to severe harm, and second,
whether. there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry
them out.").
149. Id.
150. See Martin C. Libicki, Cyberwar as a Confidence Game, STRATEGIC
STUD. Q., 132-133 (Spring 2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/
2011/spring/libicki.pdf (noting that it is hard to predict the effects of a
cyber-attack).
151. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 6 (noting several intent-based definitions
of cyber-terrorism).
152. Serge Krasavin, Ph.D., What is Cyber-terrorism? COMPUTE~ CRlME
RES. CTR., http://www.crime-research.org/library /Cyber-terronsm.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
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of inf~rmation technology" is extremely broad and unhelpful).
Accordmgly, as long as a terrorist is using the information system to
forward his or her means, the result of that use does not matter. For
example, the use of e-mail to cornrnunicate with other terrorists would
be an act of cyber-terrorism. However, the Internet's widespread use
likely means there is not a terrorist organization that does not use the
Internet and computers for any number of reasons. 153 Thus, the
category essentially becomes redundant when considering its
application to terrorism. This definition is an excellent description of
"terrorist use of the Internet," but is not helpful in distinguishing
cyber-terrorism from other types of CNA.
The advantage of an intent-based definition is that it covers the
full range of attacks both unique to CN A, such as damaging economic
data, and similar to traditional terrorism, such as releasing poison gas.
However, an attack for political motivations can run the entire
spectrum of CNA, from basic denial of service attacks and
government website defacement to potentially major attacks such as
on Siemens .s_u?ervisory control and data acquisition ("S,CADA")
controlled utilities. Intent-based definitions, like overly broad effectsbased definitions, run the risk of making the category of cyberterrorism so broad it becomes meaningless. We do not classify the
graffiti artist who spray-paints "Out of Iraq" on a public wall as a
terrorist, partly because the term would lose its meaning. The same
should hold for acts of cyber-terrorism.
The most useful approach is to add an element of motivation that
requires the CNA be premeditated and politically-motivated, with the
effects element discussed above. The term cyber-terrorism should
recognize the purpose behind the attack: to undermine a government
or motivate it to change its policies. It should only encompass CNA
with specific effects: attacks that produce fear or anxiety in the
populace. This combination will prevent the definition from being too
narrow, allowing the inclusion of certain effects unique to CNA while
also avoiding being too broad-excluding those acts that ar~ of a
more trivial nature.
3.

The Non-State Actor Requirement

Although not every definition includes a requirement that
state actor cornrnit the terrorist acts, most acts with similar
that are attributed directly to a state are considered acts of
·
154
The reason is
. because governmental agencies
aggression.

a noneffects
armed
would

153. See infra, Section II(E)(5), for a discussion of terrorist use of the
Internet.
154. Cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (providing that the United States is
prepared to assist other nations against instances of armed aggression
from other countries).
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address such an attack in a much different manner and the public
would view it differently. For example, if the intelligence operative of
a foreign nation was to set off a bomb in the United States, and it
was known that the operative was acting under the control of that
foreign nation, the U.S. Government would view it as an act of armed
aggression. The same should be true for cyber-terrorism. The
exclusion of this element is not fatal to the definition and may be
eliminated for certain applications.
One of the prime difficulties in cyber-terrorism is determining
whether a state actor is responsible for the attack. Many experts
believe that nations ·such as China and Russia, who have the
capability to conduct extensive CNA, use hacking groups not officially
related to the state in order to mask state involvement in CNA
against foreign powers. 155 This is not a new tactic; state sponsors of
traditional terrorism, such as Iran, are common. 156 However, the
built-in anonymity of the Internet and the lack of physical
infrastructure required to launch an attack make this tactic even more
successful in cyberspace. Whether a CNA is ultimately attributed to
a state will depend on the evidence particular to the case and the
willingness of political leaders to place blame on state actors.
However, because the response options will be entirely different
against a state actor, it is more useful to categorize those attacks as
something other than cyber-terrorism.

Like conventional terrorists, CyberTerrorists are out for blood.
They try to do things like break into subway computer systems
to cause a collision or use computers to tamper with power grids
or food processing. However, unlike suicide bombers and rooftop snipers, CyberTerrorists attack from the comfort of home
and can be in more than one place at a time through
cyberspace .... CyberTerrorism can be far more damaging, and
far more violent, than a 55-gallon drum of fuel and fertilizer. ..
. CyberTerrorists' isolation from the results of their actions and
the ·consequent lack of personal risk, make them particularly
dangerous . . . . [T]he ease and low cost of CyberTerrorism
combine to offer an attractive tool for once-conventional
sociopaths. 158

D.

Current Definitions of Cyber-Terrorism

Having proposed a common working definition of cyber-terrorism,
this Section analyzes the definitions that have either been offered by
academics or are in use by the U.S. Government. To start, the
original definition of cyber-terrorism came from Barry C. ~ollin, .a
senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence m
California in the 1980s. 157 His vision of cyber-terrorism was one in
which attacks conducted through computers mirrored the effects of
traditional acts of terrorism:
155. See Larry Wortzel, The Chinese Way of (Cyber) War, DEF. DOSSIER, 1
(Aug. 2012), http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (describing :he
Chinese government's use of cyber "operations"); see David J. Smith,
How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare, DEF. DOSSIER, 7 (Aug. 2012),
http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (explaining Russia's approach
to information operations).
156. See, e.g., CIA, Iran, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, (last updated Feb. 5,.
2012)
https://www.cia.gov/library / publications/the-worldfact book/ geos / ir .html (describing Iran's designation as a state sponsor
of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere).
157. Barry C. Collin, The Future of CyberTerrorism: ·Where the Physical and
Virtual Worlds Converge, 11th Annual International Symposium on
Criminal Justice Issues, CRlME & JUST. INT'L J., 15-18 (1997), available
at http://afgen.com/terrbrisml.html.
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There has been no shortage of cyber-terrorism definitions offered
in response to this statement. Many contain similar elements and
themes, but the broad divergence in the scope of these definitions
signals the need for a definition that can be used as a common
starting point. This Section examines these definitions.
1.

United States Government Definitions

Though not explicitly defined as cyber-terrorism, a form of cyberterrorism is contained in the U.S. Code Section 2332b(g) (5) defines
the "federal crime of terrorism" and includes as predicate offenses two
CF AA provisions: one relating to cyber-espionage and one related to
computer damage. 159 If one of those two CFAA provisions is violated,
and if that CFAA violation "is calculated to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct," then it meets this definition of
terrorism. 160 The implications of this provision will be covered in
greater depth later, but it is important to recognize that Congress has
thought fit to include CNA in one definition of terrorism under the
U.S. Code.
In the example in the Introduction, where Anonymous attacked a
FBI website in retaliation for its arrest of Dotcom and others
Anonymous's actions meet the definition of the federal crime of'
terrorism, despite the fact it does not meet traditional concepts of
terrorism. This is because the federal definition fails to sufficiently
158. Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 397, 403 (2004) (quoting Barry Collin).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(l) (2012) (relating
to cyber-espionage); § 1030(a)(5)(A) (resulting in damage as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) through (VI) (requiring damage to
national security related computers or if the damage involves 10 or more
computers)).
160. § 2332b(g)(5).
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address such an attack in a much different manner and the public
would view it differently. For example, if the intelligence operative of
a foreign nation was to set off a bomb in the United States, and it
was known that the operative was acting under the control of that
foreign nation, the U.S. Government would view it as an act of armed
aggression. The same should be true for cyber-terrorism. The
exclusion of this element is not fatal to the definition and may be
eliminated for certain applications.
One of the prime difficulties in cyber-terrorism is determining
whether a state actor is responsible for the attack. Many experts
believe that nations ·such as China and Russia, who have the
capability to conduct extensive CNA, use hacking groups not officially
related to the state in order to mask state involvement in CNA
against foreign powers. 155 This is not a new tactic; state sponsors of
traditional terrorism, such as Iran, are common. 156 However, the
built-in anonymity of the Internet and the lack of physical
infrastructure required to launch an attack make this tactic even more
successful in cyberspace. Whether a CNA is ultimately attributed to
a state will depend on the evidence particular to the case and the
willingness of political leaders to place blame on state actors.
However, because the response options will be entirely different
against a state actor, it is more useful to categorize those attacks as
something other than cyber-terrorism.
D.

Current Definitions of Cyber-Terrorism

Having proposed a common working definition of cyber-terrorism,
this Section analyzes the definitions that have either been offered by
academics or are in use by the U.S. Government. To start, the
original definition of cyber-terrorism came from Barry C. Collin, a
senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in
California in the 1980s. 157 His vision of cyber-terrorism was one in
which attacks conducted through computers mirrored the effects of
traditional acts of terrorism:
155. See Larry Wortzel, The Chinese Way of (Cyber} War, DEF. DOSSIER, 1
(Aug. 2012), http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (describing ~he
Chinese government's use of cyber "operations"); see David J. Smith,
How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare, DEF. DOSSIER, 7 (Aug. 2012),
http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (explaining Russia's approach
to information operations).
156. See, e.g., CIA, Iran, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, (last updated Feb. 5,.
2012)
https://www.cia.gov/library /publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ir.html (describing Iran's designation as a state sponsor
of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere).
157. Barry C. Collin, The Future of CyberTerrorism: ·Where the Physical and
Virtual Worlds Converge, 11th Annual International Symposium on
Criminal Justice Issues, CRIME & JUST. INT'L J., 15-18 (1997), available
at http://afgen.com/terrbrisml.html.
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Like conventional terrorists, CyberTerrorists are out for blood.
They try to do things like break into subway computer systems
to cause a collision or use computers to tamper with power grids
or food processing. However, unlike suicide bombers and rooftop snipers, CyberTerrorists attack from the comfort of home
and can be in more than one place at a time through
cyberspace .... CyberTerrorism can be far more damaging, and
far more violent, than a 55-gallon drum of fuel and fertilizer. ..
. CyberTerrorists' isolation from the results of their actions and
the ··consequent lack of personal risk, make them particularly
dangerous . . . . [T]he ease and low cost of CyberTerrorism
combine to offer an attractive tool for once-conventional
sociopaths. 158
There has been no shortage of cyber-terrorism definitions offered
in response to this statement. Many contain similar elements and
themes, but the broad divergence in the scope of these definitions
signals the need for a definition that can be used as a common
starting point. This Section examines these definitions.
1.

United States Government Definitions

Though not explicitly defined as cyber-terrorism, a form of cyberterrorism is contained in the U.S. Code Section 2332b(g)(5) defines
the "federal crime of terrorism" and includes as predicate offenses two
CF AA provisions: one relating to cyber-espionage and one related to
computer damage. 159 If one of those two CFAA provisions is violated,
and if that CFAA violation "is calculated to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct," then it meets this definition of
terrorism. 160 The implications of this provision will be covered in
greater depth later, but it is important to recognize that Congress has
thought fit to include CNA in one definition of terrorism under the
U.S. Code.
In the example in the Introduction, where Anonymous attacked a
FBI website in retaliation for its arrest of Dotcom and others
Anonymous's actions meet the definition of the federal crime of'
terrorism, despite the fact it does not meet traditional concepts of
terrorism. This is because the federal definition fails to sufficiently
158. Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. MARSHALL J;
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 397, 403 (2004) (quoting Barry Collin).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(l) (2012) (relating
to cyber-espionage); § 1030(a)(5)(A) (resulting in damage as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) through (VI) (requiring damage to
national security related computers or if the damage involves 10 or more
computers)).
160. § 2332b(g)(5).
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define the scope of the attack's effects. Almost any denial of service
attack against a national security website will fall under the predicate
CF AA offenses. Although denial of service attacks are serious and
should be investigated, they do not cause fear or anxiety in the
populace. Despite the inclusion of cyber-terrorism in the criminal
code most government agencies have developed their own cyberterr~rism definitions. These definitions contain some important
differences and an attempt should be made to make them more
consistent.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") has
defined cyber-terrorism as "unlawful attacks and threats of attack
against computers, netwprks, and the information stored therein when
done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance
of political or social objectives. "161 This definition incorporates an
adequate intent element that appears in most definitions of terrorism
and cyber-terrorism alike. It requires the attacker's objective to be
162
political or social coercion against a government or its people.
However the weakness of this definition is in the effects element,
Under this
which h~s no requirement for the scale of attack.
definition, the lone wolf who hacks a webpage to post a political
message such as "Stop the War in Iraq," or who temporarily. takes
down a DoJ public website to protest an arrest, would be gmlty of
cyber-terrorism. Thus, as the requirement that a CNA "intimidate or
coerce" must require a more substantive attack, this is too vague to
be an effective definition.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center defines cyberterrorism as "a criminal act perpetrated through computers resulting
in violence, death and/or destruction, and creating terror for the
purpose of coercing a government to change its policies. "163 Unlike
the other over-broad definitions, this definition focuses more on the
effects of a test, with the result that it is extremely narrow. The
·definition excludes all attacks not "resulting in violence, death and/ or
destruction, "164 which excludes some of the most devastating
possibilities of CN A. An argument could be made that this definition
is unhelpful because everything it incorporates is already covered by
definitions of terrorism. To be useful, a definition of cyber-terrorism
161. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS,
CYBERCRIME AND CYBERTERRORJSM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 4 (2008) (quoting from the FEMA toolkit for
terrorism responses).
162. Id.
163. See Scott Berinato, The Truth About Cyberterrorism, CIO (Apr. 8,
2002, 9:30), http://www.cio.com.au/article/26124/truth_about_
cyberterrorism/ (quoting Ron Dick, then Director of the NIPC).
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must include effects such as a takedown of economic systems or
corruption of massive amounts of national security data, as this is
where the unique capabilities of cyber-terrorism lie.
William L. Tafoya, Ph.D., writing in the FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, defines cyber-terrorism as "the intimidation of civilian
enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political,
religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or
deleting critical infrastructure data or information. "165 Tafoya clarifies
this definition by providing the example of wiping out the data of the
Library of Congress as compared to wiping out a single academic
paper .166 The former would be seen as devastating and certainly
affect the public's quality of life, whereas the latter would have a
limited effect on the public's lives. 167 This definition identifies
"disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information" as
the required effect. It is the opposite of the FEMA definition, 168
which required an element of violence. Instead, it does not account
for physical harms, and focuses solely on data. Recognizing this
unique effect of CNA is important, but the definition should not be
completely exclusive of all other types of harms. Nonetheless, any
definition of cyber-terrorism should similarly include attacks on
critical data systems.
Any government definition of cyber-terrorism will need to be
altered somewhat to fit with the goals of that agency, and this Article
does not suggest that all agencies must use the proposed definition.
But, as demonstrated above, the currently used definitions are so
divergent that they impede the establishment of a common,
government-wide strategy to defeat cyber-terrorism. At minimum,
there should be consistency among the three basic elements of cyberterrorism and particularity about the type of effects included.
2.

United Nations Definition of Cyber-Terrorism

An internationally consistent definition should also be sought.
Although not the focus of this Article, it is useful to examine how the
United Nations (U.N.) has defined cyber-terrorism. The UN CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force ("CTITF"), although not
explicitly using the term cyber-terrorism, recognizes that one of the
ways a terrorist organization may make "[u]se of the Internet to
perform terrorist attacks [is] by remotely altering information on

165. William L. Tafoya, Cyber Terror, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Nov.
2011, at 2.
166. Id. at 2-3.
167. Id.
168. See Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian: Cybersecurity
and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465, 476 (2011).

164. Id.
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define the scope of the attack's effects. Almost any denial of service
attack against a national security website will fall under the predicate
CF AA offenses. Although denial of service attacks are serious and
should be investigated, they do not cause fear or anxiety in the
populace. Despite the inclusion of cyber-terrorism in the criminal
code, most government agencies have developed their 0':11 cyberterrorism definitions.
These definitions contain some important
differences and an attempt should be made to make them more
consistent.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") has
defined cyber-terrorism as "unlawful attacks and threats of attack
against computers, netwprks, and the information stored therein when
done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in fu_rtherance
of political or social objectives. "161 This definition incorporates an
adequate intent element that appears in most definitions of terrorism
and cyber-terrorism alike. It requires the attacker's objective to be
162
political or social coercion against a government or its people.
However the weakness of this definition is in the effects element,
which h~s no requirement for the scale of attack.
Under this
definition, the lone wolf who hacks a webpage to post a political
message such as "Stop the War in Iraq," or who temporarily. takes
down a DoJ public website to protest an arrest, would be gmlty of
cyber-terrorism. Thus, as the requirement that a CNA "intimidate or
coerce" must require a more substantive attack, this is too vague to
be an effective definition.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center defines cyberterrorism as "a criminal act perpetrated through computers resulting
in violence, death and/ or destruction, and creating terror for the
163
purpose of coercing a government to change its policies. "
Unlike
the other over-broad definitions, this definition focuses more on the
effects of a test, with the result that it is extremely narrow. The
·definition excludes all attacks not "resulting in violence, death and/ or
destruction, " 164 which excludes some of the most devastating
possibilities of CNA. An argument could be made that this definition
is unhelpful because everything it incorporates is already covered by
definitions of terrorism. To be useful, a definition of cyber-terrorism
161. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH 8ERV., RL32114, BOTNETS,
CYBERCRIME AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 4 (2008) (quoting from the FEMA toolkit for
terrorism responses) .
162. Id.
163. See Scott Berinato, The Truth About Cyberterrorism, CIO (Apr. 8,
2002, 9:30), http://www.cio.com.au/article/26124/truth_about_
cyberterrorism/ (quoting Ron Dick, then Director of the NIPC).
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must include effects such as a takedown of economic systems or
corruption of massive amounts of national security data, as this is
where the unique capabilities of cyber-terrorism lie.
William L. Tafoya, Ph.D., writing in the FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, defines cyber-terrorism as "the intimidation of civilian
enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political,
religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or
deleting critical infrastructure data or information. "165 Tafoya clarifies
this definition by providing the example of wiping out the data of the
Library of Congress as compared to wiping out a single academic
paper .166 The former would be seen as devastating and certainly
affect the public's quality of life, whereas the latter would have a
limited effect on the public's lives. 167 This definition identifies
"disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information" as
the required effect. It is the opposite of the FEMA definition, 168
which required an element of violence. Instead, it does not account
for physical harms, and focuses solely on data. Recognizing this
unique effect of CNA is important, but the definition should not be
completely exclusive of all other types of harms. Nonetheless, any
definition of cyber-terrorism should similarly include attacks on
critical data systems.
Any government definition of cyber-terrorism will need to be
altered somewhat to fit with the goals of that agency, and this Article
does not suggest that all agencies must use the proposed definition.
But, as demonstrated above, the currently used definitions are so
divergent that they impede the establishment of a common
government-wide strategy to defeat cyber-terrorism. At minimum,'
there should be consistency among the three basic elements of cyberterrorism and particularity about the type of effects included.
2.

United Nations Definition of Cyber-Terrorism

An internationally consistent definition should also be sought.
Although not the focus of this Article, it is useful to examine how the
United Nations (U.N.) has defined cyber-terrorism. The UN CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force ("CTITF"), although not
explicitly using the term cyber-terrorism, recognizes that one of the
ways a terrorist organization may make "[u]se of the Internet to
perform terrorist attacks [is] by remotely altering information on

165. William L. Tafoya, Cyber Terror, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Nov.
2011, at 2.
166. Id. at 2-3.
167. Id.
168. See Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian: Cybersecurity
and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465, 476 (2011).

164. Id.
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computer systems or disrupting the flow of data between computer
systems. " 169 The CTITF goes on to explain:
[A]ny cyber attack qualifying as 'terrorist' would ultimately still
have to cause damage in the 'real world': for example, by
interfering with a critical infrastructure system to the extent of
causing loss of life or severe property damage. However, as
dependence on online data and services increases, an attack that
resulted only in widespread interruption of the Internet could,
in future, cause sufficient devastation to qualify as a terrorist
attack. However, categorizing such attacks as terrorist remains
controversial. The damage resulting from such attacks, while
potentially economically significant, to date their impact has
0
been more on the level of a serious annoyanceY
This definition, while a bit unwieldy, does an excellent job of
including both violent attacks and attacks on data that are serious
enough to rise to the level of terrorism. This definition, however, fails
to address the element of intent and does not include a non-state
actor requirement.
3.

Academic Definitions

Most academic interest in large-scale CNA tends to focus on
cyber-warfare and the involvement of state actors. This is logical
given the greater size and resources of governments such as China,
Russia and the United States.
Some prominent cyber-security
e~pert~, however, have focused on cyber-terrorism: the possibility of
large scale CNA by non-state actors. One of the earliest and most
widely cited academic descriptions of cyber-terrorism comes from
security-expert Dorothy Denning:
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace.
It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats
of attack against computers, networks, and the information
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government
or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough
harm to ·generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily
injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism,
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dep~nding on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential
services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not. m

~lt~ough it primarily . focuses on violent acts, Denning's
descnpt10n does include attacks that cause severe economic loss.112
She excludes at~ac~~ that are minor in nature, steering the definition
towards more sigmficant attacks. 173 Non-violent attacks may also be
cove~7~ by ~h~ P~~se "or at least cause enough harm to generate
fear, . but it is difficult to draw clear guidelines from this statement.
Dennmg also did not include whether the attacker must be a nonstate actor. Nevertheless, it is an excellent foundation from which to
formulate a precise definition that meets the criteria of being broad
enough to include unique CNA, such as attacks on data only, and
narrow enough to exclude minor activist attacks.
T~e Cen~,er for Strategic and International Studies defines cyberterr.onsm. as the use of computer network tools to shut down critical
nat10n~l mfrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government
operat10ns) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian
pop_ulation. " 175 This definition is both precise ("shut down critical
national infrastructures") and vague ("coerce or intimidate
gover_nment or civilian populace"). It fails to define what level of
coerc10n or intimidation is required before the act goes from being a
p~otest to an act of terrorism. Although the definition suggests a
hi?her level of attac~ by explicitly including critical infrastructure, it
fails to he more precise beyond that particular category.
~n her article, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet
Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a
Deterren~, Kelly Gable provides a similar definition, including "efforts
by terron~ts to u_se the_ Inte~net to hijack computer systems, bring
do':n the mternat10nal financial system, or commit analogous terrorist
act10ns in cyberspace. " 176 Gable focuses on the international finance

171. Cyberterrorism: Testimony before Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism
Comm. on Armed Servs. Before U.S. H.R., (2000) (statement of
Dorothy
E.
Denning,
Georgetown
Univ.)
available
at
http:(/www.cs.geo~g~t?wn.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html

(arg_umg that a defm1t1on of cyber-terrorism should involve a component
of v10lence or har~ing of critical infrastructure, and that, at the time, it
was mostly theoretical but could arise in the future).

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.

169. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, CTITF
Working Group Report: Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist
Purposes 8 (Feb. 2009).
170. Id. at 9.
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176. Kelly A. G~ble, Cyber-~pocaly'f!se Now: Securing the Internet Against
Cyberterrorzsm and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 62 (2010).
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computer systems or disrupting the flow of data between computer
systems. " 169 The CTITF goes on to explain:
[A]ny cyber attack qualifying as 'terrorist' would ultimately still
have to cause damage in the 'real world': for example, by
interfering with a critical infrastructure system to the extent of
causing loss of life or severe property damage. However, as
dependence on online data and services increases, an attack that
resulted only in widespread interruption of the Internet could,
in future, cause sufficient devastation to qualify as a terrorist
attack. However, categorizing such attacks as terrorist remains
controversial. The damage resulting from such attacks, while
potentially economically significant, to date their impact has
been more on the level of a serious annoyance.11°
This definition, while a bit unwieldy, does an excellent job of
including both violent attacks and attacks on data that are serious
enough to rise to the level of terrorism. This definition, however, fails
to address the element of intent and does not include a non-state
actor requirement.
3.
Academic Definitions
Most academic interest in large-scale CNA tends to focus on
cyber-warfare and the involvement of state actors. This is logical
given the greater size and resources of governments such as China,
Russia and the United States.
Some prominent cyber-security
.
' however, have focused on cyber-terrorism: the possibility of
experts,
large scale CNA by non-state actors. One of the earliest and most
widely cited academic descriptions of cyber-terrorism comes from
security-expert Dorothy Denning:
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace.
It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats
of attack against computers, networks, and the information
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government
or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough
harm to · generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily
injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism,
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dep~nding on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential
services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not. m
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~n her article, ?yber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet
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system, as opposed to critical infrastructure, but also includes
"analogous terrorist actions," 177 which suggests violent acts. This
definition is useful because it identifies the need to include CNA,
which causes drastic effects on financial systems in any definition.
Susan Brenner, another noted cyber-security expert, posits a b~sic
definition of cyber-terrorism, stating: "(g]enerically, cyberterronsm
consists of using computer technology to engage in terrorist
activity. "178 Recognizing the broad nature of this definition, Brenner
Brenner
expands on the definition in several important ways.
excludes attacks that originate through the Internet, but have the
result of large-scale destruction, which she terms as a "Weapon of
Mass Destruction" attack. 179 As an example, she provides a scenario
of a cyber-terrorist hacking into a nuclear power plant an~ ca~~ing a
Chernobyl-style meltdown. 180 Although it seems counter-rntmt1ve to
exclude this action from cyber-terrorism, Brenner argues that such an
attack would primarily be remembered as a nuclear terrorist attack,
not a cyber-attack, and therefore should not be considered an act of
cyber-terrorism. 181 Brenner argues that we do not define an att.ack
that uses a car to deliver bombs to target cites as automot1veterrorism. The logical follow on question is why define an attack that
. ?182
has a cyber-element as cyb er-terronsm.
While Brenner makes a good point that a CNA that produces
violence is a "terrorist" attack in the traditional sense, there is still
good reason to further classify it as a cyber-terrorist atta~k,
particularly if government agencies will use this as a common work~ng
definition. The definition needs a separate classification to gear policy
makers and law enforcement towards appropriate methods of
.
prevention and response.
Prevention of a traditional terrorist attack on a nuclear plant lS
vastly different from a CN A, and will require different thought
processes, security measures, and, as this Article later argues, c~anges
to the law. Traditional attack prevention involves protect10n of
physical security on the grounds surrounding the plant, whereas CNA
prevention involves protection of the plant's infor~~tion systerr:s.
Similarly, a law enforcement investigation of a trad1t10na~ terronst
attack would require vastly different techniques and expertise than a
CNA on that same plant~
In the automotive analogy, law
177. Id.
178. Brenner, supra note 19, at 386 (categorizing cyber-threats and focusing
on attribution as the key ele.ment to be solved in battling those threats).
179. Id. at 390-91.
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enforcement would use substantially the same techniques to
investigate a physical bombing of a power station whether the bomber
used a vehicle or a suicide vest to attack the station. However, the
same could not be said if the attack was conducted through
information systems.
Brenner proposes a second category of cyber-terrorism, which she
labels "Weapon of Mass Distraction. "183 This type of CNA would not
result in violent, physical effects, but psychological effects that could
undermine faith in government. 184 Brenner provides the example of a
hacked news website that leads people to believe that there was a
suitcase nuclear device on a city bus, leading to mass panic and
possibly death. 185 This may be a more realistic scenario than the
attack on the nuclear plant, given the lower level of sophistication
required to complete such an attack. For example, in retaliation for
airing a WikiLeaks documentary, the hacker group Lulzsec posted a
news story on PBS that rapper Tupac Shakur was found alive several
years after his actual death. 186 As seen above, cyber-terrorists can
accomplish this type of attack completely through the Internet, unlike
CNA against a nuclear plant, which would probably require
introducing the attack from the inside. 187
Because of the lower level of sophistication required, Brenner
views this type of attack as more than a theoretical possibility. As an
increasing amount of information is relayed through Internet news
outlets, Facebook, Twitter, instant messaging, and other Internetbased sources, the potential panic that would likely result from a
"weapons of mass distraction" attack is high. Any definition of cyberterrorism should include the major threat of causing the appearance
of a terrorist attack through CNA.
Brenner's final cyber-terrorism category is a "Weapon of Mass
.
t·10n. " 188 Th.lS type of attack uses CNA against infrastructure
Drnrup
components, such as an electrical grid or gas supply. 189 The cyberterrorist's goal would likely be to undermine the populace's faith in
183. Id. at 391-93.
184. Id. at 391.
185. Id. at 392.
186. See Kevin Poulsen, Hacktivists Scorch PBS in Retaliation for WikiLeaks
Documentary, WIRED (May 30, 2011, 3:29 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/lulzsec/.
187. See Plant Security, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/
keyiss~e~/safetyandsecurity /plantsecurity / (last visited Feb. 29, 2012)
(descnbrng nuclear plant operations as isolated from the Internet and
other networks).

180. Id.
188. Brenner, supra note 19, at 393-95.

181. Id. at 391.

189. Id.

182. Id.
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cyber-terrorism. 181 Brenner argues that we do not define an att.ack
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While Brenner makes a good point that a CNA that produces
violence is a "terrorist" attack in the traditional sense, there is still
good reason to further classify it as a cyber-terrorist atta~k,
particularly if government agencies will use this as a common wor~ng
definition. The definition needs a separate classification to gear policy
makers and law enforcement towards appropriate methods of
.
prevention and response.
Prevention of a traditional terrorist attack on a nuclear plant is
vastly different from a CNA, and will require different thought
processes, security measures, and, as this Article later argues, c~anges
to the law. Traditional attack prevention involves protection of
physical security on the grounds surrounding the plant, whereas CNA
prevention involves protection of the plant's inforn:~tion systen;s.
Similarly, a law enforcement investigation of a traditiona~ terronst
attack would require vastly different techniques and expertise than a
CNA on that same plant~
In the automotive analogy, law
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enforcement would use substantially the same techniques to
investigate a physical bombing of a power station whether the bomber
used a vehicle or a suicide vest to attack the station. However, the
same could not be said if the attack was conducted through
information systems.
Brenner proposes a second category of cyber-terrorism, which she
labels "Weapon of Mass Distraction. "183 This type of CNA would not
result in violent, physical effects, but psychological effects that could
undermine faith in government. 184 Brenner provides the example of a
hacked news website that leads people to believe that there was a
suitcase nuclear device on a city bus, leading to mass panic and
possibly death. 185 This may be a more realistic scenario than the
attack on the nuclear plant, given the lower level of sophistication
required to complete such an attack. For example, in retaliation for
airing a WikiLeaks documentary, the hacker group Lulzsec posted a
news story on PBS that rapper Tupac Shakur was found alive several
years after his actual death. 186 As seen above, cyber-terrorists can
accomplish this type of attack completely through the Internet, unlike
CNA against a nuclear plant, which would probably require
introducing the attack from the inside. 187
Because of the lower level of sophistication required, Brenner
views this type of attack as more than a theoretical possibility. As an
increasing amount of information is relayed through Internet news
outlets, Facebook, Twitter, instant messaging, and other Internetbased sources, the potential panic that would likely result from a
"weapons of mass distraction" attack is high. Any definition of cyberterrorism should include the major threat of causing the appearance
of a terrorist attack through CNA.
Brenner's final cyber-terrorism category is a "Weapon of Mass
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government by interrupting essential services. 190 Brenner sees this as
a more realistic possibility than an attack that solely produces violent,
catastrophic effects. 191 These types of attacks have been attempted
with limited success, though they have yet to cause widespread fear or
panic. 192 However, this type of attack seems a different scale from the
type of attack included in the "Weapon of Mass Destruction"
category. If a hacker could shut down the gas supply, then certainly
that same hacker could overload the gas supply and cause an
explosion.
Overall, Brenner's point was that cyber-terrorism should not be
treated as war, for the greatest potential harms from cyber-terrorism
were either too theoretical or straightforward terrorism, but should
instead be treated as crime. 193 This framework changed following the
9/11 attacks, as terrorist attacks have become a legal category unto
themselves, and the response has included participation by
intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the military. The threats
posed by terrorism have prompted the passage of new laws and the
development of new law enforcement techniques in cyber-space. 194 If
it is possible that a cyber-terrorist attack could seriously undermine a
citizenry's faith in government, as Brenner suggests, then policy
makers should identify cyber-terrorism as unique from cyber-crime,
and devote serious attention to prevention and response.
E.

Categories of Computer Network Attack

If cyber-terrorism is to be recognized as a unique type of CNA, it
is important to distinguish it from other types of CNA. CNA has
several sub-categories that this Article will distinguish by using three
factors: damage done to the target information system, motivation of
the attack, and identity of the attacker.
The attack can be
categorized and response options determined by identifying each of
the three factors in a particular attack.
190. Id. at 393-94 (describing how generally terrorists' goal is not to destroy
but to demoralize).
191. Id. at 394 (stating that urbanized societies are more vulnerable to
terrorism aimed at demoralization).
192. See, e.g., Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks,
REGISTER. (Oct. 31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (describing a cyberattack that caused annoyance, and stink, but caused little fear or serious
damage).
193. Brenner, supra note 19, at 398.
194. See Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/safeguarding-and-securing-cyberspace
(citing the progress made by the U.S. to defend and mitigate attacks
since the 9/llattacks).
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1.

Cyber-crime

This Article defines a cyber-crime as any level of CNA, conducted
by any party, for any purpose that is considered illegal under
domestic or international law. This sub-category is the broadest
within CNA and includes every type of CNA outside those that occur
in an armed conflict and do not violate the laws of war. Under U.S.
domestic law, it is essentially any act that violates the CFAA.
Cy?e:-.crirr:es need not have an information system as a target, as
the defm1t10n mcludes those attacks simply using information systems
as a tool. A current definition in use by the Computer Crime
Research Center defines cyber-crime as "crimes committed on the
Internet using the computer as either a tool or a targeted victim. "195
Although this Article argues a CNA does not have to be conducted
through use of the Internet, this definition accurately reflects that
information systems can be used to effectuate an attack and not just
serve as the target. Those perpetrating CNAs frequently use means
other than the Internet to access information systems. 196 The Stuxnet
virus, for ex~mple, is thought to have spread to information systems
through an mfected removable drive, as the target system was not
connected to the Internet. 197 This is important for a discussion of
cyber-terrorism because many critical infrastructure components are
not connected to outside networks as a security measure and must be
accessed through another means.
2.

Cyber-espionage

Cyber-espionage is a type of CNA by a state actor or government
contractor, with the purpose of collecting intelligence against another
state, which causes minimal damage or disruption to the information
system. This definition does not incorporate non-national security
rel~te~ corporate espionage, as that is a more traditional cyber-crime.
This IS not to say that corporate espionage does not have national
security implications. According to the DoD:
Every year, an amount of intellectual property larger than that
contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks
maintained by U.S. businesses, .universities, and government
departments and agencies. As military strength ultimately
depends on economic vitality, sustained intellectual property

195. Aghatise E. Joseph, Cybercrime Definition, COMPUTER. CRIME RES. CTR..
(June 28, 2006), http://www.crime-research.org/articles/joseph06.
196. See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 107.
197. See id.; see also William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger,
Israel Tests Called Crucial In Iran Nuclear Setback, N. Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2011, at Al (describing how Stuxnet spread and was solved).
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panic.192 However, this type of attack seems a different scale from_ th~
type of attack included in the "Weapon of Mass Destruct10n
category. If a hacker could shut down the gas supply, then certainly
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explosion.
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but to demoralize).
191. Id. at 394 (stating that urbanized societies are more vulnerable to
terrorism aimed at demoralization).
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1.

Cyber-crime

This Article defines a cyber-crime as any level of CNA, conducted
by any party, for any purpose that is considered illegal under
domestic or international law. This sub-category is the broadest
within CNA and includes every type of CNA outside those that occur
in an armed conflict and do not violate the laws of war. Under U.S.
domestic law, it is essentially any act that violates the CFAA.
Cyber-crimes need not have an information system as a target, as
the definition includes those attacks simply using information systems
as a tool. A current definition in use by the Computer Crime
Research Center defines cyber-crime as "crimes committed on the
Internet using the computer as either a tool or a targeted victim. "195
Although this Article argues a CNA does not have to be conducted
through use of the Internet, this definition accurately reflects that
information systems can be used to effectuate an attack and not just
serve as the target. Those perpetrating CNAs frequently use means
other than the Internet to access information systems. 196 The Stuxnet
virus, for example, is thought to have spread to information systems
through an infected removable drive, as the target system was not
connected to the Internet. 197 This is important for a discussion of
cyber-terrorism because many critical infrastructure components are
not connected to outside networks as a security measure and must be
accessed through another means.
2.
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Cyber-espionage is a type of CNA by a state actor or government
contractor, with the purpose of collecting intelligence against another
state, which causes minimal damage or disruption to the information
system. This definition does not incorporate non-national security
related corporate espionage, as that is a more traditional cyber-crime.
This is not to say that corporate espionage does not have national
security implications. According to the DoD:
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contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks
maintained by U.S. businesses, ·universities, and government
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losses erode both U.S. military effectiveness and national
competitiveness in the global economy. 198
However, the tools for dealing with traditional criminal actions,
such as corporate espionage, diverge sharply from counter-intelligence.
Cyber-espionage also does not incorporate a CNA by a state ac~or
that causes more than minor damage or degradation to a foreign
network as this would be classified as an armed attack in cyberspace.
Whethe; or not an armed attack in cyberspace rises to the level of an
act of war is a complicated calculus that has received considerable
analysis from government sources and academics alike. 199 However,
foreign governments routinely deny that they participate in armed
attacks in cyberspace, as it is generally condemned as an unacceptable
practice. 20° Cyber-espionage, on the other hand, is a generally
internationally acceptable as a form of espionage, and presents a
rising national security concern. 201 Cyber-espionage is neither clearly
condoned nor explicitly allowed by interna~ional law, 202 but could be
considered a covert action, which is generally prohibited by a state's
national law. 203 States criminalize spying under domestic laws and
198. Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, DEP'T OF
DEF. 4 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf.
199. See, e.g., Jorge Benitez, When is a cyberattack an act of war? ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Nov. 6, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.acus.org/natosource/
when-cyberattack-act-war ("If the physical consequences of a
cyberattack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a ?omb or
firing a missile would, that cyberattack should equally be considered a
use of force." If an attack reaches those levels, then a nation has a right
to act in self-defense.").
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apply it to any individual spies they catch. 204 However, in the case of
cyber-espionage, the chances of apprehension are remote because
states can engage in it without physically locating agents in a foreign
nation.
One of the best examples of cyber-espionage was the cyberesp.ionage ring known as "Titan Rain. "205
Discovered in 2003,
websites in China targeted unclassified networks in the DoD and
other federal agencies. 206 The attacks were eventually traced to the
province of Guangdong, but never definitively traced to the Chinese
government. 207 Included in the information stolen were schematics for
NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, a huge collection of files from
Redstone Arsenal, which is home to the Army Aviatiou and Missile
Command, and Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by
the Army and Air Force. 208 Alan Faller, the director of the SANS
Institute, an education and research organization focusing on cybersecurity, stated that, based upon the techniques used, the cyber-spies
were working for the Chinese military. 209 These attacks, however,
were not aimed at disrupting the operation of U.S. Government
networks; they were simply aimed at obtaining information. 210 Had
they disrupted the networks to a large degree, their actions would be
categorized as an armed attack in cyberspace.

such manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not
apparent").
204. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 792 (2006).
205. See Keating, supra note 93 (describing Titan Rain as one of the ten
worst cyber-attacks).

200. See, e.g., Estonia hit by 'Moscow cyber war', BBC (May 17, 2~07, 3.:21
PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm . (discussmg
Russian denial of involvement in CN As, despite the belief of many
experts that the Russian Government does partake in CNAs).

206. See Bradley Graham, Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites, WASH.
POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al (describing how Chinese websites have
"successfully breached hundreds of unclassified networks").

201. See Chinese step up computer espionage against United States, N.Y.
TIMES, (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/~008/11/20/
.
world/americas/20iht-spy.4.18006075.html (reportmg on a congressi?~al
committee looking into the dramatic rise in online theft of sensitive
information by the Chinese Government).

207. See Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies, TIME
(Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.time.com/time/printout/
0,8816,1098961,00.html (reporting that a civilian, Shawn Carpenter, was
able to track the spies to Guangdong while working as a computer
security analyst for Sandia National Laboratories).

202. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at t~e
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law m
Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012) (stating the U.S. Government's position is
that international law applies to cyber-space, but that "this view has
not been universal in the international community").

208. Id.

203. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign
Intelligence, Part 5: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 94th Cong. 1730 (1975) (defining a covert action as "any
clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events,
organizations or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy, conducted in
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209. Anthony Townsend, Hacker Attacks in US Linked to Chinese Military,
BREITBART
(Dec.
12,
2005),
available at http://www.mailarchive.com/ telecom-cities@forums.nyu.edu/ msg00357 .html
(arguing
that the attacks "have been traced to the Chinese province of
Guangdong" and due to the techniques used it is "unlikely to come from
any other source other than the military").
210. Cf. id. (describing the information that was probed, but not noting any
disruption of operations).
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3.

Armed Attack in Cyberspace

An armed attack in cyberspace is a CNA by or at the direction of
a state actor that causes more than minor destruction, damage, or
degradation to an information system itself, or anything outside the
information system as a result of the CN A through the use of an
information system. 211 This term is often equated with cyber-warfare
and is defined by Susan Brenner as follows:
Cyberwarfare is the conduct of military operations by vir~ual
means. It consists of nation-states' using cyberspace to achieve
the same ends that they pursue through the use of conventional
military force: achieving advantages over a competing nationstate or preventing a competing nation-state from achieving
advantages over them. 212
This close alliance with warfare has led to questioning of what
kind of CNA would rise to the level of "use _of force" and trigger law
of war considerations. 213 The DoD provides a vague standard, "[a]s in
the physical world, a determination of what ·is a 'threat or use of
force' in cyberspace must be made in the context in which the activity
occurs, and it. involves an analysis by the affected states of the effect
and purpose of the actions in question. "214 Charles Dunlap, former
Deputy Staff Judge Advocate of the Air Force and .currei:t law
Professor ' argues that a CNA resulting in violent effectsf isf eqmvalent
to an armed attack and therefore constitutes a use o orce. 215 As
such CNA that results.in violent effects should, according to Dunlap,
be ~overned by the conduct of state actors just as in traditional
warfare under the laws of war. 216 However, rarely have states
acknowledged any role in cyber-warfare outside of actions taken
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during a declared conflict, 217 because most actions that are taken by
governments in this area are more precisely defined as covert actions.
A classic example of a covert action in cyberspace is the infiltration of
the Stuxnet computer virus against Iran; assuming that, as most
analysts suspect, it was launched by a nation state. 218 This Article
identifies these. types of cyber-attacks as armed attacks in cyberspace.
A good example of armed attack in cyberspace is the 2008 conflict
between Russia and Georgia. 219 The conflict was over a province of
Georgia, South Ossetia, which sought independence. 220 The Russian
government backed the separatists, and on August 8, 2008, the two
sides clashed militarily. 221 The Georgians were pushed out of South
Ossetia on August 10, after two days of fighting. 222 As the physical
military conflict was taking place, a shadow conflict was taking place
on the Internet. According to Georgian officials, Russian statesponsored hackers launched an extensive CNA campaign against
The websites of Georgian
Georgian Government websites. 223
President Mikheil Saakashvili, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
the Ministry of Defense were all forced offline as part of the attack. 224
This CNA was unique in that it occurred in conjunction with a
larger military campaign.
Although the CNA did not appear to
affect the military operations, it did suppress the Georgian
government's ability to spread information to both its people and
those abroad. 225 This event likely foretells the increasingly large role
that cyber-warfare will play in future military conflicts.

217. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 47-48, 69
(2010) (Reprint ed. 2011) (describing the use of armed attack in
cyberspace by the U.S. Air Force in the Iraq War).
218. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (discussing why the virus
is likely of Israeli origin.

211. See Brenner, supra note 19, at 401 (stating how. cyber-warf~re ~s l~ke
traditional warfare in that it consists of nation-states ach1evmg
advantages over a competing nation-state").

219. Peter Finn, A Two-Sided Descent Into Full-Scale War, WASH. POST,
Aug. 17, 2008, at Al.

212. Id.

220. Id.

213. See generally Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Perspectives for Cyber Strategists
on Law for Cyberwar, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, at ~1-:-99
(arguing that the laws comprising the Law of Armed Conflict as ex1stmg
are adequate to deal with the new development of cyber-warfare).

221. Id.

214. DEP'T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2011, SECTION 934, 9 (Nov. 2011).

222. Id.
223. Asher Moses, Georgian Websites Forced Offline in "Cyber War,"
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/
news /technology/ georgian-websites-forced-·offline-in-cy berwar /2008/08/12/1218306848654.html (discussing how the central
government site was and the President's site had been moved to U.S.
servers).

215. Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL
ST. J., May 31, 2011, at Al (arguing that cyber attacks "that have a
violent effect are the legal equivalent of armed attacks").

224. Id.

216. Id.

225. Id.
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4.

Hacktivism

If these attacks had been conducted by civilians and had occurred
completely outside a military conflict, how should the perpetrators be
The answer would likely be as "hacktivists."
categorized?
"Hacktivism" is often confused with cyber-terrorism, given that what
distinguishes the two is, in some ways, only a matter of degree. 226
The term was coined by a group of hackers called the Cult of the
Dead Cow, who wished to use computer hacking to foster human
rights and free expression. 227 These groups are non-state actors who
conduct politically motivated CNAs. 228 However, the level of these
attacks is relatively minor, and do not cause effects traditionally
associated with terrorism, such as fear or panic in the civilian
populace, affect national security, or damage to critical
infrastructure. 229 Although these groups do commit crimes, hacktivist
· groups are primarily distinguished from most cyber-criminals by their
motivations. 230 They are motivated by a desire to change a policy,
practice or mode of thinking, as opposed to monetary gain or other
traditional criminal motivation. 231 Hacktivists have participated in
numerous CNAs, opposing, or favoring, various groups or causes, such
as attacks on Visa and MasterCard, 232 and supporting WikiLeaks. 233
226. See Jay Dioxy Riboz, The Difference Between Hacktivism and Cyber
Terrorism,
INFOBARREL
TECH.
(Dec.
18,
2009),
http://www.infobarrel.com/The_Difference_Between_Hacktivism_and
_ Cyberterrorism (explaining that hacktivism is a "fusion of hacking and
activism; politics and technology. . . . Cyber terrorism, on the other
hand, is a computer-based attack or threat of attack").
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Hacktivism is certainly a growing phenomenon, 234 but given the
limited nature of the attacks as defined, it is probably not a major
threa~ ~o national security. 235
However, if the damage caused by
hacktiv1sts were to substantially increase and pose a threat to
national security, then hacktivism would rise to the level of cyberterrorism. 236
One of the largest hacktivist operations seen to date was termed
the "50 days of Lulz. "237 In 2011, a group of hackers going by the
name of Lulz, or Lulzsec, engaged in a concentrated number of
CNA. 238 For example, in May 2011, the popular PBS news show
"Frontline" aired a show on Wikileaks that Lulz disagreed with.239 In
response, Lulz hacked into the PBS website and posted a fake news
story about Tupac Shakur being alive in New Zealand. 240
Addi~ionally, the group took down the Central Intelligence Agency's
website and released the personal information of millions of Sony
PlayStation users. 241 At least one leader of Lulz, known as Topiary,
was arrested in the Shetland Islands. 242 The CNA conducted by Lulz
was certainly serious, particularly the release of the Sony PlayStation
user data. However, in the age of Facebook, it is a stretch to argue
that publicly releasing personal data constitutes terrorism. Just as
definitions of terrorism require that the act's effects rise to a certain
level, so should a definition of cyber-terrorism in excluding these acts
of hacktivism.
5.

Terrorist Use of the Internet

When most people think of terrorist use of the Internet, they do
not think of taking down the electric grid through a cyber-attack;

227. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14,
2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07 /64193.
228. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-10-230T, CYBERSECURITY:
CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
FR.OM EVOLVING THREATS 4 (2009), (statement . of Gregory C.
Wilshusen, Dir. Info. Sec. Issues and David A. Powner, Dir. Info. Mgmt.
Issues) [hereinafter GAO CYBER.SECUR.ITY STATEMENT].

234. John P. Mello, Jr., Hacktivism Trumps Money as Motivation for Denialof-Service
Attacks,
PCWOR.LD
(Feb.
7,
2012,
8:50
AM),
http:/ (w~.pcworld.com/article/249442/hacktivism_trumps_money_a
s_mot1vat1on_for_denialofservice_attacks.html
(stating
that
hacktivism is the most widespread motivation for Distributed Denial of
Service attacks on the Internet).

229. See generally Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian:
Cybersecurity and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465,
476 (2011) (defining and providing examples of hacktivism).

236. See Riboz, supra note 226.

230. Id.

237. See Keating, supra note 93.

231. See GAO CYBER.SECUR.ITY, supra note 228, at 4.

238. Id.

232. Anonymous hacktivists say Wikileaks war to continue, BBC NEWS (last
updated Dec. 9, 2010, 4:10 ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11935539 (reporting that Visa
and MasterCard were hit with denial of service attacks after they
withdrew their services from Wikileaks).

239. See Poulsen, supra note 186.

235. See Lewis, supra note 115.

240. Id.
241. See Keating, supra note 93.

233. Peter Ludlow, WikiLeaks and Hacktivist Culture, THE NATION, Oct. 4,
2010, at 25 (discussing the prominence of Wikileaks in the hacktivist
sub-culture).

242. Josh Halliday, Charles Arthur & James Ball LulzSec hacking suspect
'Topiary' arreste~, THE GUARDIAN (July' 27, 2011, 5:02 PM),
http:/ /www.guardian.co.uk/technology /2011/jul/27 /lulzsec-hackingsuspect-topiary-arrested.
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Hacktivism is certainly a growing phenomenon, 234 but given the
limited nature of the attacks as defined, it is probably not a major
threa~ ~o national security. 235
However, if the damage caused by
hackt1v1sts were to substantially increase and pose a threat to
national security, then hacktivism would rise to the level of cyberterrorism. 236
One of the largest _hacktivist operations seen to date was termed
the "50 days of Lulz. "237 In 2011, a group of hackers going by the
name of Lulz, or Lulzsec, engaged in a concentrated number of
CNA. 238 For example, in May 2011, the popular PBS news show
"Frontline" aired a show on Wikileaks that Lulz disagreed with. 239 In
response, Lulz hacked into the PBS website and posted a fake news
story about Tupac Shakur being alive in New Zealand. 240
Addi~ionally, the group took down the Central Intelligence Agency's
website and released the personal information of millions of Sony
PlayStation users. 241 At least one leader of Lulz, known as Topiary,
was arrested in the Shetland Islands. 242 The CNA conducted by Lulz
was certainly serious, particularly the release of the Sony PlayStation
user data. However, in the age of Facebook, it is a stretch to argue
that publicly releasing personal data constitutes terrorism. Just as
definitions of terrorism require that the act's effects rise to a certain
level, so should a definition of cyber-terrorism in excluding these acts
of hacktivism.
5.

Terrorist Use of the Internet

When most people think of terrorist use of the Internet, they do
not think of taking down the electric grid through a cyber-attack;

227. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14,
2004), http://www.wired.co.m/techbiz/it/news/2004/07 /64193.
228. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-10-230T, CYBERSECURITY:
CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
FROM EVOLVING THREATS 4 (2009), (statement . of Gregory C.
Wilshusen, Dir. Info. Sec. Issues and David A. Powner, Dir. Info. Mgmt.
Issues) [hereinafter GAO CYBERSECURITY STATEMENT].
229. See generally Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian:
Cybersecurity and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465,
476 (2011) (defining and providing examples of hacktivism).

234. John P. Mello, Jr., Hacktivism Trumps Money as Motivation for Denialof-Service
Attacks,
PCWORLD
(Feb.
7,
2012,
8:50
AM),
http:/ (w~.pcworld.com/article/249442/hacktivism_trumps_money_a
s_mot1vat1on_for_denialofservice_attacks.html
(stating
that
hacktivism is the most widespread motivation for Distributed Denial of
Service attacks on the Internet).
235. See Lewis, supra note 115.
236. See Riboz, supra note 226.

230. Id.

237. See Keating, supra note 93.

231. See GAO CYBERSECURITY, supra note 228, at 4.

238. Id.

232. Anonymous hacktivists say Wikileaks war to continue, BBC NEWS (last
updated Dec. 9, 2010, 4:10 ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11935539 (reporting that Visa
and MasterCard were hit with denial of service attacks after they
withdrew their services from Wikileaks).

239. See Poulsen, supra note 186.
240. Id.
241. See Keating, supra note 93.

233. Peter Ludlow, WikiLeaks and Hacktivist Culture, THE NATION, Oct. 4,
2010, at 25 (discussing the prominence of Wikileaks in the hacktivist
sub-culture).

242. Josh Halliday, Charles Arthur & James Ball LulzSec hacking suspect
'Topiary' arreste~, THE GUARDIAN (July' 27, 2011, 5:02 PM),
http://www.guardmn.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/27 /lulzsec-hackingsuspect-topiary-arrested.
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instead, they picture Al-Qaeda posting a video online or other
Terrorist organization presence on the
promotion measures. 243
Internet has thus far been dominated by using the Internet for
planning, coordination, propaganda, and recruitment, which is what
this Article defines as "terrorist use of the Internet. "244 One of the
earliest terrorist organizations to realize the potential of the Internet
was Al-Qaeda, and it quickly became one of its most effective
resources in becoming an international terrorist organization. 245
Former chief of the CIA unit that tracked Osama Bin Laden, Michael
Scheuer, stated a terrorist organization's use of the Internet "erodes
the ability of our security services to hit them when they're most
vulnerable, when they're moving. "246 In a similar thought, State
Department counter-terrorism expert Dennis Pluchinsky finds the
global jihad movement
has
become a
'"'[w]eb-directed"
phenomenon. "247
Cyberspace is an ideal platform upon which to communicate and
coordinate activities.
Its speed, simplicity, ease of access, and
anonymity makes it difficult to monitor and control. 248 There are also
reports that terrorist organizations have turned to traditional cybercrimes such as theft and fraud to raise funds. 249 Some experts believe
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that such activities are the extent of many terrorist organization's
capabilities without a state sponsor, or an influx of highly trained
computer personnel. 250 Others, including the FBI, believe Al-Qaeda
may try some act of cyber-terrorism. 251 Either way, international
terrorist organizations have learned the power of the Internet and are
willing to use it in creative ways to accomplish their objectives.
However, using information systems as a tool to further an
organization's objectives is distinctly different from using those
information systems as a weapon of terror. Al-Qaeda does not need
to write malicious code or manipulate SCADA systems to help
organize and fund the organization or to spread propaganda. The two
categories will certainly connect in some ways, but the tools needed to
counter them are fundamentally different.
Having defined cyber-terrorism, examined the elements of that
definition, and distinguished it from other types of CNA, the next
Section of this Article will examine examples of major acts of CNA to
determine whether those attacks could be appropriately categorized as
cyber-terrorism.
SECTION

Ill. RECENT EXAMPLES OF COMPUTER NETWORK
ATTACK

243. See Eben Kaplan, Terrorists and the Internet, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL.
(Jan.
8,
2009),
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-andtechnology /terrorists-internet/p10005 (discussing the advantages the
Internet offers terrorist organizations and how they use it).
244. See GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET 25 (2006) (discussing
how modern terrorist organizations exploit the Internet to raise funds,
recruit members, plan and launch attacks, and publicize their results);
see also Benjamin R. Davis, Note, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating
Terrorist Exploitation of the Internet with the Rule of Law and
Improved Tools for Cyb er Governance, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 119,
129 (2006-2007) (arguing the U.S. and foreign governments, as well as
international bodies like ICANN, have failed to adequately respond to
the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations).
245. Steve Coll & Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of
Operations,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
7,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/ article/2005 /08/05 / AR2005080501138.html (charting Al
Qaeda's migration from operating primarily in real space to operating in
cyberspace).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See WEIMANN, supra note 244, at 25.
249. Jon Swartz, Terrorists' use of Internet spreads, USA TODAY (Updated
Feb. 21, 2005, 12:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries /technology /2005-02-20-cyber-terror-usat_x.htm
(citing
examples of terrorists organizations using fraud on the internet to
finance operations).
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This Section examines several recent major examples of CNA to
determine if they should be classified as cyber-terrorism. Specifically,
this Section examines the effects, motives, and targets of the
perpetrators of CNA, measuring them against the elements set out in
the definition of cyber-terrorism.
A.

Anonymous

Anonymous is a:ri affiliation of hackers who have conducted an
increasingly large number of attacks since the group's origin around

250. Mark Ward, Cyber terrorism 'overhyped', BBC (Mar. 14, 2003, 2:01
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology /2850541.stm. (stating the
belief of several security experts that would-be online terrorists lack the
technical expertise and resources to engage in cyber-terrorism).
251. Cybersecurity: Preventing Terrorist Attacks and Protecting Privacy
Rights in Cyberspace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and
Homeland Sec. of the Sen. Comm. On the Judiciary, lllth Cong. 2
(2009) (statement of Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Ass't. Dir., Cyber
Division, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
252. Anonymous (YourAnonNews), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:25
PM), https://twitter.com/YourAnonNews/status/168068014758039552.
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One of the
earliest terrorist organizations to realize the potential of the Internet
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245
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vulnerable, when they're moving. "246 In a similar thought, State
Department counter-terrorism expert Dennis Pluchinsky finds the
global jihad movement
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become
a
""[w]eb-directed"
247
·
phenomenon. "
Cyberspace is an ideal platform upon which to communicate and
coordinate activities.
Its speed, simplicity, ease of access, and
anonymity makes it difficult to monitor and control. 248 There are also
reports that terrorist organizations have turned to traditional cybercrimes such as theft and fraud to raise funds. 249 Some experts believe

that such activities are the extent of many terrorist organization's
capabilities without a state sponsor, or an influx of highly trained
computer personnel. 250 Others, including the FBI, believe Al-Qaeda
may try some act of cyber-terrorism. 251 Either way, international
terrorist organizations have learned the power of the Internet and are
willing to use it in creative ways to accomplish their objectives.
However, using information systems as a tool to further an
organization's objectives is distinctly different from using those
information systems as a weapon of terror. Al-Qaeda does not need
to w~ite malicious code or manipulate SCADA systems to help
orgamze and fund the organization or to spread propaganda. The two
categories will certainly connect in some ways, but the tools needed to
counter them are fundamentally different.
Having defined cyber-terrorism, examined the elements of that
definition, and distinguished it from other types of CNA, the next
Section of this Article will examine examples of major acts of CNA to
determine whether those attacks could be appropriately categorized as
cyber-terrorism.
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Internet offers terrorist organizations and how they use it).
244. See GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET 25 (2006) (discussing
how modern terrorist organizations exploit the Internet to raise funds,
recruit members, plan and launch attacks, and publicize their results);
see also Benjamin R. Davis, Note, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating
Ter'rorist Exploitation of the Internet with the Rule of Law and
Improved Tools for Cyb er Governance, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 119,
129 (2006-2007) (arguing the U.S. and foreign governments, as well as
international bodies like I CANN, have failed to adequately respond to
the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations).
245. Steve Coll & Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of
Operations,
WASH.
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(Aug.
7,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp.
dyn/ content/ article/2005 /08/05 / AR2005080501138.html (chartm? ~l
Qaeda's migration from operating primarily in real space to operatmg m
cyberspace).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See WEIMANN, supra note 244, at 25.
249. Jon Swartz, Ter'rorists' use of Internet spreads, USA TODAY (Updated
Feb. 21, 2005, 12:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries/ technology /2005-02-20-cyber-terror-usat_x.htm
(citing
examples of terrorists organizations using fraud on the internet to
finance operations).
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This Section examines several recent major examples of CNA to
if they should be classified as cyber-terrorism. Specifically,
thrn Sect10n examines the effects, motives, and targets of the
perpetrators of CNA, measuring them against the elements set out in ·
the definition of cyber-terrorism.
de~ermine_

A.

Anonymous

Anonymous is ari affiliation of hackers who have conducted an
increasingly large number of attacks since the group's origin around

250. Mark Ward, Cyber terrorism 'overhyped', BBC (Mar. 14, 2003, 2:01
P:I\~), http://news.bb~.co.uk/2/hi/technology /2850541.stm. (stating the
belief of several security experts that would-be online terrorists lack the
technical expertise and resources to engage in cyber-terrorism).
251. C~berse_curity: Preventing Ter'rorist Attacks and Protecting Privacy
Rights in Cyberspace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and
Homeland Sec. of the Sen. Comm. On the Judiciary, lllth Cong. 2
(2_0~9) (statement of Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Ass't. Dir., Cyber
D1v1s1on, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
252. Anonymous (YourAnonNews), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:25
PM), https://twitter.com/YourAnonNews/status/168068014758039552.
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2003.253 The members of Anonymous are thought to be assoc~ated
with Lulz.254 Some of the group's most notable targets include private
.
1 255
d s
256
organizations such as the Church of Sciento ogy
an
o~~'
257
government organizations including the CIA,
and the Tumsmn
governments of Tunisia25 s and Iran. 259 Although many of their attacks
have shown a high degree of coordination, t~e na~ure ~f the
organization is somewhat informal. 260 In a 2011 mterview with IT
world reporter Dan Tynan, one Anonymous leader, known as
Commander X stated there were approximately ten thousand
Anonymous me~bers. 261 Commander X stated that its targets are
selected by considering several factors, including whether: 1) there are
already protests in place against the target; 2) the protests are non253. See, e.g., Chris Landers, Serious Business, BALT. CITY PAPE~· (Apr. 2,
http://www2.citypaper.com/columns/story:asp.1d=15543
2008),
(describing a 2008 dispute between the Church of Scient?logy an~
Anonymous that was a response in part to the Church of Scientology s
claims of online copyright infringement).
254. See supra Section II; see also Poulsen, supra note 186.
255. See Landers, supra note 253.
256. See Elinor Mills, Sony sites offline after Anonymous attack threats,
CNET (Apr. 6, 2011 4:52 PM), http://news.cnet.com/83?1-27080--:-320051482-245.html (discussing Anonymous's distrib~ted ~en~a~-of-serv1ce
attacks against Sony in response to Sony's suit agamst md1v1duals who
had "jailbroken" software for its popular gaming system).
257. Nicole Perlroth, Anonymous Says It Knocked C.l.A. Site Offline, N.Y.
TIMES
BITS
BLOG
(Feb.
10,
2012,
5:.14
PM),

http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/ano~ymous-says-_it-knocked

c-i-a-site-offline/ (suggesting that Anonymous s attack agamst the CIA
website may have been tied to the FBI arrests of the owners
Megaupload.com, a popular music downloading).
258. Max Read, Anonymous Attacks Tunisian Government over Wikileaks
Censorship,
GAWKER
(Jan.
3,
2011,. . 12:14
AM),
http://gawker.com/5723104/anonymous-attacks-tum~ia~-governme:11t
over-wikileaks-censorship (explaining Anonymous's d1stnbut.ed denial-~f
service attacks against the Tunisian Government's websites were m
response to the Government's blocking of its country's Internet users
from accessing Wikileaks, or any news outlet that reported on the
leaked cables regarding Tunisia, in December 2010).
259. Kevin Fogarty, 'Anonymous' attacks Iran, calls for volunteers to help
U.S. tornado victims, IT WORLD (May 2, 2011, 4:07 PM),
http://www.itworld.com/security /161241/anonymous-attacks-Iran-callsvolunteers-help-us-tornado-victims (blaming Anonymous for attacks
launched against multiple Iranian Government websites).
260. Dan Tynan, A conversation with Commander X, IT WORLD (Feb .. 18,
2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.itworld.?om/int~rnet/1375~0/conversat10~~
commander-x ("'So is there some kmd of mformal hierarchy . · · ·
'That is correct."').
261. Id.
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violent; 3) the protest has a likelihood of success; and 4) there is a
clear moral imperative. 262 Commander X does not define whose
"moral imperative" guides their actions. 263
Clearly, Anonymous sees its actions as civil disobedience, using
the language of morality to justify its actions. An example of this
moralistic language was the recent launch of a cyber-campaign against
Israel. 264 Anonymous purportedly released a video that promised a
"crusade" against Israel. 265 The stated aim of Anonymous was
"systematically removing [Israel] from the internet." 266 The video
cited Israel's "Zionist bigotry" and population displacement as reasons
for the promised attacks. 267
In conjunction with the attack outlined at the beginning of this
Article, these attacks raise the issue of whether Anonymous is a
hacktivist organization or a cyber-terrorist organization. As already
detailed, the group's attacks against justice and national security
websites such as the FBI and DoJ, as well as the CIA attack, meet
the definition of a federal crime of terrorism. Nevertheless, should the
act of t~mporarily taking down a government website result in
labeling a group as "terrorists"?
Examining the elements presented in this Article's definition of
cyber-terrorism clarifies the answer. First is the prong· of intent,
which Anonymous clearly satisfies: Anonymous endeavors to
undermine groups and organizations they disagree with, including
governments. 268 It also meets the requirement of being a non-state
group, as it contains no known ties to a state. The last question is
whether the effects of the group's attacks are designed to cause fear or
anxiety in a civilian populace. This can be done through effects that
cause widespread damage to critical physical or informational
infrastructure, national security related information systems, critical
economic systems, or that result in severe physical damage or human
casualties.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Given the nature of Anonymous' announcements, it would be easy for
anyone to claim action in their name. However, the Author could find
no statement repudiating the intended launch of a CNA against Israel
by Anonymous.
265. Donald Macintyre, Hacking group threatens 'crusade' against Israel,
INDEPENDEN~
(Feb.
11,
2012),
http://www.mdependent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/hacking-groupthreatens-crusade-against-israel-6 720039 .html?.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Tynan, supra note 260 (reporting that Commander X stated that by
victory, "[d]ictators on planes to Saudi Arabia works for us.").
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violent; 3) the protest has a likelihood of success; and 4) there is a
clear moral imperative. 262 Commander X does not define whose
"moral imperative" guides their actions. 263
Clearly, Anonymous sees its actions as civil disobedience, using
the language of morality to justify its actions. An example of this
moralistic language was the recent launch of a cyber-campaign against
Israel. 264 Anonymous purportedly released a video that promised a
"crusade" against Israel. 265 The stated aim of Anonymous was
"systematically removing [Israel] from the internet." 266 The video
cited Israel's "Zionist bigotry" and population displacement as reasons
for the promised attacks. 267
In conjunction with the attack outlined at the beginning of this
Article, these attacks raise the issue of whether Anonymous is a
hacktivist organization or a cyber-terrorist organization. As already
detailed, the group's attacks against justice and national security
websites such as the FBI and DoJ, as well as the CIA attack, meet
the definition of a federal crime of terrorism. Nevertheless, should the
act of t~mporarily taking down a government website result in
labeling a group as "terrorists"?
Examining the elements presented in this Article's definition of
cyber-terrorism clarifies the answer. First is the prong· of intent,
which Anonymous clearly satisfies: Anonymous endeavors to
undermine groups and organizations they disagree with, including
governments. 268 It also meets the requirement of being a non-state
group, as it contains no known ties to a state. The last question is
whether the effects of the group's attacks are designed to cause fear or
anxiety in a civilian populace. This can be done through effects that
cause widespread damage to critical physical or informational
infrastructure, national security related information systems, critical
economic systems, or that result in severe physical damage or human
casualties.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Given the nature of Anonymous' announcements, it would be easy for
anyone to claim action in their name. However, the Author could find
no statement repudiating the intended launch of a CNA against Israel
by Anonymous.
265. Donald Macintyre, Hacking group threatens 'crusade' against Israel,
INDEPENDEN~
(Feb.
11,
2012),
http://www.mdependent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/hacking-groupthreatens-crusade-against-israel-6 720039 .html?.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Tynan, supra note 260 (reporting that Commander X stated that by
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None of the attacks conducted by Anonymous or its affiliates
have directly caused physical damage or human casualties, but the
attacks have affected web operations for some national security
related agencies through denial of service attacks. 269 However, CNAs
that have resulted in the temporary takedown of websites, such as
those of the FBI, White House, or CIA, should not be considered
widespread damage. The public web pages of these agencies, while
important, are generally media outlets and general notices to the
public. 270 Additionally, the hacked websites are typically down only
for a brief period. 271 Should these attacks occur during a public
emergency with increased reliance on those sites for vital information,
the effects would likely meet . the definitional element of cyberterrorism.
Anonymous has also gone so far as to eavesdrop on the phone
In this CNA,
calls between the FBI and Scotland Yard. 272
Anonymous was able to listen in on a conference call discussing efforts
against hacking groups, raising the question of how deeply the group
had infiltrated various law enforcement agencies. 273 This infiltration
should be considered more severe than the take-down of a website, as
it could affect operations and, potentially, national security.
However, the public effects of such actions are limited and should not
be considered cyber-terrorism. Anonymous has not limited itself to
denial of service attacks and other types of CNA may be a bit
different.
In August 2011, the Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART")
administration in San Francisco announced that they would cut cell
phone service in tunnels as a response to protests over the shooting of
a man by BART police. 274 Following this announcement, Anonymous
269. See Elinor Mills, Keeping up with the hackers (chart), CNET (Feb. 8,
2012,
5:46
PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20071830245/keeping-up-with-the-hackers-chart/ (providing a chart of computer
attacks and the results of these attacks over the past year).
270. See, e.g., CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ (last accessed Feb. 12, 2012).
271. See, e.g., Christopher Williams, Anonymous attacks FBI website over
Megaupload raids, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2012 10:44 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/technology /news/ 9027246 /Anonymousattacks-FBI-website-over-Megaupload-raids.html
(describing
the
Anonymous attacks on the FBI website and stating the site was only
down for a brief period, although the websites for the Motion Picture
Association of America were down for a considerably longer period).
272. Leo Kelion, Anonymous gain [sic} access to FBI and Scotland Yard
hacking
call,
BBC
NEWS
(Feb.
3,
2012,
15:54
ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16875921.
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leaked the names, phone numbers, and passwords of BART riders. 275
Although Anonymous apologized to the riders for the release of their
information, they blamed the release on BART for having lax security
practices. 276 The Oakland Police Chief responded by labeling the
CNA an act of cyber-terrorism. 277
Loss of private data can be of great concern, and certainly affects
these individuals' lives more than website disruption, but does it rise
to the level of fear and anxiety necessary to fit the definition of cyberterrorism? As personal information placed on information systems
becomes more prevalent, it also becomes more vulnerable to theft.
An entire generation has become comfortable putting large amounts
of personal information on the Internet. Although most people trust
that this data is somewhat secure, an entire industry has grown up
around information security and identity protection with companies
such as Lifelock, Debix, and TrustedID, which advertise identity-theft
protection. 278 There seems to be a constant flow of news stories about
government agencies, banks, and other companies losing the private
data of their clients or constituents. 279 Is the knowledge that so much
of our personal data is located in the hands of third parties limiting
the effect of a release such as that of Anonymous? The line is a
difficult one to draw, but in the specific case of BART, in which the
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/bay-area-authorities-cut-cellcoverage-to-thwart-protestors/ ("Officers were concerned that the
protestors "would use mobile devices to coordinate their disruptive
activities and communicate about the location and umber of BART
police").
275. Joshua Brustein, Anonymous to BART: We Hack. We Organize, Too,
N.Y.
TIMES
BITS
BLOGS
(Aug.
15,
2011,
2:09
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/anonymous-to-bart-we-hackwe-organize-too / (describing Anonymous' activities in response to
BART's actions).
276. Id. ("We apologize to any citizen that has his information published,
but you should go to BART and ask them why your information wasn't
secure with them," [Anonymous] wrote on the Web site where it posted
the leaked information.")
277. Matthew Artz, Oakland officials condemn release of personal
information by Anonymous, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (updated Feb. 7,
2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/occupy/ci_19910127.
278. See Bruce Schneier, The Pros and Cons of LifeLock, WIRED (June 12,
2008), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/
securitymatters / 2008 / 06 / securitymatters_0612? currentP age= all.

274. David Streitfeld, Bay Area Officials Cut Cell Coverage to Thwart
Protestors, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:55 PM),

279. See generally Mark Sullivan, Protect Our Data! A Digital Consumer Bill
of Rights, PCWORLD (Feb. 9, 2012, 7:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249558/protect_our_data_a_digital_
consumer_bill_of_rights.html (discussing the various ways consumers
store information and the ways that information can be protected and
unkriowingly accessed).
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None of the attacks conducted by Anonymous or its affiliates
have directly caused physical damage or human casualties, but the
attacks have affected web operations for some national security
related agencies through denial of service attacks. 269 However, CNAs
that have resulted in the temporary takedown of websites, such as
those of the FBI, White House, or CIA, should not be considered
widespread damage. The public web pages of these agencies, while
important, are generally media outlets and general notices to the
public. 270 Additionally, the hacked websites are typically down only
for a brief period. 271 Should these attacks occur during a public
emergency with increased reliance on those sites for vital information,
the effects would likely meet. the definitional element of cyberterrorism.
Anonymous has also gone so far as to eavesdrop on the phone
In this CNA,
calls between the FBI and Scotland Yard. 272
Anonymous was able to listen in on a conference call discussing efforts
against hacking groups, raising the question of how deeply the group
had infiltrated various law enforcement agencies. 273 This infiltration
should be considered more severe than the take-down of a website, as
it could affect operations and, potentially, national security.
However, the public effects of such actions are limited and should not
be considered cyber-terrorism. Anonymous has not limited itself to
denial of service attacks and other types of CNA may be a bit
different.
In August 2011, the Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART")
administration in San Francisco announced that they would cut cell
phone service in tunnels as a response to protests over the shooting of
a man by BART police. 274 Following this announcement, Anonymous
269. See Elinor Mills, Keeping up with the hackers (chart), CNET (Feb. 8,
2012,
5:46
PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20071830245/keeping-up-with-the-hackers-chart/ (providing a chart of computer
attacks and the results of these attacks over the past year).
270. See, e.g., CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ (last accessed Feb. 12, 2012).
271. See, e.g., Christopher Williams, Anonymous attacks FBI website over
Megaupload raids, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2012 10:44 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology /news/9027246/ Anonymousattacks-FBI-website-over-Megaupload-raids.html
(describing
the
Anonymous attacks on the FBI website and stating the site was only
down for a brief period, although the websites for the Motion Picture
Association of America were down for a considerably longer period).
272. Leo Kelion, Anonymous gain {sic} access to FBI and Scotland Yard
BBC
NEWS
(Feb.
3,
2012,
15:54
ET),
hacking
call,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16875921.
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data release was limited to user names and passwords, the loss was
not substantial enough to be considered cyber-terrorism.
Thus, the actions of Anonymous, while troublesome to many, 280
do not yet rise to the level of cyber-terrorism. Its rhetoric may
suggest radical or even occasionally violent aims, but its actions do
not rise to that level.
However, this does not mean that as
Anonymous' capabilities increase the likelihood that the group will
not attempt a CNA that rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. The
National Security Agency ("NSA") has warned that by 2014,
Anonymous could have the ability to bring down portions of the U.S.
power grid, 281 which should be considered cyber-terrorism as a CNA
on critical infrastructure. NSA had been silent regarding Anonymous
to this point, making the statement particularly notable. 282
Additionally, Anonymous announced plans to "blackout" the Internet
by attacking the Domain Name System to protest "our irresponsible
leaders and the beloved bankers who are starving the world for their
own selfish needs out of sheer sadistic fun. "283 Time will tell if
280. See, e.g., Steven Musil, Interpol sweep nets 25 Anonymous suspects,
CNET (Feb. 28, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009-=-35 7387203-83 / interpol-sweep-nets-25-anonymous-suspects /
(report mg
that Interpol arrested twenty-five Anonymous members across Europe
and South America in response to coordinated attacks by the group
against websites in Colombia and Chile).
281. Siobhan Gorman, Alert on Hacker Power Play, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204059804577229390105521090.html?mod=WSJ_hp_
MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird (discussing warnings issued by NSA
Director General Keith Alexander, in meetings with the White House
and lawmakers); see also Elizabeth Flock, Anonymous attacks WSJ page
hours after story warning group is getting more powerful, WASH. POST
(Feb.
22,
2012,
10:02
AM),
http://www. washingtonpost .com/blogs /blogpost /post/ anonymousattacks-wsj-page-hours-after-story-warning-group-is-getting-morepowerful/2012 /02/22 / gIQA 7Q1FTR_blog.html
(describing
several
attacks on Wall Street Journal Facebook pages by a German faction of
Anonymous after the Wall Street Journal reported on General
Alexander's comments regarding Anonymous).
282. Kevin Fogarty, NSA: Anonymous may take down U.S. power grid in
two
years,
IT
WORLD
(Feb.
21,
2012,
2:12
PM),
http://www.itworld.com/security /251904/nsa-anonymous-may-takedown-us-power-grid-two-years (stating that the NSA has treated
Anonymous "much more even-handed" then other groups).
283. Jeremy Kirk, Anonymous threatens to DDOS root Internet servers, IT
WORLD (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:19 AM), http://www.itworld.com/
security /251450 / anonymous-threatens-ddos-root-internet-servers
(suggesting Anonymous' announcement that it would launch an action
on March 31, 2012 as part of "Operation Global Blackout" that would
target the root Domain Name System (DNS) servers is unlikely to be
successful).
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Anonymous truly has the intention and capability to carry out such
attacks. Given the nature of the organization and the manner in
which it distributes its me~sages, it is difficult to determine whether
these statements are legitimately from Anonymous. At this point,
Anonymous is an example of a hacktivist group that has generally
well-defined motivations, but whose attacks are more of nuisance than
a true threat to national security. 284 Sometime in the future, however,
Anonymous may meet the definition of a cyber-terrorist organization.
B.

ILO VEYO U virus

Opposite to Anonymous' actions are a variety of attacks that
have resulted in large-scale damage but with less clearly-defined
motivation. The ILOVEYOU virus and its variants are a prime
example of this type of CNA. The ILOVEYOU virus was estimated
to have infected forty-five million users and cost billions of dollars in
damage. 285 The suspected creator, Onel de Guzman, was allegedly
motivated by the rejection of his thesis on computer vulnerabilities. 286
If a physical bombing in the United States caused billions of dollars in
damage but no injuries, and had political motivation, it would likely
meet the definition of an act of terrorism. 287 However, although the
ILOVEYOU virus did just that, a different analysis must be used
when examining CNA. The effects of CNA are generally much more
widespread and lack the shock of that results from a physical attack.
Therefore, the working definition of cyber-terrorism should be
analyzed to determine whether· an act of cyber-terrorism has truly
taken place.
The ILOVEYOU virus does not rise to the level of cyberterrorism under this Article's definition. First, there is insufficient
evidence that the attack was politically-motivated. 288 The attacks did
not appear to target government or national security institutions. 289
Additionally, no message declaring intent to undermine government
284. See, e.g., David Goldman, Hacker group Anonymous is a nuisance, not
a
threat,
CNN
MONEY
(Jan.
20,
2012,
3:01
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/20/technology /anonymous_hack/index.
htm (calling Anonymous the "graffiti artists of the Internet").
285. I
love
you
Virus,
ORACLE THINKQUEST
EDUC.
FOUND.,
. http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct / 00460 /!LoveYou.html,
(last accessed Feb. 14, 2012) (describing the effects of the virus).
286. Mark Landler, A Filipino Linked to "Love Bug" Talks About His
License to Hack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at Cl (reporting that Mr.
Guzman dropped out of school after his thesis proposal on stealing
passwords to gain free access to the Internet was rejected).
287. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (U.S. Code definition of terrorism).
288. See Landler, supra note 286.
289. Id.
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If a physical bombing in the United States caused billions of dollars in
damage but no injuries, and had political motivation, it would likely
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290
or influence policy was released in conjunction with the attack.
However under examination of the effects element, the answer is less
clear. Although the attack was not aimed at national security
291
systems or infrastructure, it had a significant effect on business and
affected the networks of the CIA, Pentagon, and British
Parliament.292 Given the scale of the damage, had these attacks been
politically-motivated, they would likely have risen to the level of
cyber-terrorism. However, because the attack fails the intent element,
the ILOVEYOU should be categorized as a cyber-crime.
C.

U.S. Power Grid

In April 2009, U.S. officials discovered hackers from Russia,
China and other countries had gained access to the U.S. power grid
' behind tools that could have destroyed system cont ro1s. W3
and left
The intrusions could not be definitively traced to either state or nonstate actors. 294 The motivations of the intrusions were not clearly
understood as the attacks were never carried out. 295 Speculations
include th~ belief that Russian and Chinese governments gained
access so that in the event of a future conflict, the grid could be shut
down or otherwise affected. 296
.
The threat to the various power grids operating in the United
States has prompted the Energy Department to launch an initiative
into protecting the grid from CNA. 297 Losing control over the power
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grid could have cascading effects with disastrous consequences for
hospitals, emergency responders, defense and law enforcement
agencies, and the financial sector, among others. 298 In an armed
conflict, the power grid is often among the first targets because it can
debilitate a nation's command and control structure. 299 Given the
potential effect on society, a CNA that takes down a significant
portion of a region's power grid for any extended period passes the
effects test element of cyber-terrorism. If a non-state actor committed
the 2009 intrusions into the power grid, then they should be
considered an act in preparation for a cyber-terrorist attack and
treated just as seriously as an attempted attack.
D.

Stuxnet

Between June 2009 and May 2010, a type of computer virus
known as a worm, 300 was discovered to have damaged SCADA
systems that controlled centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. 301
The worm most likely infected the software using a portable drive,
such as a thumb drive. 302 Given the sophistication of the CNA,
experts conclude it would have required the resources of a national
government to engineer, and the most likely culprit was Israel. 303
Initially, Stuxnet spread indiscriminately, but the virus was designed
to target only a very specific type of system, and to only affect
intended targets. 304 Although there were no reports of radiation
Energy to find and contain gaps in the cyber · security defenses
protecting the nation's electric grid).

290. Id.
291. Id.
292. John Markoff, An "I Love You" Virus Becomes Anything But, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2000, WK2 (reporting that the White House, Pentagon,
Congress and the British House of Commons were among those affected
by the ILOVEYOU virus).
293. Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009, at Al-A2 (reporting on the discovered intrusio1:1s
upon the information systems controlling portions of the U.S. power gnd
and the calls for the implementation of increased security measures); see
also James A. Lewis, The Electrical Grid as a Target for Cyber Attack,
CTR.
FOR
STRATEGIC
&
INT'L
STUDIES
(Mar.
2010),
http://csis.org/files/publication/100322_ElectricalGridAsATargetforCy
berAttack.pdf [hereinafter Lewis II] (evaluating the risks of CNA on
components of the electrical grid system).

298. Lewis II, supra note 293, at 1.
299. See Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., Strategic Attack of National Electrical
Systems, Arn UNIV. PRESS. 1 (1994), http://www.comw.org/pda/
full text/ griffith. pdf (describing the history and purpose behind military
attacks on electrical infrastructure).
300. A worm is a type of CNA that replicates itself and sends those copies to
other systems it comes in contact with. Worms can carry other
computer viruses, or replicate and spread to use up bandwidth. See
Definition of: Worm, PC MAG ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t33Dworm&i33D54
874,00.asp (last accessed Feb. 19, 2013).

294. Gorman, supra note 293, at A2.

301. John Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at 15.

295. Id.

302. Id.

296. Id.
297. Stephen Lawton, Energy Department to analyze power grid cyber
threats SC MAGAZINE (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/
energy~department-to-analyze-power-grid-cyber- threats/ article/ 222399 /
(reporting on the Electric Sector Cyber-security Risk Management
Maturity project, a federal program headed by the Department of

303. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (reporting that some
experts point to a secret facility in Israel's Negev desert where they
claim Israel has a set of nuclear centrifuges similar to Iran's, where they
tested Stuxnet).
304. Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet virus targets and spread revealed, BBC (last
updated Feb. 15, 2011, 8:51), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
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298. Lewis II, supra note 293, at 1.
299. See Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., Strategic Attack of National Electrical
Systems, Arn UNIV. PRESS. 1 (1994), http://www.comw.org/pda/
full text/ griffith. pdf (describing the history and purpose behind military
attacks on electrical infrastructure).
300. A worm is a type of CNA that replicates itself and sends those copies to
other systems it comes in contact with. Worms can carry other
computer viruses, or replicate and spread to use up bandwidth. See
Definition of: Worm, PC MAG ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t33Dworm&i33D54
874,00.asp (last accessed Feb. 19, 2013).

294. Gorman, supra note 293, at A2.

301. John Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at 15.

295. Id.

302. Id.

296. Id.
297. Stephen Lawton, Energy Department to analyze power grid cyber
threats SC MAGAZINE (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/
energy~department-to-analyze-power-grid-cyber- threats/ article/ 222399 /
(reporting on the Electric Sector Cyber-security Risk Management
Maturity project, a federal program headed by the Department of

303. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (reporting that some
experts point to a secret facility in Israel's Negev desert where they
claim Israel has a set of nuclear centrifuges similar to Iran's, where they
tested Stuxnet).
304. Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet virus targets and spread revealed, BBC (last
updated Feb. 15, 2011, 8:51), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
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leakage from the affected sites, the NATO ambassador to Russia
stated the virus "could lead to a new Chernobyl. "305
The Stuxnet virus should not be considered an act of cyberterrorism because the prevailing opinion was that it was a covert
CNA conducted by a nation state. 306 Therefore, the appropriate
categorization is as an armed attack in cyberspace. However, it is
interesting from a cyber-terrorism perspective because it represents
the potential for future cyber-terrorist attacks on SCADA software
operating critical infrastructure systems. That no deaths or violence
resulted from the Stuxnet virus is not a factor weighing against
potential classification as cyber-terrorism. Knowing that a nuclear
facility has been targeted would be enough to cause a state of fear for .
those living near an affected facility. Were it to be revealed that this
CNA was actually the result of a non-state actor, it should certainly
be considered cyber-terrorism.
Under almost any definition of terrorism, an attack on a nuclear
facility for political purposes would rank as a terrorist attack. 307
Given the potentially severe consequences of CNA on nuclear
facilities, or similar facilities such as chemical plants that produce
dangerous gas, these types of attacks should receive particularly close
attention. These sophisticated cyber-weapons that have the unique
potential for cyber-terrorism, such as Stuxnet, should be classified as
weapons as weapons of mass destruction. 308
E.

Estonia

In April of 2007, Estonia was one of the most wired nations in the
world. 309 The Estonians had pioneered a system of "e-government,"
making many government services and functions available through
the Internet. 310 Estonia prided itself on both its Internet savvy and
cyber-security. 311
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This was the backdrop on April 27, 2007, when the Estonian
Government moved a Soviet-era Russian war memorial from a central
square in the capital Tallinn to another location, prompting massive
protests from the ethnic Russian minority population in Estonia and
outrage from Russians abroad. 312 In conjunction with the physical
protests, a three-week wave of CNA was launched against Estonia,
primarily attacking the websites of Estonia's "e-government,"
dramatically reducing the government's ability to function. 313
Perpetrators committed different types of cyber-attacks on the
national Internet services, such as denial of service attacks shutting
down much of the e-government services and hacking into government
and media websites to alter content. 314
Additionally, most of
Estonia's media outlets were taken down by denial of service attacks,
which prevented reporting on what was happening in Estonia. 315
Estonia estimated the resulting damage to be in the tens of millions of
Euros. 316
The CNA against Estonia may be the closest case of pure cyberThe attacks were politically-motivated and
terrorism seen yet.
affected Estonia in a unique way. Estonian society is tied more
deeply into the Internet than probably any other nation at the time. 317
Furthermore, Estonia was also prepared to defend a major CNA
better than any country. 318
The three weeks CNA that Estonia endured was technologically
difficult for its citizens, but the psychological effect on the citizenry is
not as clear. Mikhel Tammet, the chair of Estonia's cyber-defense co-

to educate citizens in use of the Internet and place as many government
functions online as possible).
311. Traynor, supra note 309.
312. Id.

12465688 ("Once on a corporate network, the worm is designed to seek
out a specific configuration of industrial control software made by
Siemens.").
305. Id.
306. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197.
307. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (2012) (listing offenses against
nuclear materials among the predicate offenses for the federal crime of
terrorism).
308. See infra Section V(D), for a discussion of this classification.
309. Ian Traynor, Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia,
THE GUARDIAN
(May 16, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2007 /may /17 /topstories3.russia [hereinafter Traynor].

313. Id. (noting the main targets of the attacks included the "Estonian
presidency and its parliament[,] almost all of the country's government
ministries[,] political parties[,] three of the country's six big new
organisations[,] two of the biggest banks; and firms specializing in
communications[.]").
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Ian Traynor, Web attackers used a million computers, says Estonia, THE
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology /
2007 /may /18/news.russia [hereinafter Traynor II].
317. See Traynor, supra note 309 (noting that Estonia is "highly dependent
on computers").

310. Clark Boyd, Estonia opens politics to the web, BBC (May 7, 2004, 7:02
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology /3690661.stm (following
independence from the Soviet Union, Estonia made a nationwide push

318. See id. ("With their reputation for electronic prowess, the Estonians
have been quick to marshal their defense[.]").
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ordination committee, believed the attack to be an act of terrorism,
and stated:

offici~ls discovered that many of the attacks had been routed through
Russian government serverEl, but again, this was inconclusive. 325 The
ambiguity of who conducted the CNA against Estonia is an excellent
example of the difficulty attribution creates in classifying a CN A.

This is a kind of terrorism, the act of terrorism is not to steal
from a state, or even to conquer it. It is, as the word suggests,
to sow terror itself. If a highly IT country cannot carry out its
every day activities, like banking, it sows terror among the
people. 319
Tammet's use of the word terrorism may have been intended to
pressure Russia into investigating the attacks, but it may also have
reflected the anxiety of the nation as a whole, given the unique
connection, through the Internet, between the Government and
people of Estonia. 320 Thus, this attack meets the effects test, not
necessarily due to the nature of the attacks, but because of the nature
of Estonian society.
The last question when examining the CNA against Estonia is
determining the perpetrator. The identity of the attacker as either
the Russian Government or a non-state actor was never completely
resolved; this situation represents the difficulty of determining
attribution even in large-scale attacks. 321 Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonia's
defense minister, stated, "There is not sufficient evidence of a
[Russian] governmental role. "322 Moreover, Estonia estimated at least
one million computers were used in the attack. 323 Hackers can easily
control this many computers with a bot-net. 324 Additionally, Estonian
319. Adrian Blomfield, Estonia calls for Nato cyber-terrorism strategy,
TELEGRAPH
(May
18,
2007,
12:01
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1551963/Estonia-calls-forNato-cyber-terrorism-strategy.html.
320. Estonia hit by "Moscow cyber war", BBC (last updated May 17, 2007,
3:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm.
321. See Traynor II, supra note 316; but see Robert Coalson, Behind The
Estonia
Cyberattacks,
RADIO FREE EUR.
(Mar.
6,
2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyberattacks/1505
613.html (describing a remark by a State Duma Deputy from the proKremlin Unified Russia party that his assistant was responsible for
coordinating the attack, but clarifying that his assistant acted on his
own accord).
322. Traynor II, supra note 316.
323. See Adrian Bloomfield, Estonia calls for Nato cyber-terrorism strategy,
TELEGRAPH (May 18, 2007, 12:01 AM) (noting that "hackers used
robots to infiltrate hundreds of thousands of computers around the
world ... [which] then flooded Estonian websites").
324. See Cyrus Farivar, What the attacks on Estonia have taught us about
online combat, SLATE (May 22, 2007),
http://www.slate.com/ articles/technology /technology /2007 /05 / cyberwa
r_i.html (defining botnet as "a network of computers that have been
surreptitiously infected to run nefarious software").
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SECTION

IV.

THE CURRENT LAW AND PROBLEMS

"The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the
opportunity in every difficulty. "326

In the previous Sections, this Article sought to define cyberterrorism and apply the definition in the context of some recent
examples of CNA. Logically, the next issue to address is how to best
fight cyber-terrorism. This Section first examines the main hindrance
in combating CNA in general and cyber-terrorism specifically:
attribution. It then examines current domestic cyber-crime and
counter-terror laws to determine how these existing laws might be
used to counter cyber-terrorism.
A.

The Dilemma of Attribution

Perhaps the greatest ·challenge in confronting cyber-terrorism is
the problem of attribution: identifying the party or parties responsible
for a CNA. 327 The problem of attribution in the context of the
Internet is, in large part, inherent in the structure of the system. 328
Many hackers are now able to "spoof" Internet Protocol Addresses
which allows them to make their CNA appear to originate fro~
another location. 329 This is an issue common to all cyber-crimes and
is recognized by the government and private industry alike. The DoD
stated that "[t]he Internet was designed to be collaborative, rapidly
expandable, and easily adaptable to technological innovation.
Information flow took precedence over content integrity; identity
authentication was less important than connectivity." 330 The United
325. Traynor, supra note 309.
326. Winston Churchill.
327. See GREGORY N. LARSEN & DAVID A. WHEELER, TECHNIQUES FOR
CYBER
ATTACK
ATTRIBUTION
1-2
(2003)
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468859
(describing
technological barriers to correct attribution of cyber-attacks); see also
Stephen Dycus, Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY
L. & POL'Y 155, 163 (2010) (stating that the attribution problem
effectively eliminates traditional deterrence and response options).
328. See Larsen & Wheeler, supra note 327, at 2-4; see also Dycus, supra
note 327.
329. See Gable, supra note 176, at 102.
330. DEPT. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE, 2 (2011).
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States Computer Emergency Readiness Team noted that the "[t]he
speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among
the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult[.]" 331
The Internet's anonymity has proved remarkaply adept at foiling law
enforcement attempts at enforcing laws governing and deterring
cyber-crime.
Without the ability to catch and prosecute, there is little
deterrence for would-be cyber-criminals. 332 For this reason, many
jurisdictions place harsh penalties on cyber-crimes, in relation to
similar crimes conducted without the use of information systems. 333
The current head of U.S. Cyber Command, then-Lieutenant General.
Keith Alexander, articulated, "The bottom line is, the only way to
deter cyber attack is to work to catch perpetrators and take strong
and public action when we do. "334 Attribution is a necessity to enable
traditional deterrence as well as to distinguish between the categories
of CNA. 335
Susan Brenner framed the issue of attribution elegantly, stating,
"Cyberspace fractures the crime scene into shards[.] "336 One shard
can be considered the place or places where the attack is felt. In
widespread attacks such as the ILOVEYOU virus, there may be
millions of shards. 337 Additional shards include the information

systems through which the attack was conducted. 338 Expert cybercriminals tend to route their attack through a maze of servers across
the world to maintain anonymity. 339 Finally, there are the shards of
the attackers, who may have planned and launched the attack from
multiple information systems at multiple locations across the globe. 340
And, as is the case in some distributed denial of service attacks, the
attacking computers may be operating without their owner having
any knowledge of the attack. 341
The shattering of the crime scene immensely complicates law
enforcement efforts to track the perpetrators. 342
Whereas most
traditional crimes require some physical proximity between
perpetrator and victim, the same is not true in cyberspace. Law
enforcement agents are forced to navigate a web of state, federal, and
international jurisdictions to trace an attack to its origin, and then
must tie an individual or individuals to an information system from
which the attack was launched. 343 A serious result of this fracturing
occurs when investigators mistake an intermediary point of
transmission for the attack's originating point. 344
The discussion on how to deal with the attribution dilemma has
led to many interesting ideas, including using civilian enforcement to
help deter cyber-criminals. 345 These ideas include how to deal with
attribution in large-scale attacks. For greater-scale attacks, some

331. U.S COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, viii (2003).

338. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418-19 (noting that "[o]ther, variable crime
scene shards . . . are the intermediary points of transmission used in the
attack").

332. See Kathryn Stephens, A Review of the Cybersecurity Legislative
Proposal, NAT'L SEC. CYBERSPACE INST., 1 (June 15, 2011),
http://www.nsci-va.org/WhitePapers/2011-06-15Federal %20Cyber%20Legislative%20Proposal%20WhitepaperK%20Stephens. pdf (reviewing the proposed penalties for cyber-crime,
but noting "these guidelines are much needed, and will at least send a
message to criminals who engage in cyber crime, they are reactionary .
and do little to help prevent cyber-attacks or ·address the frequently
discussed challenge of attribution").
333. Id. (discussing the addition of harsher penalties for organized crime
groups that engage in acts of cyber-crime).
334. Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth Cong.
209, 222 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, USA Nominee
for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to question regarding
the challenge of attribution).

339. Id. (describing the various locations from which an attack can be
launched).
340. Id.
341. See e.g., Franz-Stefan Grady, Africa's Cyber WMD, FOREIGN PoL'Y
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2010/03/24/africas_cyber_wmd (describing how one could turn Africa's
computer network into a host of "zombie computers").
342. See Brenner, supra note 19, at 418 ("Aside. from anything else, a
fractured crime scene can result in false positives-in investigators
assuming that an intermediary point of transmission of an attack is the
originating point for the attack.").

335. See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 598 (arguing that information, not
systems, should be the focus of cyber-security); cf. Brenner, supra note
19, at 438.

343. See generally Darrel Menthe, Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of
International Spaces 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (1998)
(examining jurisdictional laws and arguing Internet jurisdiction should
be analogized to Antarctica, outer space, and the high seas, and treated
as an "international space").

336. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418.

344. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418.

337. ORACLE THINKQUEST EDUC. FOUND., supra note 285 (noting that the
attack was thought to have affected forty-five million computers worldwide).

345. See, e.g., id. at 465-74 (advocating a redistribution of responsibility for
the identification of cyber criminals to civilians to improve cybercrime
investigations).
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331. U.S COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, viii (2003).
332. See Kathryn Stephens, A Review of the Cybersecurity Legislative
Proposal, NAT'L SEC. CYBERSPACE INST., 1 (June 15, 2011),
http://www.nsci-va.org/WhitePapers/2011-06-15- .
Federal 320Cyber320Legislative320Proposal320Wh_itepaper.
K320Stephens.pdf (reviewing the proposed penalties_ for cyber-cnme,
but noting "these guidelines are much needed, and will at least ~end a
message to criminals who engage in cyber crime, they are reactionary .
and do little to help prevent cyber-attacks or ·address the frequently
discussed challenge of attribution").
333. Id. (discussing the addition of hars~er penalties for organized crime
groups that engage in acts of cyber-cnme).
334. Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth C~ng.
209, 222 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, ~SA Nonn1:1ee
for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to question regardmg
the challenge of attribution).
335. See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 598 (arguing that information, not
systems, should be the focus of cyber-security); cf. Brenner, supra note
19, at 438.

Expert cybercnmmals tend to route their attack through a maze of servers across
the world to maintain anonymity. 339 Finally, there are the shards of
the attackers, who may have planned and launched the attack from
multiple _information systems at multiple locations across the globe.34o
And, as is the case in some distributed denial of service attacks the
attacking computers may be operating without their owner h~ving
any knowledge of the attack. 34 i
The shattering of the crime scene immensely complicates law
enforcement efforts to track the perpetrators. 342
Whereas most
traditional crimes require some physical proximity between
perpetrator and victim, the same is not true in cyberspace. Law
enforcement agents are forced to navigate a web of state, federal and
interna~ional jurisdictions to trace an attack to its origin, and 'then
must tie an individual or individuals to an information system from
which the attack was launched. 343 A serious result of this fracturing
occurs when investigators mistake an intermediary point of
transmission for the attack's originating point. 344
The di~cussion on how to deal with the attribution dilemma has
led to many interesting ideas, including using civilian enforcement to
help deter cyber-criminals. 345 These ideas include how to deal with
attribution in large-scale attacks. For greater-scale attacks, some
338. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418-19 (noting that "[o]ther, variable crime
scene shards . . . are the intermediary points of transmission used in the
attack").
339. Id. (describing the various locations from which an attack can be
launched).
340. Id.
341. See e.g., Franz-Stefan Grady, Africa's Cyber WMD, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2010/03/24/africas_cyber_wmd (describing how one could turn Africa's
computer network into a host of "zombie computers").
342. See Brenner? supra note 19, at 418 ("Aside. from anything else, a
fractured cnme scene can result in false positives-in investigators
assuming that an intermediary point of transmission of an attack is the
originating point for the attack.").
343. See generally Darrel Menthe, Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of
Intern~t~ona_l ~pa_ce~ 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (1998)
(exammmg JUnsdictional laws and arguing Internet jurisdiction should
be analogized to Antarctica, outer space, and the high seas and treated
as an "international space").
'
344. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418.

336. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418.
337. ORACLE THINKQUEST EDUC. FOUND., supra note 285 (noting that the
attack was thought to have affected forty-five million computers worldwide).

345. See,. e.g.,. i_d. ~t 465-74 (advocating a redistribution of responsibility for
the identification of cyber criminals to civilians to improve cybercrime
investigations).
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have favored imputing attribution directly to the state where the
attack originated, under a strict liability theory. 346 Some have also
suggested that this approach should apply to traditional acts of
terrorism. 347 This theory is difficult to apply to CNA because of the
ease of launching a cyber-attack from any state in the world. Would
it be unjust to hold Senegal responsible if an Iranian cyber-terrorist
traveled to Dakar, connected to the Internet, and launched his attack
that he had planned and developed in Tehran? This theory also
assumes that governments have the financial or technical capabilities
to adequately monitor their networks.
. .
The Chinese government has attempted to solve attnbut10n
problems by enacting a series of laws that require Intern~t us~rs
identify themselves. 348 These laws include mandatory reg1strat10n
requirements, requirements on ISPs to track users' a~tivity, and
regulation of cyber cafes. 349 These steps have resulted m a general
feeling a~ong the Chinese people that "every bit of [their] activity"
can be attributed back to them. 350 Even if these legal attempts to
eliminate anonymity on the Internet were successful, it is highly
unlikely that such methods could be implemented in the western
world for constitutional and human rights reasons. 351 If governments
cannot eliminate the problem of attribution entirely, for a variety of
reasons governments will also not be able to rely upon attribution as
a primary means of prevention.

346. See David E. Graham Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & PoL'Y 87, 92-93 (2010) (seeking to impute responsibility to
states for attacks originating from that state's territory); see also
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against
States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6-7
(2009) (arguing that a state's use of cyber-defenses against CNA
emanating from states that do not adequately prevent such attacks).
347. Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly
Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 B~R~LE~. J.
INT'L L. 615, 643-53 (2005) (discussing applying the stnct hab1hty
theory to terrorism).
348. Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation of the H. Comm. on
Science and Technology, lllth Cong. 111 (2010) (statement of. M~rc
Rotenberg, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (reviewmg
Chinese Internet laws relating to attribution and arguing they would be
found unconstitutional if implemented in the United States).
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B.

Current Domestic Law Relating to Cyber-Crimes

The question now becomes what strategies can be implemented to
assist in the ultimate goal of preventing cyber-terrorist attacks? To
help answer this question, this Section addresses current cyber and
terrorism laws to determine their applicability in helping to deter
cyber-terrorism. This Section reviews current laws drafted for, or
commonly applied to, cyber-crimes. This collection of statutes is not
an exhaustive list of cyber-related crimes, but rather the discussion
includes those statutes that are most potentially applicable to cyberterrorism.
1.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") 352 proscribes a
number of cyber activities. 353 Originally enacted pursuant to a federal
interest in protecting computers, it established criminal liability for
the use of computers to commit trespass, making threats to others,
damaging computers, and committing espionage and fraud. 354 The act
was broadened significantly through several amendments, 355 eventually
protecting:
[C]omputers in which there is a federal interest-federal
computers, bank computers, and computers used in or effecting
interstate and foreign commerce.
It shields them from
trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being
corruptly used as instruments of fraud. 356
Thus, the CFAA now covers every computer that is connected to
the internet, a conduit to "interstate and foreign commerce."

352. 18

u.s.c.

§ 1030 (2012).

353. OFF. LEGAL EDUC.: EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES, 1 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that "[i]n the CFAA,
Congress attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the
Federal Government's interest in computer crime and the interests and
abilities of States to proscribe and punish such offenses").
354. See generally Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use And The
Computer Fraud And Abuse Act: Narrowing The Scope, DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. [i], No. 012 (2010) (discussing the CFAA in the
employer/ employee context).
355. Id. at iv.

349. Id. at 111-112.
351. Id. at 110 ("It is not even clear that it would be constitutional to
mandate such a requirement in the United States.").

356. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND
RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 5 (2010) (providing an overview of
18 U.S.C. § 1030 and its federal statutory companions).
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350. Id. at 112.
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attack originated, under a strict liability theory. 346 Some have also
suggested that this approach should apply to traditional acts of
terrorism. 347 This theory is difficult to apply to CNA because of the
ease of launching a cyber-attack from any state in the world. Would
it be unjust to hold Senegal responsible if an Iranian cyber-terrorist
traveled to Dakar, connected to the Internet, and launched his attack
that he had planned and developed in Tehran? This theory also
assumes that governments have the financial or technical capabilities
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problems by enacting a series of laws that require Internet users
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requirements, requirements on ISPs to track users' activity, and
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feeling among the Chinese people that "every bit of [their] activity"
can be attributed back to them. 350 Even if these legal attempts to
eliminate anonymity on the Internet were successful, it is highly
unlikely that such methods could be implemented in the western
world for constitutional and human rights reasons. 351 If governments
cannot eliminate the problem of attribution entirely, for a variety of
reasons governments will also not be able to rely upon attribution as
a primary means of prevention.

346. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 87, 92-93 (2010) (seeking to impute responsibility to
states for attacks originating from that state's territory); see also
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against
States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6-7
(2009) (arguing that a state's use of cyber-defenses against CNA
emanating from states that do not adequately prevent such attacks).
347. Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly
Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 615, 643-53 (2005) (discussing applying the strict liability
theory to terrorism).
348. Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation of the H. Comm. on
Science and Technology, lllth Cong. 111 (2010) (statement of Marc
Rotenberg, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (reviewing
Chinese Internet laws relating to attribution and arguing they would be
found unconstitutional if implemented in the United States).
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B.

Current Domestic Law Relating to Cyber-Crimes

. T~e questio~ now becomes what strategies can be implemented to
assist m the ultimate goal of preventing cyber-terrorist attacks? To
help ~nswer this question, this Section addresses current cyber and
terrorism laws to determine their applicability in helping to deter
cyber-terrorism. This Section reviews current laws drafted for or
commonly applied to, cyber-crimes. This collection of statutes is' not
~n exhaustive list of cyber-related crimes, but rather the discussion
mclu~es those statutes that are most potentially applicable to cyberterronsm.
1.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") 352 proscribes a
number of cyber activities. 353 Originally enacted pursuant to a federal
interest in protecting computers, it established criminal liability for
the us~ of computers to commit trespass, making threats to others,
damagmg computers, and committing espionage and fraud. 354 The act
was br~adened significantly through several amendments, 355 eventually
protectmg:
[C]omputers in which there is a federal interest-federal
?omputers, bank computers, and computers used in or effecting
mterstate and foreign commerce.
It shields them from
trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being
corruptly used as instruments of fraud. 356
Thus, the CFAA now covers every computer that is connected to
the internet, a conduit to "interstate and foreign commerce."

352. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
353. OFF. LEGAL EDUC.: EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES, 1 (2d _ed. 2010) (noting that "(i)n the CFAA,
Congress attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the
Fe~~~al Government's interest in computer crime and the iiiterests and
ab1ht1es of States to proscribe and punish such offenses").
354. See generally Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use And The
Computer Frau_d And Abuse Act: Narrowing The Scope, DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. [1], No. 012 (2010) (discussing the CFAA in the
employer/ employee context).
355. Id. at iv.

349. Id. at 111-112.
351. Id. at 110 ("It is not even clear that it would be constitutional to
mandate such a requirement in the United States.").

356. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND
RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 5 (2010) (providing an overview of
18 U.S.C. § 1030 and its federal statutory companions).
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There are seven distinct crimes outlawed by the CFAA. 357
Although not originally intended as an counter-terrorism statute, the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (commonly
known as the "PATRI OT ACT") added two provisions to the list of
offenses that, if violated in conjunction with a political purpose and
certain violent effects, meet the definition of a federal crime of
terrorism. 358 This Section discusses those provisions and reviews the
various uses of some CF AA provisions for combating cyber-terrorism.
Section C(l) ·will discuss the implications of the federal crime of
·
terrorism.
Section 1030(a)(l) prohibits unauthorized access of a computer to
obtain national security related information, including restricted
nuclear data, and using it to harm the United States or to aid an
enemy of the United States. 359 The provision essentially prohibits
cyber-espionage. 360 The substantial penalty for a first time offense, up
to ten years imprisonment, could make this subsection an effective
prosecution tool, if an attack can be attributed. 361
Section 1030(a)(2) applies to almost any crime involving
computers, as it prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without
authorization or exceeding the user's authorized access to obtain
information from any protected computer. 362 The statute requires a
showing that the subject has obtained information, but this must be
read while keeping in mind accompanying legislative history that
states that "the Committee wishes to make clear that 'obtaining
information' in this context includes mere observation of the data. "363
The penalties under §1030(a)(2) are normally misdemeanors that can
be charged as felonies with up to a five-year sentence if "the offense
357. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006) (codifying the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act).
358. 18

u.s.c. § 2332b.
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was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act
"36 4
This statute could be used effectively against organizations with
terrorist aspirations that conduct smaller scale CNA or engage in·
preparatory CN A for a larger attack.
Section 1030(a)(3) applies to the unauthorized access of U.S.
Government computers. 365 This is a simple trespass statute and is
limited in its applicability; the statute does not require that the
defendant obtain any information in the commission of the crime. 366
Therefore, if a cyber-terrorist plot involved accessing a Government
computer, and officials caught the cyber-terrorist while exploring that
computer for vulnerabilities, this statute could apply. The downside
to this law for prosecution of large-scale cyber attacks is that it is a
misdemeanor, unless the defendant has a prior §1030 conviction. 367
Sections 1030(a)(2)-(3) could be used in a manner similar to "spitting
on the sidewalk" offenses used to combat traditional terrorism. 368
Section 1030(a)(5) deals with using a computer to cause damage
to a protected computer. 369 The Government is most likely to use this
statute following an actual event of cyber-terrorism. It has the
advantage of being very broad in scope and provides increasing
penalties when the CNA causes certain harms. Depending on the
effects of the attack, these penalties can reach up to twenty years
imprisonment or life. 370 Additionally, a violation of §1030(a)(5)(A), if
one "knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
364. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (stating that an offense "committed for commercial
advantage or private financial gain" results in a similar range of
penalties).
365. §1030(a)(3) (defining violating acts as intentional, unauthorized access
to "any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United
States that is exclusively for the use of the government of the United
States or, in the case of a computer not· exclusively for such use, is used
by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct effects
that use by or for the Government of the United States").

359. § 1030(a)(l).

366. Id.

360. Cf. id. (defining "espionage" as "obtaining information that has been
determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national defense or foreign relations.").

367. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (stating the punishment scheme for repeat offenders).

361. § 1030(c) (noting that punishment is discretionary; it can include a fine
or term of imprisonment, or both).

368. Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov.
4, 2001, at Al (discussing in part Attorney General John Ashcroft's use
of minor crimes to prevent or investigate terrorist crimes. Ashcroft
stated, "Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest
mobsters spitting on the sidewalk if it would help in the battle against
organized crime[.]").

362. §1030(a)(2)(C) (noting that qualifying "information" includes: financial
records from financial institutions, consumer reporting agencies, any
department or agency of the United States, or any protected computer
involved in interstate commerce or foreign communication).

369. § 1030(a)(5) (describing the various damaging effects that qualify under
this provision).

363. § 1030(a)(2); S. Rep No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2479, 2484 (recommending an amendment to title 18 of the U.S. code to
provide additional penalties for fraud and related activities in
connection with computer access).

370. § 1030(c)(2)(E)-(F) (stipulating that if the attack causes serious bodily
injury, then the penalty is a maximum of twenty years imprisonment,
and if a death occurs as a result of the attack the penalties range up to
life imprisonment).
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There are seven distinct crimes outlawed by the CFAA.
Although not originally intended as an counter-terrorism statute, the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (commonly
known as the "PATRI OT ACT") added two provisions to the list of
offenses that, if violated in conjunction with a political purpo_se and
certain violent effects, meet the definition of a federal cnme of
terrorism. 358 This Section discusses those provisions and reviews the
various uses of some CF AA provisions for combating cyber-terrorism.
Section C(l) · will discuss the implications of the federal crime of
terrorism.
Section 1030(a)(l) prohibits unauthorized access of a computer to
obtain national security related information, including restricted
nuclear data and using it to harm the United States or to aid an
enemy of th~ United States. 359 The provision essentially prohibits
cyber-espionage. 360 The substantial penalty for a first time offense, up
to ten years imprisonment, could make this subsection an effective
prosecution tool, if an attack can be attributed. 361
Section 1030(a)(2) applies to almost any crime involving
computers, as it prohibits intentionally accessing a computer witho~t
authorization or exceeding the user's authorized access to obtam
information from any protected computer. 362 The statute requires a
showing that the subject has obtained information, but this must be
read while keeping in mind accompanying legislative history that
states that "the Committee wishes to make clear that 'obtaining
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"363
information' in this context mcludes
mere ob servat10n
The penalties under §1030(a)(2) are normally misdemeanors that can
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was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act
. "364
This statute could be used effectively against organizations with
terrorist aspirations that conduct smaller scale CNA or engage in·
preparatory CNA for a larger attack.
Section 1030(a)(3) applies to the unauthorized access of U.S.
Government computers. 365 This is a simple trespass statute and is
limited in its applicability; the statute does not require that the
defendant obtain any information in the commission of the crime. 366
Therefore, if a cyber-terrorist plot involved accessing a Government
computer, and officials caught the cyber-terrorist while exploring that
computer for vulnerabilities, this statute could apply. The downside
to this law for prosecution of large-scale cyber attacks is that it is a
misdemeanor, unless the defendant has a prior §1030 conviction. 36 7
Sections 1030(a)(2)-(3) could be used in a manner similar to "spitting
on the sidewalk" offenses used to combat traditional terrorism. 368
Section 1030(a)(5) deals with using a computer to cause damage
to a protected computer. 369 The Government is most likely to use this
statute following an actual event of cyber-terrorism. It has the
advantage of being very broad in scope and provides increasing
penalties when the CNA causes certain harms. Depending on the
effects of the attack, these penalties can reach up to twenty years
imprisonment or life. 370 Additionally, a violation of §1030(a)(5)(A), if
one "knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
364. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (stating that an offense "committed for commercial
advantage or private financial gain" results in a similar range of
penalties).
365. §1030(a) (3) (defining violating acts as intentional, unauthorized access
to "any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United
States that is exclusively for the use of the government of the United
States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used
by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct effects
that use by or for the Government of the United States").

359. § 1030(a)(l).

366. Id.

360. Cf. id. (defining "espionage" as "obtaining informa~ion th.at has been
determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national defense or foreign relations.").

367. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (stating the punishment scheme for repeat offenders).

361. § 1030( c) (noting that punishment is discretionary; it can include a fine
or term of imprisonment, or both).
·

368. Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov.
4, 2001, at Al (discussing in part Attorney General John Ashcroft's use
of minor crimes to prevent or investigate terrorist crimes. Ashcroft
stated, "Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest
mobsters spitting on the sidewalk if it would help in the battle against
organized crime[.]").

362. §1030(a)(2)(C) (noting that qualifying "information" ~ncludes: ~inancial
records from financial institutions, consumer reportmg agencies, any
department or agency of the United States, or any protected computer
involved in interstate commerce or foreign communication).

369. § 1030(a)(5) (describing the various damaging effects that qualify under
this provision).

363. § 1030(a)(2); S. Rep No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2479, 2484 (recommending an amendment to title 18 of the u.~ .. c_ode ~o
provide additional penalties for fraud and related act1v1ties m
connection with computer access).

370. § 1030(c)(2)(E)-(F) (stipulating that if the attack causes serious bodily
injury, then the penalty is a maximum of twenty years imprisonment
and if a death occurs as a result of the attack the penalties range up t~
life imprisonment).
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code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer," also
falls under the § 2332b terrorism statute if one of the following
eiements is met under § 1030 (c) (4) (A) (i) (II)-(VI). 371 These elements
include: (II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification
or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or
care of one or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person;
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage affecting a
computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or
national security; or, (VI) damage affecting 10 or more protected
computers during any one-year period. 372 Of particular interest is
subsection (V), which would make attacks on most government
websites a terrorist act.
Additionally, subsection (VI) virtually
ensures that any active hacking group is now guilty of terrorism.
Section 1030 (a) (7) deals with the use of computers for extortion
and transmitting threats. 373 This section is potentially useful in
combating organizations that threaten cyber-terrorism acts when
officials lack sufficient evidence to link them to a particular attacks.
Overall, the CF AA provides a wide range of tools for law
enforcement to charge organizations with crimes pertaining to acts of
cyber-terrorism. When viewed through the lens of prevention, the
CFAA's main use may be the prosecution of cyber-terrorists before
the terrorists acquire the capabilities to conduct such an attack. The
expansive penalties possible under § 1030(a)(5) may serve to
effectively criminalize and punish any act of cyber-terrorism.
However, the CFAA is still a very traditional criminal law statute
because it is focused on after-the-fact prosecution for particular
instances of misconduct in which each act can be attributed to an
actor.
The CFAA only prevents future misconduct through
deterrence, which, as previously discussed, is inadequate in the cybercrime environment. Congress must enact additional laws that go to
the heart of prevention to supplement after-the-fact prosecution.

to prosecute perpetrators who employ "phishing" emails to obtain
passwords and financial information. 375 This statute could be useful
for prosecuting groups suspected of intending to commit acts of cyberterrorism, as gaining access to computer systems would likely be an
initial step in the development of any cyber-terrorism scheme.

2.

Access Device Fraud

Section 1029, "Fraud and related activity in connection with
access devices," outlaws the production, use, possession, and/ or
trafficking of unauthorized or counterfeit access devices. 374 The DoJ
manual, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, recommends using the statute
371. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (2008).

C.

Domestic Counter-Terrnrism Law That Relate to Cyber-Terrnrism

In addition to laws that specifically pertain to cyber-crime, a
number of laws that the Government uses to prosecute terrorism
offenses may also be relevant to cyber-terrorism.
This Section
examines these laws to determine their applicability.
1.

The Federal Crime of Terrorism

The federal crime of terrorism is defined as a violation of any
offense listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), when that violation "is calculated
to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. "376 The federal
crime of terrorism has several implications including an increased
statute of limitations, 377 increased maximum term of supervised
release, 378 and a presumption against release on bail. 379
Section 2332b provides prosecutors with important tools for
preventing cyber-terrorism.
Prosecutors can request supervised
release for life instead of the traditional five years, which could
prevent a convicted terrorist from being able to strike in a more
significant manner a second time. A court's denial of bail for a
defendant suspected of trying to launch a cyber-terrorism attack may
also help prevent an attack in its early stages. Additionally, the
CFAA violations that are included as predicate offenses in §

375. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. & EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES 102 (2d ed. 2010) (defining "phishing" as "where a
defendant uses fraudulent emails to obtain bank account numbers and
passwords").
376. § 2332b(g) (5)
culpability).

(defining

the

requisite

intent

and

violations

for

377. § 3286(a) (noting an eight-year statute of limitations for certain offenses
and no limitation for others).
378. § 3583(j) (specifying the supervised release terms for convicted terrorists
as "any term of years or life").

374. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2012) (listing qualifying access devices, including
telecommunications equipment, scanning receivers, software, hardware,
and credit card systems).

379. See § 3142(g)(l) (noting the judicial officer should take into account
that the person had been charged with the federal crime of terrorism
into account. when determining if bail is available); see also CHARLES
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 38-39 (2010) (describing the presumption
against bail).
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code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer," also
falls under the § 2332b terrorism statute if one of the following
eiements is met under § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II)-(VI). 371 These elements
include: (II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification
or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or
care of one or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person;
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage affecting . a
computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government m
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or
national security; or, (VI) damage affecting 10 or more protected
computers during any one-year period. 372 Of particular interest is
subsection (V), which would make attacks on most government
websites a terrorist act.
Additionally, subsection (VI) virtually
ensures that any active hacking group is now guilty of terrorism.
Section 1030(a)(7) deals with the use of computers for extortion
and transmitting threats. 373 This section is potentially useful in
combating organizations that threaten cyber-terrorism acts when
officials lack sufficient evidence to link them to a particular attacks.
Overall, the CF AA provides a wide range of tools for law
enforcement to charge organizations with crimes pertaining to acts of
cyber-terrorism. When viewed through the lens of prevention, the
CF AA's main use may be the prosecution of cyber-terrorists before
the terrorists acquire the capabilities to conduct such an attack. The
expansive penalties possible under § 1030(a)(5) may serve to
effectively criminalize and punish any act of cyber-terrorism.
However, the CF AA is still a very traditional criminal law statute
because it is focused on after-the-fact prosecution for particular
instances of misconduct in which each act can be attributed to an
actor.
The CFAA only prevents future misconduct through
deterrence, which, as previously discussed, is inadequate in the cybercrime environment. Congress must enact additional laws that go to
the heart of prevention to supplement after-the-fact prosecution.

to prosecute perpetrators who employ "phishing" emails to obtain
passwords and financial information. 375 This statute could be useful
for prosecuting groups suspected of intending to commit acts of cyberterrorism, as gaining access to computer systems would likely be an
initial step in the development of any cyber-terrorism scheme.

2.

Access Device Fraud

Section 1029, "Fraud and related activity in connection with
access devices," outlaws the production, use, possession, and/ or
trafficking of unauthorized or counterfeit access devices. 374 The DoJ
manual, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, recommends using the statute
371. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (2008).

C.

Domestic Counter-Terrorism Law That Relate to Cyber-Terrorism

In addition to laws that specifically pertain to cyber-crime, a
number of laws that the Government uses to prosecute terrorism
This Section
offenses may also be relevant to cyber-terrorism.
examines these laws to determine their applicability.
1.

The Federal Crime of Terrorism

The federal crime of terrorism is defined as a violation of any
offense listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), when that violation "is calculated
to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. "376 The federal
crime of terrorism has several implications including an increased
statute of limitations, 377 increased maximum term of supervised
release, 378 and a presumption against release on bail. 379
Section 2332b provides prosecutors with important tools for
preventing cyber-terrorism.
Prosecutors can request supervised
release for life instead of the traditional five years, which could
prevent a convicted terrorist from being able to strike in a more
significant manner a second time. A court's denial of bail for a
defendant suspected of trying to launch a cyber-terrorism attack may
also help prevent an attack in its early stages. Additionally, the
CF AA violations that are included as predicate offenses in §

375. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. & EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES 102 (2d ed. 2010) (defining "phishing" as "where a
defendant uses fraudulent emails to obtain bank account numbers and
passwords").
376. § 2332b(g) (5)
culpability).

(defining

the

requisite

intent

and

violations

for

377. § 3286(a) (noting an eight-year statute of limitations for certain offenses
and no limitation for others).
378. § 3583(j) (specifying the supervised release terms for convicted terrorists
as "any term of years or life").

374. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2012) (listing qualifying access devices, including
·telecommunications equipment, scanning receivers, software, hardware,
and credit card systems).

379. See § 3142(g)(l) (noting the judicial officer should take into account
that the person had been charged with the federal crime of terrorism
into account, when determining if bail is available); see also CHARLES
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 38-39 (2010) (describing the presumption
against bail).
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2332b(g)(5)(B), are also included as predicate offenses in the !aterial
3
support to terrorism statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.

fifteen years in prison. 387 More directly relevant is the second
situation.
Section 2339A incorporates two CFAA provisions as
predicate offenses. 388 The statute includes "any offense listed in §
2332b(g)(5)(B)," which, as seen above, incorporates§ 1030(a)(l), and
§ 1030(a)(5)(A). 389 Under § 2339A, providing any kind of material
support includes:

2.

Material Support to Terrorism Statutes

One of the most successful prosecutorial methods in combating
terrorism is the use of the material-support statutes. 381 These laws
work well as a prevention method because they inhibit the flow of
resources to a terrorist group, 382 which hampers the ability to carry
out attacks. Outlawing material support to terrorists is comprised
383
primarily of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
Section
2339A outlaws providing material support or resources, when the
provider knows that the support will be used to carry out of a
384
violation of certain offenses deemed to rise to the level of terrorism.
Section 2339B outlaws the provision of any support or resources to
designated terrorist organizations. 385
Section 2339A is applicable to cyber-terrorism in two situations.
First use of a computer to aid a terrorist is technically a qualifying
violation of the statute. 386 Thus, one who provides computer training
or support to a terrorist organization, knowing that the organization
intends to use that training to prepare for or perform an act of
terrorism, would violate § 2339A, which poses a punishment of up to

380. Compare the predicate offenses listed in §2332b(g)(5)(B), with the
predicate offenses listed in§ 2339A, and § 2339B.

[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses,
false
documentation
or
identification,
communications
equipment,
facilities,
weapons,
lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine
or religious materials. 390
Section 2339B prohibits providing material support to designated
foreign terrorist organizations ("FT0"). 391 This statute prohibits
knowingly providing material support and resources to a FT0. 392
Additionally, financial institutions that become aware that they have
control over accounts of a FTO must freeze those funds and report to
the Secretary of State. 393 The Secretary of State may designate an
FTO if he finds that: first, the organization is foreign based; second,
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and, third, this activity
threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 394 The
U.S. Code primarily defines terrorist activity as premeditated,
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. 395

381. Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 September 11, 2011, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 13 (2011)
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/O/Documents/TTRC320Ten3
20Year%20Issue.pdf (listing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B as the
second and third most prosecuted terrorism related offenses, after 18
U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy. Since 2009, §§2339A and 2339B have been
the first and second most prosecuted offenses).

387. § 2339A(a) (allowing for a life sentence if the death of a person results
from the prohibited act).

382. §§ 2339A, 2339B (proscribing acts of providing resources to terrorists).

388. Id.

383. Id.
384. § 2339A (codifying the offense of providing material support to
terrorists).
385. § 2339B (barring providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations).
386. § 2339A (noting the qualifying provisions, including: §§ 32, 37, 81, 175,
229, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930 (c), 956, 1091, 1114,
1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281,
2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, or 2442 of title 18, § 236 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2284), § 46502 or 60123 (b) of
title 49 or any offense listed in § 2332b (g) (5) (B) (except for sections
2339A 'and 2339B) or in preparation for, or in carryin~ ou~, the
concealment of an escape from the commission of any such v10lat10n, or
attempts or conspires to do such an act.).

389. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (listing predicate offenses).
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390. § 2339A(b)(l) (defining "support").
391. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
392. § 2339B(a)(l) (describing prohibited conduct).
393. § 2339B(a)(2) (stating the conditions under which financial institutions
must report possession of funds).
394. 8 U~S.C. § 1189(a)(l) (2006); see also Foreign Terrorist Organizations, .
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 28, 2012)
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
(noting
the
current list of FTOs and the procedure that the Secretary of State
follows to designate them as such).
395. 22

u.s.c. § 2656f(d)(2)

(2006).
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2332b(g)(5)(B), are also included as predicate offenses in the ~aterial
support to terrorism statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
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2.

Material Support to Terrorism Statutes

One of the most successful prosecutorial methods in combating
terrorism is the use of the material-support statutes. 381 These laws
work well as a prevention method because they inhibit the flow of
resources to a terrorist group, 382 which hampers the ability to carry
out attacks. Outlawing material support to terrorists is comprised
383
primarily of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
Section
2339A outlaws providing material support or resources, when the
provider knows that the support will be used to carry out of a
334
violation of certain offenses deemed to rise to the level of terrorism.
Section 2339B outlaws the provision of any support or resources to
designated terrorist organizations. 385
•
.
.
.
Section 2339A is applicable to cyber-terronsm m two s1tuat10ns.
First use of a computer to aid a terrorist is technically a qualifying
violation of the statute. 386 Thus, one who provides computer training
or support to a terrorist organization, knowing that the organization
intends to use that training to prepare for or perform an act of
terrorism, would violate § 2339A, which poses a punishment of up to

380. Compare the predicate offenses listed in §2332b(g)(5)(B), with the
predicate offenses listed in§ 2339A, and § 2339B.
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fifteen years in prison. 387
More directly relevant is the second
situation.
Section 2339A incorporates two CFAA provisions as
predicate offenses. 388 The statute includes "any offense listed in §
2332b(g)(5)(B)," which, as seen above, incorporates§ 1030(a)(l), and
§ 1030(a)(5)(A). 389 Under § 2339A, providing any kind of material
support includes:
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses,
false
documentation
or
identification,
communications
equipment,
facilities,
weapons,
lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine
or religious materials. 390
Section 2339B prohibits providing material support to designated
foreign terrorist organizations ("FT0"). 391 This statute prohibits
knowingly providing material support and resources to a FT0. 392
Additionally, financial institutions that become aware that they have
control over accounts of a FTO must freeze those funds and report to
the Secretary of State. 393 The Secretary of State may designate an
FTO if he finds that: first, the organization is foreign based; second,
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and, third, this activity
threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 394 The
U.S. Code primarily defines terrorist activity as premeditated,
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. 395

381. Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 September 11, 2011, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 13 (2011)
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/O/Documents/TTRC320Ten3
20Year320Issue.pdf (listing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B as the
second and third most prosecuted terrorism related offenses, after 18
U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy. Since 2009, §§2339A and 2339B have been
the first and second most prosecuted offenses).

387. § 2339A(a) (allowing for a life sentence if the death of a person results
from the prohibited act).

382. §§ 2339A, 2339B (proscribing acts of providing resources to terrorists).

388. Id.

383. Id.
384. § 2339A (codifying the offense of providing material support to
terrorists).
385. § 2339B (barring providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations).
386. § 2339A (noting the qualifying provisions, including: §§ 32, 37, 81, 175,
229, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930 (c), 956, 1091, 1114,
1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281,
2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, or 2442 of title 18, § 236 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2284), § 46502 or 60123 (b) of
title 49 or any offense listed in § 2332b (g) (5) (B) (except for sections
2339A 'and 2339B) or in preparation for, or in carryin~ ou~, the
concealment of an escape from the commission of any such v1olat10n, or
attempts or conspires to do such an act.).

389. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (listing predicate offenses).
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390. § 2339A(b)(l) (defining "support").
391. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
392. § 2339B(a)(l) (describing prohibited conduct).
393. § 2339B(a)(2) (stating the conditions under which financial institutions
must report possession of funds).
394. 8 U:S.C. § 1189(a)(l) (2006); see also Foreign Terrorist Organizations, ·
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 28, 2012)
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
(noting
the
current list of FTOs and the procedure that the Secretary of State
follows to designate them as such).
395. 22

u.s.c.

§ 2656f(d)(2) (2006).
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When looking to prevent cyber-terrorism, the downside of this
statute is twofold. First, the statute requires that the organization
396
be foreign-based.
It can be difficult to define whether a cyberterrorist organization is foreign or domestic, given the lack of physical
infrastructure required to maintain the organization. Theoretically,
no training camps are required and the members do not even need. to
reside in the same place. However, this could cut both ways, as
almost every hacking organization is, at least in part, foreign.
Second, it is unclear whether this definition of terrorist activity
could include cyber-terrorism.
The statute does not explicitly
mention CNA, and the statute's definition of terrorism requires
397
violence.
As previously discussed, CNA may result in fear and
anxiety among the populace without producing violent effects.
It remains uncertain how much utility the material support
statutes· would have in combating cyber-terrorism. CNA is clearly
included in § 2339A, but the applicability of § 2339B to cyberterrorism is much less clear. This Article will discuss in Section V(A)
how the material-support statutes can be amended to make them a
more valuable tool in preventing cyber-terrorism.
3.

Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224

Under Executive Order 13224 and related regulations, the
Executive branch can attach the label of Specially Designated Global
Terrorist ("SDGT") to terrorist groups, individuals acting as part of a
terrorist organization, and other entities providing financial support
398
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
or assistance.
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, may designate
foreign individuals or entities that have been determined to have
committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism
tha~ threa~en the security of U.S. nationals or the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States. 399 Additionally, the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, may designate as "Specially Designated
Nationals" ("SDN") individuals or entities that are determined "to be
owned or controlled by, or act for or on behalf of" an individual or
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entity so designated. 40° Further, the Secretary of State may deem it
appropriate to add those, with the approval of the Secretary of
Treasury, who "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for . . . acts of terrorism" or individuals or
entities so designated; or who are found "to be otherwise associated
with" certain individuals or entities designated in or under the
Order. 401 Most SDGTs and SDNs are foreign persons, but the late
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, was mistakenly designated as an
SDGT. 402
Executive Order 13224 defines terrorism as an activity that
involves "a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure." 403 The act must "appearD to be intended - (A) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking. "404
Here the applicability of Executive Order 13224 to cyberterrorism depends upon the interpretation of its provision that that
the attack be "an act dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure. "405 If the Government considers data to be property
and information systems to be infrastructure, then the Executive
Order could certainly apply to cyber-terrorism.
4.

Conspiracy

There are two conspiracy statutes that are directly applicable to
cyber-terrorism: 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit an offense or
to defraud the United States; 406 and 18 U.S.C. § 956, conspiracy to
kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign
400. Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/
Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#l 7 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2013)
(answering the question "[w]hat is an SDN?" as "a list of individuals
and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of,
targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as
terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are
not country-specific").

396. § 2339B(a)(l) (noting the "foreign" requirement of the statute).

401. Id.

397. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A (2006) (noting a list of predicate outcomes which
include violence).
'

402. Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons List, OFF. OF
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
ofac/downloads/tllsdn.pdf.

398. Office of the Spokesman, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
'
prs/ps/2010/09/146554.htm (describing the procedure for designation as
a SDGT).

403. See Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note 399, at§ 3(d).
404. Id.
405. Id.

399. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
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u.s.c. § 371

(2012).
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When looking to prevent cyber-terrorism, the downside of this
statute is twofold. First, the statute requires that the organization
396
be foreign-based.
It can be difficult to define whether a cyberterrorist organization is foreign or domestic, given the lack of physical
infrastructure required to maintain the organization. Theoretically,
no training camps are required and the members do not even need. to
reside in the same place. However, this could cut both ways, as
almost every hacking organization is, at least in part, foreign.
Second, it is unclear whether this definition of terrorist activity
could include cyber-terrorism.
The statute does not explicitly
mention CNA, and the statute's definition of terrorism requires
397
violence.
As previously discussed, CNA may result in fear and
anxiety among the populace without producing violent effects.
It remains uncertain how much utility the material support
statutes· would have in combating cyber-terrorism. CNA is clearly
included in § 2339A, but the applicability of § 2339B to cyberterrorism is much less clear. This Article will discuss in Section V(A)
how the material-support statutes can be amended to make them a
more valuable tool in preventing cyber-terrorism.
3.

Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224

Under Executive Order. 13224 and related regulations, the
Executive branch can attach the label of Specially Designated Global
Terrorist ("SDGT") to terrorist groups, individuals acting as part of a
terrorist organization, and other entities providing financial support
398
or assistance.
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, may designate
foreign individuals or entities that have been determined to have
committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism
that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States. 399 Additionally, the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, may designate as "Specially Designated
Nationals" ("SDN") individuals or entities that are determined "to be
owned or controlled by, or act for or on behalf of" an individual or
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entity so designated. 40° Further, the Secretary of State may deem it
appropriate to add those, with the approval of the Secretary of
Treasury, who "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for . . . acts of terrorism" or individuals or
entities so designated; or who are found "to be otherwise associated
with" certain individuals or entities designated in or under the
Order. 401 Most SDGTs and SDNs are foreign persons, but the late
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, was mistakenly designated as an
SDGT. 402
Executive Order 13224 defines terrorism as an activity that
involves "a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure." 403 The act must "appearO to be intended - (A) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ( C) to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking. "404
Here the applicability of Executive Order 13224 to cyberterrorism depends upon the interpretation of its provision that that
the attack be "an act dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure. "405 If the Government considers data to be property
and information systems to be infrastructure, then the Executive
Order could certainly apply to cyber-terrorism.
4.

Conspiracy

There are two conspiracy statutes that are directly applicable to
cyber-terrorism: 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit an offense or
to defraud the United States; 406 and 18 U.S.C. § 956, conspiracy to
kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign
400. Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/
Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#l 7 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2013)
(answering the question "[w]hat is an SDN?" as "a list of individuals
and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of,
targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as
terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are
not country-specific").

396. § 2339B(a)(l) (noting the "foreign" requirement of the statute).

401. Id.

397. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A (2006) (noting a list of predicate outcomes which
include violence).
'

402. Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons List, OFF. OF
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
ofac/downloads/tllsdn.pdf.

398. Office of the Spokesman, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
'
prs/ps/2010/09/146554.htm (describing the procedure for designation as
a SDGT).

403. See Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note 399, at§ 3(d).
404. Id.
405. Id.

399. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
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country. 407 Although it does not apply directly to terrorism, the
Government prosecuted most terrorist crimes under § 371 in the ten
years following 9/11. 408 Given that any act of cyber-terrorism is
covered, at a minimum under the CFAA, there are no obstacles in
using§ 371 to combat cyber-terrorism.
However, it is less apparent how the DoJ may use § 956 to charge
a group conspiring to commit an act of cyber-terrorism in a foreign
cov.ntry. Section 956(b) criminalizes any conspiracy:
[T]o damage or destroy specific property situated within a
foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to any
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, or other
public utility, public conveyance, or public structure, or any
religious, educational, or cultural property so situated[.] 409
This statute focuses on property belonging to foreign governments
and certain segments of infrastructure. 410 It is unclear whether this
statute would apply to damage to the data contained on information
systems.
SECTION

V.

INCORPORATING CYBER-TERRORISM INTO
CURRENT LAW

"Better to be ·despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too
confident security. "4 11

Section V examined the applicability of current cyber-crime and
counter-terror laws to counter cyber-terrorism. This examination
revealed several important gaps in those laws that might prevent the
Government from using them in the fight against cyber-terrorism.
The previous Section also found that these laws do not provide an
adequate focus on the prevention of cyber-terrorism. To help remedy
this, Section V proposes that this Article's definition of cyberterrorism be incorporated into some of the most frequently-used
counter-terrorism laws, thereby filling those gaps and providing tools
to law enforcement officials for the prevention of cyber-terrorism.
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A.

Material Support to Terrorism Statutes

As previously discussed, the material support statutes have
proven to be some of the Government's most effective tools in the
counter-terrorism toolkit. The DoJ has referred to the material
support to terrorism statutes412 as "[o]ne of the cornerstones of our
prosecution efforts" in the battle against terrorism. 413
As a
demonstration of the statute's effectiveness in combating terrorism,
the DoJ quoted a defendant charged under the material support
statutes, who made the following statement in conversation with an
informant:
[T]he reason it was not organized is, couldn't be organized as it
should've been, is because we don't have support. Everybody's
scared to give up any money to help us. . . . Because of the law
that Bush wrote about, you know, supporting terrorism . . .
Everybody's scared . . . . [Bush] made a law that say, for
instance, I left out of the country and I fought, right, but I
wasn't able to afford a ticket but you bought my plane ticket,
you gave me the money to do it . . . . By me going and me
fighting and doing that they can, by this new law, they can
come and take you and put you in jail for supporting what they
call terrorism. 414
Given the success of these statutes the Government should be use
it in countering cyber-terrorism. 415 The gaps previously identified in§
2339B 416 should be remedied to allow the proper authority to
designate cyber-terrorist organizations.
The two main problems
preventing this are the definitions of terrorism, 417 and the requirement
that designated organizations be foreign. 418

412. See text and accompanying notes supra Section IV(C)(2).
413. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 14 (2006).
414. Id. at 15.
415. As discussed supra Section IV(C)(2), cyber-terrorism is covered under §
2339A by incorporating provisions of the CFAA as predicate offenses.

407. 18

u.s.c.

§ 956 (2012).

408. Terrorist
Trial Report
Card,
supra note 381, at
13,
http://www.lawandsecurity .org/Portals / 0/Documents /TTRC%20Ten 3
20Year%20Issue.pdf.
409. § 956(b).
410. Id.

411. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
(1890).

344

IN

FRANCE 11

416. It is less certain is whether a cyber-terrorist organization could be
designated as a FTO by the Secretary of State as applied under §
2339B. See supra Section IV(C)(2).
417. 22

u.s.c.

§ 2656f(d)(l)-(2) (2006).

418. To be designated as a FTO, the organization in question must meet the
following requirements: 1) the organization is a foreign organization; 2)
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and 3) the terrorist
activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1189(a) (2006).
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country. 407 Although it does not apply directly to terrorism, the
Government prosecuted most terrorist crimes under § 371 in the ten
years following 9/11. 408 Given that any act of cyber-terrorism is
covered, at a minimum under the CFAA, there are no obstacles in
using§ 371 to combat cyber-terrorism.
However, it is less apparent how the DoJ may use § 956 to charge
a group conspiring to commit an act of cyber-terrorism in a foreign
col).ntry. Section 956(b) criminalizes any conspiracy:
[T]o damage or destroy specific property situated within a
foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to any
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, or other
public utility, public conveyance, or public structure, or any
religious, educational, or cultural property so situated[.] 409
This statute focuses on property belonging to foreign governments
and certain segments of infrastructure. 410 It is unclear whether this
statute would apply to damage to the data contained on information
systems.
SECTION

V.

INCORPORATING CYB ER- TERRORISM INTO
CURRENT LAW

"Better to be ·despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too
confident security. "4 11

Section V examined the applicability of current cyber-crime and
counter-terror laws to counter cyber-terrorism. This examination
revealed several important gaps in those laws that might prevent the
Government from using them in the fight against cyber-terrorism.
The previous Section also found that these laws do not provide an
adequate focus on the prevention of cyber-terrorism. To help remedy
this, Section V proposes that this Article's definition of cyberterrorism be incorporated into some of the most frequently-used
counter-terrorism laws, thereby filling those gaps and providing tools
to law enforcement officials for the prevention of cyber-terrorism.
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proven to be some of the Government's most effective tools in the
counter-terrorism toolkit. The DoJ has referred to the material
support to terrorism statutes412 as "[o]ne of the cornerstones of our
prosecution efforts" in the battle against terrorism. 413
As a
demonstration of the statute's effectiveness in combating terrorism,
the DoJ quoted a defendant charged under the material support
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should've been, is because we don't have support. Everybody's
scared to give up any money to help us .... Because of the law
that Bush wrote about, you know, supporting terrorism . . .
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you gave me the money to do it . . . . By me going and me
fighting and doing that they can, by this new law, they can
come and take you and put you in jail for supporting what they
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Given the success of these statutes the Government should be use
it in countering cyber-terrorism. 415 The gaps previously identified in§
2339B 416 should be remedied to allow the proper authority to
designate cyber-terrorist organizations.
The two main problems
preventing this are the definitions of terrorism, 417 and the requirement
that designated organizations be foreign. 418
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2339B. See supra Section IV(C)(2).
417. 22

u.s.c.

§ 2656f(d)(l)-(2) (2006).

418. To be designated as a FTO, the organization in question must meet the
following requirements: 1) the organization is a foreign organization; 2)
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and 3) the terrorist
activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1189(a) (2006).
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The first step is incorporating cyber-terrorism into the definition
of terrorism used in the statute regarding designation of a FTO:
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. "419
As previously discussed, the violence requirement effectively precludes
many potential acts of cyber-terrorism. If the proposed definition of
cyber-terrorism were included along with the definition of terrorism,
the Secretary of State could then designate foreign organizations that
engage in cyber-terrorist activity as terrorist groups.
However,
identifying cyber-terrorist organizations as foreign is difficult due to
the attribution dilemma-hacker organizations such as Anonymous
and LulzSec are distributed worldwide with no specific locus. 420
Given the issue of identifying the precise locus of cyber-terrorist
organizations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 should also be amended with respect to
cyber-terrorist organizations and the definition of "foreign
421
organizations. "
If Congress updated the phrase to "the organization
is a foreign organization or conducts operations primarily through
cyberspace," it would resolve the difficult question of whether a cyberterrorist group is foreign. However, the inevitable question resulting
from this revision would be: Why include domestic cyber-terrorist
groups, but not other types of domestic terrorist organizations? One
answer is that cyber-terrorist groups operate from different locations
around the world with no specific physical center and may include
both domestic and foreign members.
In addition to an exception for domestic cyber-terrorist groups,
another counter-argument to the proposed change is that outlawing
material support would have little effect in stopping a cyber-terrorist
organ:ization. Preventing the flow of money and training to a group
of advanced computer hackers will not hinder operations the way it
does to a traditional terrorist group, which needs travel funds,
weapons, and a base of operations. However, one counter to this
theory is an advanced cyber-weapon. Stuxnet, the malware that
damaged the Iranian nuclear centrifuges, was estimated to have cost
one million dollars to produce, and likely needed the backing of nation
422
If the definition of cyber-terrorism is limited to only those
states.
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major attacks with serious effects, then it is false to believe that a
portion of these attacks would not require large amounts of financial
and logistical support.
Preventing the flow of resources to
organizations capable of mounting large-scale attacks should be a
priority.
B.

Amend FISA 's definition of international terrorism

The Government did not pass the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") 423 as a counter-terrorism tool, but rather as
a means to collect intelligence on foreign powers. However, with the
rise of international terrorist organizations in the last two decades,
and amendments such as "lone wolf" provision, 424 FISA has become an
important counter-terrorism tool.
FISA allows for the electronic surveillance of a foreign power,
within the United States, for the purpose of collecting intelligence
information without a Title III warrant. 425 The definition of a foreign
power under the statute includes groups that are "engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. "426 Also
included are "agent[s] of a foreign power," which, under the statute
so-called lone-wolf provision, includes "any person other than a
United States person, who ... engages in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefore. "427
FISA's definition of
international terrorism contains the following phrase: "activities that
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, "428 which makes
this definition ambiguous as to whether it applies to cyber-terrorism.
The definition could exclude a non-violent cyber-terrorist attack, such
as the destruction of financial or national security data.
FISA's increased importance over the last decade is evident from
the rising number of FISA warrants granted. 429 In 1998, the courts

423. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2012).

420. See Keating, supra note 100.

424. § 1801(b)(l)(C); ELIZABETH BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22011,
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004:
"LONE WOLF" AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2004).

421. See § 1189.

425. § 1802(a)(l).

419. § 2656f(d)(2).

422. Ben Flanagan, Former CIA Chief speaks out on Iran Stuxnet attack,
THE NATIONAL (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/
thenationalconversation/industry-insights/technology/former-cia-chiefspeaks-out-on-iran-stuxnet-attack (referring to statements by General·
Michael Hayden, former head of the National Security Agency, in which
he stated that "the precision with which Stuxnet targeted Iran mean
that "responsible nations" could not be excluded").
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426. § 1801(a)(4).
427. § 1801(b)(l)(C).
428. § 1801(c)(l).
429. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Count Orders 1979-2011,
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.
(last .updated May 4,
2012)
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html
(charting the
number of FISA warrants applied for each year).
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"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. "419
As previously discussed, the violence requirement effectively precludes
many potential acts of cyber-terrorism. If the proposed definition of
cyber-terrorism were included along with the definition of terrorism,
the Secretary of State could then designate foreign organizations that
engage in cyber-terrorist activity as terrorist groups.
However,
identifying cyber-terrorist organizations as foreign is difficult due to
the attribution dilemma-hacker organizations such as Anonymous
and LulzSec are distributed worldwide with no specific locus. 420
Given the issue of identifying the precise locus of cyber-terrorist
organizations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 should also be amended with respect to
cyber-terrorist organizations and the definition of "foreign
421
organizations. "
If Congress updated the phrase to "the organization
is a foreign organization or conducts operations primarily through
cyberspace," it would resolve the difficult question of whether a cyberterrorist group is foreign. However, the inevitable question resulting
from this revision would be: Why include domestic cyber-terrorist
groups, but not other types of domestic terrorist organizations? One
answer is that cyber-terrorist groups operate from different locations
around the world with no specific physical center and may include
both domestic and foreign members.
In addition to an exception for domestic cyber-terrorist groups,
another counter-argument to the proposed change is that outlawing
material support would have little effect in stopping a cyber-terrorist
organization. Preventing the flow of money and training to a group
of advanced computer hackers will not hinder operations the way it
does to a traditional terrorist group, which needs travel funds,
weapons, and a base of operations. However, one counter to this
theory is an advanced cyber-weapon. Stuxnet, the malware that
damaged the Iranian nuclear centrifuges, was estimated to have cost
one million dollars to produce, and likely needed the backing of nation
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states.
If the definition of cyber-terrorism is limited to only those
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major attacks with serious effects, then it is false to believe that a
portion of these attacks would not require large amounts of financial
and logistical support.
Preventing the flow of resources to
organizations capable of mounting large-scale attacks should be a
priority.
B.

Amend FISA 's definition of international terrorism

The Government did not pass the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") 423 as a counter-terrorism tool, but rather as
a means to collect intelligence on foreign powers. However, with the
rise of international terrorist organizations in the last two decades,
and amendments such as "lone wolf" provision, 424 FISA has become an
important counter-terrorism tool.
FISA allows for the electronic surveillance of a foreign power,
within the United States, for the purpose of collecting intelligence
information without a Title III warrant. 425 The definition of a foreign
power under the statute includes groups that are "engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. "426 Also
included are "agent[s] of a foreign power," which, under the statute
so-called lone-wolf provision, includes "any person other than a
United States person, who ... engages in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefore. "427
FISA's definition of
international terrorism contains the following phrase: "activities that
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, "428 which makes
this definition ambiguous as to whether it applies to cyber-terrorism.
The definition could exclude a non-violent cyber-terrorist attack, such
as the destruction of financial or national security data.
FISA's increased importance over the last decade is evident from
the rising number of FISA warrants granted. 429 In 1998, the courts
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420. See Keating, supra note 100.
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Michael Hayden, former head of the National Security Agency, in which
he stated that "the precision with which Stuxnet targeted Iran mean
that "responsible nations" could not be excluded").
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granted 800 FISA warrants. 430 By 2008, that number was over
431
2000.
The ability to conduct electronic surveillance on those
suspected of terrorism is invaluable to both prevent terrorist activities
and lead law enforcement officials to those who support terrorists.
FISA would be particularly useful against organizations that operate·
primarily in the electronic realm, and therefore should be expanded to
cover cyber-terrorism.
Congress should amend FISA to include as a foreign power groups
"engaged in international terrorism, cyber-terrorism, or activities in
preparation thereof." The lone-wolf provision should similarly be
Adding cyber-terrorism to
amended to include cyber-terrorism.
FISA's definition of international terrorism would be an important
step in making FISA an effective tool to prevent cyber-terrorism.
C.

Conspiracy

Using 18 U.S.C. § 956, "conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or
injure persons or damage property in a foreign country," 432 against
cyber-terrorism is problematic because it is unclear if the phrase "to
damage or destroy specific property" or "other public utility" would
include damage to data contained in information systems. This
statute could be amended to more clearly cover cyber-terrorism in two
different ways, one broad and one narrow. The broad solution would
be to include "information systems related both to foreign
governments and operation of the included infrastructure
components" in the litany of included targets.
This inclusion,
however, would include minor CNA, such as denial of service attacks.
This would undermine the intent of this particular statute. The
narrow solution would be to add a clause to § 956 that amends it to
read:
To damage or destroy specific property through any physical
means or act of cyber-terrorism, situated within a foreign
country and belonging to a foreign government or to any
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, economic
data system, or other public utility, utility control system,
public conveyance, or public structure, or any religious,
educational, or cultural property so situated.
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This clause would criminalize an act of cyber-terrorism, as defined
by this Article, that is directed against a foreign state's economic
system or infrastructure control system, such as its SCADA control.
However, this significantly narrows the qualifying types of CNA that
can rise to the level of cyber-terrorism.
D.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

As seen with the Stuxnet virus, the effects of cyber-weapons may
equal. those of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"). Although
WMD are often thought of as chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons ("CBRN"), the definition under 18 U.S.C. § 2332A
of a WMD 433 is much broader. Along with the CBRN type weapons,
the statute includes a wide variety of destructive devices as defined
under 18 U.S.C. § 921, including bombs and grenades. 434 Thus, WMD
is not as narrow a category as the public believes. However, CNA is
not included in§ 2332A, or in the WMD definition under the FISA, 435
unless these statutes encompass a CNA that causes the release of
chemical, biological, or radiological substance.
Despite the lack of statutory inclusion, there are indications that
cyber-weapons could be another form of WMD. As recently as
January 2009, former Director of National Intelligence, Mike
McConnell, equated cyber-weapons with WMD when he expr~sse,d
concern about terrorists' use of technology to degrade the nations
infrastructure. 436 Director McConnell noted that terrorists aim to
damage infrastructure and "when the level of sophistication reaches a
point that there could be strategic damage to the United States, and
that time is not too far off. "437
Congress could easily remedy this exclusion by adding cyberweapons designed to cause cyber-terrorism to the statutes that
include WMD in the U.S. Code. Again, however, the added definition
should exclude all but the most serious CNA from its scope.
Incorporating these types of weapons into the definition of WMD
criminalizes the use of any cyber-weapon by or against a national of
the United States. This amendment would also bring an extraterritorial statute into the legal arsenal of law enforcement and help
address the jurisdictional dilemma posed by CNA. Incorporating this

430. Report from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to Hon.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29,
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency /doj/fisa/
1998rept.html.

434. § 2332A(c)(2)(A).

431. Report from Ronald Weich, Ass't. Att'y Gen. of the United States, to
Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate (May 14, 2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2008rept.pdf.

436. Interview by Charlie Rose with Mike McConnell, Director of National
Intelligence, on The Charlie Rose Show - PBS (Jan. 8, 2009) (including
cyber-weapons with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons as the
four things with the highest ability to degrade the infrastructure).

432. See supra Section V(C)(4), for a discussion of conspiracy statutes.

348

433. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A(c)(2) (2012).
435. § 1801(p).

437. Id.
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granted 800 FISA warrants. 430 By 2008, that number was over
431
The ability to conduct electronic surveillance on those
2000.
suspected of terrorism is invaluable to both prevent terrorist activities
and lead law enforcement officials to those who support terrorists.
FISA would be particularly useful against organizations that operate
primarily in the electronic realm, and therefore should be expanded to
cover cyber-terrorism.
Congress should amend FISA to include as a foreign power groups
"engaged in international terrorism, cyber-terrorism, or activities in
preparation thereof." The lone-wolf provision should similarly be
amended to include cyber-terrorism.
Adding cyber-terrorism to
FISA's definition of international terrorism would be an important
step in making FISA an effective tool to prevent cyber-terrorism.
C.

Conspiracy

Using 18 U.S.C. § 956, "conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or
injure persons or damage property in a foreign country, "432 against
cyber-terrorism is problematic because it is unclear if the phrase "to
damage or destroy specific property" or "other public utility" would
include damage to data contained in information systems. This
statute could be amended to more clearly cover cyber-terrorism in two
different ways, one broad and one narrow. The broad solution would
be to include "information systems related both to foreign
governments and operation of the included infrastructure
components" in the litany of included targets.
This inclusion,
however, would include minor CNA, such as denial of service attacks.
This would undermine the intent of this particular statute. The
narrow solution would be to add a clause to § 956 that amends it to
read:
To damage or destroy specific property through any physical
means or act of cyber-terrorism, situated within a foreign
country and belonging to a foreign government or to any
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, economic
data system, or other public utility, utility control system,
public conveyance, or public structure, or any religious,
educational, or cultural property so situated.
430. Report from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to Hon.
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29,
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/
1998rept.html.
431. Report from Ronald Weich, Ass't. Att'y Gen. of the United States, to
Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate (May 14, 2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2008rept.pdf.
432. See supra Section V(C)(4), for a discussion of conspiracy statutes.
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This clause would criminalize an act of cyber-terrorism, as defined
by this Article, that is directed against a foreign state's economic
system or infrastructure control system, such as its SCADA control.
However, this significantly narrows the qualifying types of CN A that
can rise to the level of cyber-terrorism.
D.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

As seen with the Stuxnet virus, the effects of cyber-weapons may
equal those of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"). Although
WMD are often thought of as chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons ("CBRN"), the definition under 18 U.S.C. § 2332A
of a WMD 433 is much broader. Along with the CBRN type weapons,
the statute includes a wide variety of destructive devices as defined
under 18 U.S.C. § 921, including bombs and grenades. 434 Thus, WMD
is not as narrow a category as the public believes. However, CNA is
not included in§ 2332A, or in the WMD definition under the FISA, 435
unless these statutes encompass a CNA that causes the release of
chemical, biological, or radiological substance.
Despite the lack of statutory inclusion, there are indications that
cyber-weapons could be another form of WMD. As recently as
January 2009, former Director of National Intelligence, Mike
McConnell, equated cyber-weapons with WMD when he expressed
concern about terrorists' use of technology to degrade the nation's
infrastructure. 436 Director McConnell noted that terrorists aim to
damage infrastructure and "when the level of sophistication reaches a
point that there could be strategic damage to the United States, and
that time is not too far off. "437
Congress could easily remedy this exclusion by adding cyberweapons designed to cause cyber-terrorism to the statutes that
include WMD in the U.S. Code. Again, however, the added definition
should exclude all but the most serious CNA from its scope.
Incorporating these types of weapons into the definition of WMD
criminalizes the use of any cyber-weapon by or against a national of
the United States. This amendment would also bring an extraterritorial statute into the legal arsenal of law enforcement and help
address the jurisdictional dilemma posed by CNA. Incorporating this

433. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A(c)(2) (2012).
434. § 2332A(c)(2)(A).
435. § 1801(p).
436. Interview by Charlie Rose with Mike McConnell, Director of National
Intelligence, on The Charlie Rose Show - PBS (Jan. 8, 2009) (including
cyber-weapons with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons as the
four things with the highest ability to degrade the infrastructure).
437. Id.
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definition into the FISA would bring those who develop or proliferate
in cyber-terrorism weapons under the jurisdiction of the FISA.
CONCLUSION

From hacktivists who wish to make a political point by
temporarily altering websites, 438 to foreign governments and
corporations wishing to steal valuable intellectual property, 439 to
common criminals wishing to steal credit card information for
440
financial gain, the motivations behind CNA are almost as broad as
the various uses of the Internet. Given the broad range of CNA, the
tendency has been to seek legal responses that cover these crimes as a
whole. Just as non-Internet related activities such as espionage, theft
of intellectual property, financial crimes, and terrorism have each
developed unique legal regimes to deal with the particularities of each
crime, so have different types of cyber-crimes. However, a notable
exception is cyber-terrorism, which has yet to be defined in the U.S.
Code.
Despite certain sections of the CFAA being listed as predicate
offenses in the federal crime of terrorism, the resulting applicability is
narrow and does little to address the prevention of cyber-terrorism.
As terrorist organizations become more sophisticated in the field of
information technology, it will only be a matter of time before they
attempt to use information systems to conduct terrorist activities.
These attacks could be broad-based denial of service attacks such as
the attacks on Estonia, 441 or they could be narrow malware attacks on
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As of yet, there has not been a cyber-terrorist event in the United
States, but this should not stop Congress from enacting legislation to
help prevent cyber-terrorism. The first step in any such legislation
must be a careful definition of cyber-terrorism. This Article proposes
a definition that is broad enough to cover the potentially unique
effects of a weapon of cyber-terrorism, while narrow enough to
exclude CNAs that are relatively minor in nature; a definition that is
either too broad or too narrow risks being either irrelevant or useless.
Once a proper definition is agreed upon, it can be incorporated
into existing counter-terrorism legislation. Material-support statutes,
the FISA, conspiracy, and WMD statutes all hold the potential to
prevent cyber-terrorism, but must first incorporate cyber-terrorism
into their definitions and coverage. A formal legal definition will also
allow government agencies to operate from a common standard in
developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for countering cyberterrorism.
These steps will obviously not provide all the tools needed to stop
cyber-terrorists. Increased cyber-security aimed at government and
critical infrastructure information systems and greater information
sharing are important requirements in stopping cyber-terrorists.
Potential laws aimed at requiring widespread use of data encryption
also hold potential for stopping would-be cyber-terrorists. But just as
the fight against terrorism has left no stone unturned in finding ways
to defeat terrorists, so should the fight against cyber-terrorists. The
fact that there has not yet been a "cyber 9/11" should not deter
government taking the extremely important steps of defining the
problem and using the definition to amend existing counter-terrorism
statutes.
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